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ABSTRACT 
This work argues that leading forms of contemporary 
moral realism are inadequate, and that the ph~1osoph~ca2 at· 
tempt to vindicate the naive moral realism implicit within 
popular ethical opinion is misguided. In their place a form 
of moral anti-realism is defended which construes the appro· 
priateness or inappropriateness of moral practices and the 
correctness or incorrectness of moral judgments as relative 
to linguistic conventions, but it is also argued that such 
relativism does not undermine the objectivity of moral truth 
if one is prepared to adopt Blackburn's (1984) quasi-realist 
conception of ontological comnitment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Moral claims (or statements) and the moral practices 
into which they are woven form an essential part of our 
lives. However, the relationship between moral language and 
practice has not typically been appreciated. in that there has 
been a tendency (especially on the part of moral realists) to 
view moral sentences in isolation and not to realize that a 
complete understanding of moral claims requires an under-
standing of their function within a context among speakers. 
A commonplace view, shared by philosophers and non-philoso-
phers alike, is that our actions, our institutions, the 
virtues and vices we as persons exhibit--in a word, our moral 
practices--are one thing, whereas what we s8yabout these 
things, the questions we raise, the conunands we utter--in 
general, our moral discourse--is quite another thing. It is 
thought that our moral practices depend for neither their ex-
istence nor their correctness or incorrectness upon the exis-
tence and nature of moral discourse. It is thought, for ex-
ample, that the practice of infanticide is (or is not) moral-
ly permissible independent of persons' abilities to recognize 
and assert as much. On this view, the truth or falsehood of 
moral statements (•Infanticide is wrong."), the appropriate-
ness or inappropriateness of moral commands ( 0 Do not practice 
infanticide!•), the relevance or irrelevance of a moral ques-
tion (•Should we commit infanticide?•) is not dependent upon 
the capacities of language-users or the conventions of any 
linguistic cormnunity. I call this view D8~ve mor81 re81~s.m. 
It is informed by an uncritical but natural attitude toward 
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moral discourse and the moral practices to which it apparent-
ly refers. It is uncritical in the sense that it is typical-
ly not adopted as the result of rational deliberation, but 
that is natural: generally speaking children do not learn to 
attach a realistic semantic interpretation to moral discourse 
by convincing themselves of the truth of PrjJZCj'p.ia Eth.ica. 
It is this common sense view which meta-ethicists as diverse 
as Moore (1903), Boyd (1988) and Brink (1989) seek to vindi-
cate. One of the principal theses of this dissertation is 
that the vindication of moral discourse and moral practice 
(what together with their relation I refer to as mora.l.itYJ is 
neither possible nor necessary. I shall argue, instead, for 
what may (after Arrington, 1989) be called the autonomy of 
mora.l.i ty. 
Arguments against the poss.ib.i.l.ityof vindicating naive 
moral realism fall into two categories: there is a body of 
criticism against spec.ifj'c foundational forms of realism, and 
there are more general criticisms, stemming from 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which call into question the 
very idea of foundationalist epistemology itself. 
With respect to the first line of criticism, a number of 
specific realisms defended during the Twentieth Century will 
be presented and criticized. The foundationalist moral re-
alisms of the Twentieth Century can be classified according 
to their epistemological forbears as rationalist, intuition-
ist and empiricist. The rationalists--Gewirth (1978), Gert, 
(1966) and Donagan (1977) --are to some degree or other de-
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scendents of the Cartesian tradition. 1 Like Descartes, they 
hold that one's beliefs tibout one's beliefs may be incorrigi-
ble and that the contents of one's beliefs may exhibit cer-
tain features (like Descartes' own criteria of clarity and 
distinctness) which guarantee correspondence between mental 
contents and facts which make such contents true. Against 
such views it will be argued that if justification requires 
internal certifiability, then an infinite regress is generat-
ed that precludes the possibility of an adequate foundation. 
Just this sort of argument has been offered against corre-
spondence theories of truth by philosophers as diverse as 
Kant (1787), Frege (1897), and Moore (1899). I do not be-
lieve that these arguments undermine the possibility of there 
be.ing correspondence (that is, of the possibility of truth as 
being a kind of correspondence) so much as they undermine the 
possibility of Jcnor1edgs being correspondence that is inter-
nally certifiable. Knowledge and true belief are not the 
same thing. Nevertheless, the argument does cut against the 
project of vindicating naive moral realism, if that project 
is construed as one of providing morality with a foundation 
of this sort. 
Intuitionists, like G. E. Moore, tend to be direct, 
rather than representational, realists. According to Moore, 
one has direct, unmediated access to objects and their prop-
erties and the facts into which they figure. 2 Because con-
'Not all rationalists accept a correspondence theory of 
truth. Goldman (1988), for example, accepts a coherence the-
ory of truth. Because his is not an attempt to establish a 
form of realism~ it is not dealt with below. 
2 This is slightly misleading as, for Moore, objects just 
are concatenations of properties. 
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sciousness and judgment effect a direct relation to objects 
and their properties and relations, the problem of detennin-
ing whether one's mental contents correspond to reality is 
avoided. A11 objects and properties of which one may be 
aware possess mind-independent existence. Natural properties 
(i.e., those which occur in time and space) are accessed by 
means of perception. Non-natural properties, such as those 
referred to by the words Mt1NO," Mbeautiful" and ugood," are 
accessed by means of a special faculty of intuition. 
Moore's view thus contains t1NO principal theses: (i) 
that ugood" denotes a property that enjoys an objective onto· 
logical status, and (ii) that it denotes a non-natural prop-
erty. His arguments for both these claims will be examined 
and found wanting. As suggested above, it does not follow 
from the fact that one cannot knowwhether one's mental con· 
tents correspond to reality, that no such contents exist and, 
therefore, that we have direct access to objects and proper· 
ties. In fact, arguments such as the Argument from Illusion 
provide abductive evidence to support the hypothesis that 
they do exist. Thesis (i) is found wanting on other grounds. 
If direct realism (in general) and intuitionism (with respect 
to mathematics and ethics) makes it possible for there to be 
direct knowledge of the objects of consciousness, then it 
also seems to preclude the possibility of error. I will 
argue that ethical intuitionism fails to account for how per· 
sons may fonn false moral beliefs. 
Thesis (ii) derives from Moore's argument that no infor· 
mation concerning.that to which ugoodw refers may be garnered 
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from facts about the natural world. To think otherwise is to 
commit what Moore refers to as the NaturaJ~st~c FaJJacy. 
Here my principal criticism is, not that one can draw infer-
ences about moral properties from premises solely concerning 
natural properties, but that such information is at least a 
necessary component in many or most inferences regarding 
moral properties. 
An interesting alternative to the intuitionism of Moore, 
which avoids many of its difficulties, stems from the recent 
work of J. J. Katz within semantic theory. Katz is a s81118n-
t~c intuitionist, but his viewpoint carries important impli-
cations for meta-ethics. According to semantic intuitionism, 
all expressions have a sense. These senses are abstract pla-
tonic entities, and, as such, they are in no way part of the 
natural order. Senses are not dependent for their existence 
either upon the capacities of language-users or the conven-
tions of a linguistic community. Even if no sapient creature 
were to exist in the universe, there would still exist sens-
es, there to be grasped under the appropriate conditions. In 
contrast to Moore, a sense (or meaning) is not to be identi-
fied with an expression's referent. Grasping or intuiting 
the same sense, however, makes it possible for persons to 
communicate and refer to the very same thing. Because refer-
ence is mediated by sense, other things being equal, determi-
nancy of sense entails determinancy of reference. 3 This means 
1 The ceter~s par~bus clause here expresses that, for Katz, 
reference is accomplished by adhering to pragmatic principles 
as well as semantic principles. Thus senses med~ate rather 
than fully determine reference. The other things which must 
be equal, if conmunication is to occur and reference is to be 
mutual, is an understanding of these pragmatic principles. 
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that what is correctly called •good" and correctly called 
•bad" have nothing to to do with the proclivities of individ-
uals or the customs of societies. 
Katz's view is not without its advantages. Like Moore, 
he appeals to platonic entities (even though these entities 
are the senses rather than the referents of expressions), and 
it is this fact which provides the underpinning of a kind of 
moral realism. Unlike direct realism, this view can accommo-
date false judgments; and because it construes the entities 
which mediate reference as mind-independent, it avoids prob-
lems connected with ~ntsrna1 certifiability with which ratio-
nalist theories are faced. Nevertheless, I believe that 
Katz's argument runs aground precisely at that point at which 
he claims best explanation status for his platonic senses. 
In contrast, I believe that concrete linguistic tokens belong 
among the determinants of reference. My argument against 
Katz prefigures the view I shall ultimately defend, which is 
largely Wittgenstein-ian in that it gives prominence to the 
semantic role which linguistic tokens play. 
The next group of realists are the epistemological heirs 
of Locke and Mill. Empiricists such as Sturgeon (1988) and 
Boyd (1988) assimilate moral reasoning to scientific reason-
ing. They consider the methodology of the best science of 
the day as providing a paradigm for what counts as justified 
belief. Unlike rationalist foundationalists, they do not 
count indubitability (i.e, the impossibility of error) among 
the necessary conditions for knowledge. They maintain, in 
contrast, that any claim that proceeds from methods analogous 
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to those found in the empirical sciences may be regarded as 
justified. Each in his own way thinks that the formation and 
confirmation and disconfirmation of moral judgments approxi-
mates processes evident within the empirical sciences. 
Although they disagree over what counts as the best science, 
they agree that if moral claims can be made scientifically 
respectable, then they should carry ontological commitment. 
Of tne two views I shall examine, Boyd's (1988) is the most 
sophisticated. He maintains that moral decision-making exem-
plifies a form of reflective equilibrium found in the empiri-
cal sciences. 
Against this line of reasoning Quine's (1981b) thesis 
that ethics is methodologically infirm is most relevant. I 
do not agree with Quine's conception of ontological commit-
ment in terms of what a theory quantifies over and what is 
presupposed by quantification (i.e., the existence of sets), 
but I do want to defend his claim that ~fontological commit-
ment is to be cashed out in these terms, then ethics comes up 
dry. 
Finally, it can be argued that normative ethical reason-
ing and scientific reasoning are unlike one another in terms 
of their goals. Science seeks explanation; ethics seeks jus-
tification. 
Up to this point a number of foundationalist and (more 
generally) justificationist moral realist positions and the 
specific objections that will be directed against them have 
been sketched. More general criticisms, which hail from 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, may be directed against the 
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whole enterprise of foundationalism, however that enterprise 
may be conceived. Particularly relevant are Wittgenstein's 
views concerning the nature of rules and rule-following. 
What his arguments show is that the rules we follow--includ-
ing those which underlie our moral discourse--are not given, 
and indeed need not be given, any of the forms of justifica-
tion thusfar considered. Each of the justificationist ap-
proaches is, in one manner or another, cognitivist in nature 
in that it regards as justificatory some propos.it.ion that is 
arrived at by means of some rational, intuitional, or empiri-
cal method. What Wittgenstein shows is that nothing of the 
sort is possible, that linguistic practices are in an impor-
tant sense ungrounded. 
Are we therefore entitled to be skeptics with respect to 
our ordinary moral judgments? Earlier I claimed that it was 
neither possible nor necessary to vindicate naive moral real-
ism by providing it with an epistemological justification. 
Thus, my view is at odds with the traditional current found 
in moral epistemology. 
Traditionally, realists and their opponents have assumed 
that we are entitled to moral skepticism in the absence of 
adequate epistemological justification. It is felt that 
without such a justification ordinary prescriptions--for ex-
ample, the prescription against killing one's neighbor--couJd 
turn out to be false. What is wanted is some kind of guaran-
tee that killing one's neighbor is wrong. Now, surely, some-
thing has gone awry if someone genuinely utters the question, 
•rs there any guarantee that killing one's neighbor is 
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wrong?" We would be entitled to feel dismay. We would 
think, to use Wittgenstein's phrase, that language had gone 
on a ho1~day (1958, #38), and we would ask, •Which word do 
you not understand: 'guarantee' or 'killing'?•• The speak-
er's words might invite dismay, they might even precipitate a 
certain degree of anguish over our own safety; they would 
not, however, invite moral skepticism by enticing us to seri-
ouslessly countenance the moral permissibility of killing our 
hapless neighbor. I contend that the justificatory approach-
es that have animated so much of the history of meta-ethics 
is ill conceived. •The difficulty,# as Wittgenstein puts it, 
•is to realize the groundlessness of our believing• (1969, # 
170), and to realize that its groundlessness is not a flaw 
but a feature of its very nature. Morality is in this way 
autonomous. 
Where does this leave naive moral realism? Should we 
accept the conunon sense presumption that moral judgments are 
made true or false by the appropriateness or inappropriate-
ness of the practices to which they refer (where the appro-
priateness or inappropriateness of a practice is not merely a 
reflection of the opinion of the subject or the conventions 
of the society)? I believe this is a complex question that 
cannot simply be answered either affirmatively or negatively. 
4 In a similar vein, mocking Moore's assumption that a be-
lief in .the objectivity of physical objects stands in need of 
defense, Wittgenstein says: 
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; 
he says again and again •r know that that's a 
tree,~ pointing to a tree that is near us. 
Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell 
him: •This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing 
philosophy• (1969, # 467). 
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This is so for three reasons: (a) ordinary semantic dis-
course consists of a diverse number of forms and even what 
appear to be diverse JeveJs of forms (comparable perhaps to 
the distinction between practical ethics, normative ethics 
and meta-ethics), (b) it is not clear what truth in ethics 
consists in, or whether what counts as truth in ethics falls 
under one concept or several, and (c) it is not obvious at 
all what standard of ontological conmitment is appropriate 
for meta-ethics: internal certifiabilty, quantification 
under a theory, transcendental criteria of invariance, or 
pragmatic necessity. Matters are complicated by the fact 
that a great deal of the discourse which constitutes naive 
moral realism already embodies much that is Cartesian: the 
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity (which gives 
rise to a conception of ontological commitment in terms of 
internal certifiability) is very much a part of our culture. 
If these Cartesian elements are false, as I maintain, then at 
least certain aspects of naive moral realism are false. 
More important for us than the justificationist thesis, 
which may be inherent in naive moral realism, is the semantic 
and metaphysical thesis that statements of moral judgment are 
made true by moral objects, properties or facts which possess 
objective existence. Is it possible to defend realism on 
other than justificationist (i.e., on other than rationalist, 
intuitionist, and empiricist) grounds? One group of real-
ists, with whom I am partJysympathetic, regards the autonomy 
of morality as indicating the mean~ngJessness of utterances 
which deny, for example, that murder is wrong. These 
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philosophers--Platts (1979) and McDowell (1988) --may best be 
described as non-justificationist or descri'pt~ve realists. 
The latter term is particularly apt in that they accept 
Wittgenstein's admonition to •look and see• (1958, # 66) how 
moral terms are used and how moral judgments are made. 
Denials of the sort just mentioned fall outside of the bounds 
of sense and cannot be genuinely uttered by someone who par-
ticipates in our form of life. Someone who sincerely be-
lieves murder is not wrong, is not raising serious doubts 
about the moral fabric of the world; rather, what is called 
into question are the subject's own capacities and disposi-
tions. Platts would say that the subject lacks certain spon-
tansous conv~ct~onswhich arise within and unify the members 
of a community. McDowell, alternatively, will describe such 
persons as lacking in certain moral sens~.b~1~t~es. Both 
views are heirs to Wittgenstein's contention that persons who 
are at odds with the community over the use of a term (and 
using the word •permissible• in the context of and with ref-
erence to a murder would be a case in point) actually are 
.b1~nd to the meaning of the term in question. 5 As the term 
•meaning-blindness• is meant to suggest, one who fails to un-
derstand the meaning of a word is not related to his or her 
surroundings in the appropriate sort of way, and what is con-
sidered to be the appropriate or r~ght way is determined by 
the members of that conmunity. This opens the way to acer-
1 Actually Wittgenstein speaks of •aspect-blindness• (1958, 
pp. 213-214), but he does so in order to highlight the simi-
larity between an inability to see certain aspects of a draw-
ing (for example, not being able to see Jastow's duck-rabbit 
as a duck) an inability to understand the meaning of a word. 
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tain kind of realism. The individual whose view is at odds 
with the view held by the rest of that society is seen as not 
having (yet) d~scoversdwhat the truth of the matter really 
is. Such an individual, for whatever reason, just cannot see 
what everyone else sees as the correct response. On the 
other hand, where there is agreement (and of this there may 
not be much), there objectivity is to be found. What moral 
facts there are is determined by which moral beliefs are 
agreed upon by the members sharing a form of 2~fe. A form of 
life consists in shared practices (linguistic and othe:rwise). 
Such practices are seen as necessary or essential to that way 
of life. 
This view, although it regards its own practices as 
groundless, does appear to be compatible with justification-
ist views in the sense that both types of views point to a 
certain necess~tywith regard to what can be said by us. 
Such a view, for instance, would not be at odds with a view 
that would maintain that if certain moral practices are uni-
versal or invariant across cultures, then talk of moral facts 
is appropriate. Rachels (1986), for instance, points out 
that, if we find that the practice of caring for one's chil-
dren is universal, if the linguistic practice of assenting to 
the claim that one ought to care for one's children is in-
variant across cultures, then we are entitled to regard the 
obligation to care for one's children as a moral fact. 
Rachels holds that many disagreements concerning moral issues 
revolve around disagreements over non-moral facts. For exam-
ple, the current issue over whether abortion is morally per-
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missible is fueled at least in part by the divergent world-
views of (at least some of) the proponents of each side of 
that debate. Furthermore, argues Rachels, divergent prac-
tices can often be subsumed under a single moral principle 
once economic and other social pressures have been taken into 
account. The practice of infanticide among traditional 
Eskimo peoples can, for example, be shown to be a means by 
which to preserve the family against destruction under harsh 
conditions. For Rachels certain moral practices must neces-
sarily be observed by any society which is to survive. 
It is not my intention to attempt to resolve the ques-
tion of whether moral practices can be subsumed under sets of 
principles that are invariant across cultures. What is of 
interest to me is that as a matter of fact some moral prac-
tices are subject to critique, a point not easily accorrmodat-
ed by the realism just described. Some practices seem to be 
evaluated in terms of their capacity to be subsumed under 
other practices which either are or are not regarded asap-
propriate. This fact has long been recognized within norma-
tive ethics where it is customary to draw a distinction be-
tween primary and secondary principles (cf. Rachels, 1986 pp. 
99-101). That some practices are more basic and less contro-
versial than others is not something we would expect to find, 
if the realist conception just described were true or, at 
least, if it were the whole story. If nothing else, some 
kind of distinction should be drawn between moral statements 
for which justification is rarely asked and those for which 
justification is customarily sought and to which assent is 
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given only as a result of some critical process. 
Furthermore, some kind of distinction should be observed be· 
tween statements designed. to inculcate basic moral concepts 
(to a child, for example) and those that presuppose as much 
but which extend the application of a moral concept. Or, 
again, it would appear that moral agents learn what is wrong 
in quite a different manner than they learn what is permissi· 
ble: the former a matter of explicit training, the latter 
not. These are not merely epistemological distinctions. 
Given the descriptive realist's conception of ontological 
conanitment, it is relevant that the non-existence of certain 
practices is conceivable. 
What I find valuable in descriptive realism is its the-
sis that (some) moral practices are groundless (obviously the 
claim that 411 practices deemed moral are groundless will 
have to be revised in light of the counter-examples). That 
at least some moral principles cannot be justified rationally 
is consistent with the thesis of the autonomy of morality. 
However, descriptive realism's standard for ontological com-
mitment must be viewed as suspect. It holds that one is en-
titled to regard something as real, provided. the non-exis· 
tence of the practices which occur as if it exists is incon· 
ceivable. So there is a moral fact of murder being wrong, 
just in case we cannot conceive of the elimination of the 
practices of prohibiting murder, pronouncing it wrong, etc. 
Or, conversely, there would be no such moral fact, only if we 
could conceive of the possibility of there being a society 
which makes a habit of engaging in murder, praising it, and 
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so forth. The Kantian flavor of this approach gives away its 
rationalist underpinnings. Although the concept of objectiv-
ity for these realists is not what it was for those working 
within the Cartesian and Lockean tradition, their allegiance 
to to principles "1hose oppos~te ~s ~nconce~va.b1e suggests, at 
the least, a closet acceptance of justificationism, particu-
larly as it finds a voice in Kant's transcendental conditions 
for morality~ I suspect that realists who make much of our 
fonn of 1~fe, for all their concern with pract~ces that are 
groundless, covertly accept some sort of coherence version of 
justificationism. They believe one cannot say, e.g., that 
murder is permissible without contradicting much of what else 
is said about what is right, wrong, just or unjust. One 
could perhaps deny that murder is wrong without immediately 
contradicting oneself, but saying such would be inconsistent 
with everything e1se one says and does. On this view, cer-
tain moral practices appear to be necessary conditions under-
lying the very existence of society; and certain moral prin-
ciples appear elevated to the status of necessary truths. 
By way of criticism, I shall argue that descriptive re-
alism, for all its advantages over justificationist approach-
es to realism, misconstrues the logical and semantic status 
of the propositions it holds to be necessarily true and pre-
supposes a false view concerning the nature of ontological 
corrmitment. The two principal theses for which I shall argue 
in this dissertation are: (1) that the ultimate moral prin-
ciples which are referred to by realists are, to use 
Wittgenstein's term, grilm118t~ca1 propositions, and (2) that 
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ontological conunitment is, as one might say, a matter of 
pri.iX.is rather than thsor.ie. 
To say that statements such as "One ought to keep one's 
promises" express grammatical propositions is to say that 
such statements are the expression of a linguistic conven-
tion. Thus one expresses the convention that language users 
c811 keeping one's promises •something one ought to do." The 
statement "It is wrong to treat others disrespectfully" ex-
presses the fact that language users refer to the disrespect-
ful treatment of others as •wrong.• Such circumstances as 
these provide us with cr.iter.ia for saying "That is something 
one ought to have done• or "that was wrong," which is not to 
say they provide us with ev.idence that an obligation has been 
met or that wrongdoing has occurred. They are, to borrow a 
phrase from Dunmett, among the assert4b . i1.ity cond . it.ions for 
the sentences containing the words in question. From a gram-
matical proposition one learns what speakers' met!!ll1 by, under 
what conditions they use, a particular word or phrase. The 
breaking of a promise serves as one of the myriad instances 
under which a child learns how "ought," "obligation,• and 
"wrong" are used, and it learns to form expectations concern-
ing the behaviors of those who use them. Typically the ut-
terance of a gramnatical proposition to someone who has al-
ready mastered the uses of such words serves as a rem.indero£ 
the sort of circumstance under which the use of the word was 
mastered: the original breaking of a promise was no doubt 
surrounded by numerous events--perhaps the damaged expecta-
tions of a friend; parental disappointment, or some form of 
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punishment--but among those events there was the utterance of 
•one ought to keep one's promisesn or something similar.' 
Here a sliver of the original context in which one mastered 
the linguistic t!ll1d other practices of those who call breaking 
a promise uwrong• is re-presented in the hope that the hearer 
shall again become disposed to follow the customs of the 
tribe. It might be said that the utterance of a grammatical 
proposition provides the occ8s~on for the hearer's behavior 
(linguistic and otherwise) to be realigned. 7 
The great error of the descriptive realists is to con-
strue grammatical propositions as synthetic 8 pr~or~ state-
ments. They believe that from the necessity which appears to 
attach to statements like •rt is wrong to treat others disre-
spectfully,• one can milk information concerning the moral 
structure of the world, a structure that is independent of 
human proclivity and custom. But to think this is to lose 
sight of the essential function of grammatical propositions: 
their tokens, uttered within particular contexts and followed 
by particular behaviors, estilb2~sh linguistic practices and 
concordant behaviors. It is to this fact that I alluded at 
the outset of this Introduction when I said that naive moral 
realism and its philosophical offspring misunderstand the re-
lationship between moral discourse and moral practice. The 
mistake is in not recognizing that moral discourse is itself 
a pr8ct~ce, and, in particular, it lies in not recognizing 
the particular kind of practice that uttering a grammatical 
• Wittgenstein: •The work of the philosopher consists in 
assembling reminders for a particular purposen (1958, #127). 
7 Meaning-blindness is attributed to the person for whom all 
such attempts fail. 
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remark consists in. Among our linguistic practices is that 
of say2ngor asserting something to be true. In contrast, 
the utterance of a grammatical proposition sho,m what can be 
called •true.• Such utterances are, in a sense to be ex-
plained more fully in the final chapter, antecedent to truth. 
In an important respect they say nothing, not because they 
express mere conventions and are thus incapable of being ei-
ther true or false of mind-independent facts, but because 
their occurrence determines what can be said to be true or 
false. They set the stage for, provide the linguistic scaf-
folding for, the practice of calling statements of a certain 
form "true.• As I remarked earlier, they re-present a sliver 
of the context in which various practices are mastered. We 
lose sight of the non-cognitive nature of these expressions, 
because it is customary to say they are true (even necessari-
ly true) or that their truth is presupposed by the truth of 
more particular claims {such as "You should keep your promis-
es") or that they constitute a kind of definition (they might 
indeed be regarded as operat~ona2 definitions); even 
Wittgenstein's use of the term ,,proposition• suggests a con-
tent. I view these customs as remnants of a rationalist as-
sumption inherent in our cul~ure that all meaningful utter-
ances must have cognitive value, a propositional core. 
It is appropriate to label the view just sketched as a 
form of moral ant2-rea2~·sm. The term •moral anti-realism" 
may be applied to any account of moral practices which con-
strues the appropriateness of such practices as the mere re-
flection of human tendencies or customs. If these tendencies 
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or customs change, so does morality itself. Changes in moral 
practice are not symptomatic of greater or lesser accord with 
moral facts which exist independently of the minds of those 
who perform moral judgments or the societies these minds in-
habit. In the version sketched above the appropriateness of 
a particular practice is dependent upon the linguistic con-
ventions of the persons who deem such practices appropriate. 
What is wrong, for example, depends on what is counted as 
wrong, what is sa~d to be wrong, upon what moral statements 
we ca11 true, and these depend upon what grammatical proposi-
tions one is trained to live in accordance with. 
One thing that is distinctive about this form of anti-
realism is that it construes the claims and queries of the 
moral realist, not as false, but as nonsens~ca1. This much 
was already suggested with regard to the foundationalist's 
question nWhat guarantee do we have that breaking a promise 
is wrong?" There is something peculiar in thinking that we 
must be ent~t1ed to regard breaking promises as really wrong. 
(Should we we1come our children to the comnunity of human re-
sponse?) If anything, the first part of the statement nit 
reii1..ly ~s a fact that breaking promises is wrong" makes more 
emphatic the utterance of the gramnatical proposition which 
follows. Just as grade school teachers clap their hands to 
gain their students' attention, it readies its audience to 
take a serious stance toward what follows. In their ordinary 
context such utterances have a use; it is when they are in-
terpreted as expressing deep metaphysical truths that the 
danger arises. Stripped of their normal context their tokens 
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become bits of nonsense. 
Shall we then say that there is no truth or objectivity 
in ethics? Are we to resign ourselves to thinking of our 
moral pronouncements as essentially false or arbitrary? I 
think not. One of the purposes of this dissertation is not 
only to demonstrate the nonsensica1 nature of such realist 
pronouncements and questions as mentioned above, but to ex-
pose the nonsensical nature of utterances which occupy, as it 
were, the opposite end of the spectrum: "There is no truth 
in ethics,• -What's right for you is right for you, what's 
right for me is right for me,• and others of their ilk. 
There is a tendency to think that because the realists' 
questions cannot be answered affirmatively (or simply cannot 
be anSMrJred, as I would have it), statements of the latter 
sort are justified. But underlying statements which occupy 
either extreme is a false conception of ontological commit-
ment. What is common to both the justificationist and de-
scriptive forms of realism is the view that ontological com-
mitment is a kind of accomp1ishment, in particular that it is 
a cognitive accomplishment. They see the matter as a ratio-
nal process that terminates in a decision concerning flHJat 
there ~s. I do not think that we ontologically commit our-
selves, but that we become committed through our activities 
and practices. To put the point in a somewhat Heideggerian 
manner, we are throM:J .into a world which is in part comprised 
of customs and practices. Following Blackburn (1984), I con-
tend that ontological commitment consists in a stance we take 
towards certain salient features of our environment (includ-
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ing our social environment). We allow ourselves to be struck 
by such features as present themselves, for example, by the 
wrongfulness of breaking a promise. It does not matter that 
the manner in which we ascribe wrongfulness to actions stems 
from convention (i.e., that wrongfulness is, what Blackburn 
calls, a •projected" or •spread" property), for wrongfulness 
is a feature of our world. 
Moral realists will perhaps be put off by this phenome-
nalizing of our ontological commitments. This view, they 
will argue, places morality as well as everything else within 
the sphere of subjectivity. But I think this concern is mis-
placed. The Wittgensteinian conception of language defended 
in the course of this dissertation does not treat the use of 
language as the mere expression of what is subjective. If 
anything, the traditional subject/object dichotomy is called 
into question. Language is essent~a11ya set of social (and 
always potentially public) practices. This is the lesson of 
Wittgenstein's private language argument. Moral discourse 
is, as it were, out there among its 'objects.' Once we view 
morality as consisting of mutually affective practices (some 
of which are linguistic practices), the bogey of moral skep-
ticism begins to fade. Once light has been cast upon what 
was once regarded as darkly subjective, there remains no 
place for the skeptic to dwell. Thus, the phenomena1.iz.ing of 
the objects of moral judgment is offset by the object~v.iz.ing 
of language itself. 
Moral anti-realism should not occasion moral skepticism 
or even a laissez-faire, come-what-may attitude regarding 
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one's actions and the actions of others. Such attitudes are 
engendered by the belief or the desire for there to be h4rd 
moral facts beyond the phenomena. But, even though.this can-
not be the case, morality exists! Its life is our own. It 
lives in our actions and is no less real than they. In the 
end, moral anti-realism enjoins us to take responsibility for 
the morality which is our creation. 
I think the value of this dissertation lies in the fact 
that it points to the importance of engag~ng in normative 
ethics, of engaging in the issues of our day and in being an 
activist. Moral rules are not like rails laid in the moral 
heavens, they are not dictates of divine command nor of semi-
divine Reason; virtues do not bear the stamp of Platonic 
Forms; rights do not stem from Natural Law. These are but 
the posturings of bad faith. What is important is to see 
that morality answers to us, in an important sense ~s us. 
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empiricists. One might, for example, justify one's perceptu-
al belief that P by appealing to the fact that one perceives 
that Pis the case. Since one can be mistaken about whether 
one's faculty of perception is functioning properly, to claim 
as much is to offer non-inductive evidence. But because he 
is a direct realist, if the faculty in question is function-
ing properly, then the belief is incorrigible. 10 Properly 
functioning faculties--including a properly functioning fac-
ulty of moral intuition--provide more than non-deductive evi-
dence: they provide direct access to the truths of proposi-
tions." 
Although the philosophers examined in this chapter dis-
agree as to what constitutes justification, they share a de-
sire to provide some sort of justification for the type of 
meta-ethical claim discussed earlier. Each wants to demon-
strate that a belief in the obJect~v~tyof true nonnative 
claims is warranted, i.e., that such claims are made true by 
moral facts, properties, or objects. They obviously disagree 
with respect to the ontology required to make such claims 
true (or false). Also, they differ with respect to how ex-
plicit this goal appears within their overall project. One 
will not find in Gewirth the statement, •r intend to prove 
there are moral properties and facts." One w~11 find in both 
"It occurs to me that Moore's early epistemology is a pre-
cursor to contemporary reliabilist theories of knowledge 
(e.g., Armstrong, 1973): if one's faculties are functioning 
properly, then one would not believe P, unless Pis true. 
The difference would primarily lie in Moore's rejection of a 
purely physicalist ontology. 
11 For the Moore of 1899 propositions and facts are one and 
the same (as are concepts and properties); so to be aware of 
the truth of a proposition is none other than to be aware 
that a certain fact obtains. 
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Reason and Horal.ity (1978, p. 175) and his "Replies to My 
Critics" (1984, p. 220) the claim that his normative 
Principle of Generic Consistency is made true by correspon-
dence to the nonnat.ive structure of action. 12 Moore and Boyd 
appeal quite explicitly to the sort of meta-ethical claim 
with which we are concerned in order to support their partic-
ular versions of utilitarianism, and they attempt to offer 
justification for these meta-ethical claims. And Katz, whose 
work in semantic theory bears upon the meta-ethical issues, 
does not discuss these issues at all. 
2. MORAL RATIONALISM 
Moral rationalists, like Gewirth (1978), Gert, (1966) 
and Donagan (1977), are the philosophical descendants of 
Descartes. It is their goal to provide epistemological foun-
dations for moral judgments in ways analogous to those adopt-
ed by Descartes to prove the existence of the external world 
whereby the physical sciences were provided with a firm foun-
dation. For these philosophers a normative ethical theory 
must consist of a set of propositions which are (in some 
sense) self-evident or derivable from those which are self-
evident. Only if one's moral judgments hail from foundations 
such as these can one be said to have moral knowledge. In 
the following section, after briefly describing the Cartesian 
12 An uncritical reading of Gewirth would lead one to think 
that what makes the Principle of Generic Consistency true 
just is the sort of evidence evinced in the course of the di-
alectically necessary method for it; but that is to confuse 
the grounds which Gewirth offers for accept.ing the principle 
(an epistemological matter) with what makes the principle 
true (a metaphysical one). 
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CHAPTER I 
JUSTIFICATORY FORMS OF MORAL REALISM 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The realists of this chapter may be distinguished from 
those of the next in terms of the way in which they construe 
the question of whether there are moral facts, properties or 
objects. Those considered in this chapter view naive moral 
realism as in need of v1nd1cat1on; consequently, they attempt 
to provide ,iust1f1cat1on for such claims as, for example, 
that there is something about murder that is wrong. Those of 
the next chapter reject the assumption that naive realism 
stands in need of justification. Their concern is not with 
justifying these kinds of judgments but with describing and 
explaining ho~persons form such judgments, and, consequent-
ly, how they go about count1ng (or under what conditions they 
regard) something like the wrongness of an action as real. 
Obviously, when the time comes, some amount of discussion 
will have to be devoted to the issue of whether that sort of 
descriptive account deserves to be interpreted ontologically 
as a real1sm. Those discussed in this chapter clearly would 
not agree that descriptive and explanatory accounts of the 
manner in which persons form ordinary meta-ethical judgments 
should in any way be regarded as offering insight into flHlat 
there 1s in the moral realm. If our universe really does in-
clude moral facts, properties or objects, then these philoso-
phers hold that beliefs and statements to that effect stand 
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in need of justification. Unless such justification is in 
the offing, unless one can lay claim to meta-ethical know2-
edge, they maintain that skepticism concerning the objectivi-
ty of morals is appropriate. 
The three forms of justificatory realism share in common 
a view of knowledge such that S knows P, if and only if (1) S 
believes P, (2) Pis true, and (3) Sis justified in believ-
ing P. 1 The first condition identifies knowledge with a par-
ticular propositional attitude, namely, the attitude of hold-
ing P to be true. Thus knowledge cannot consist mere2yin 
desiring P to be true, fearing P to be true, imagining P to 
be true, etc. Obviously, the mere possession of belief can-
not suffice for having knowledge; otherwise one who enter-
tains a false belief would be in possession of knowledge 
every bit as much as one who entertains a true belief. In 
that case the distinction between knowledge and ignorance or 
error would collapse, and the very idea of knowledge would 
become vacuous. The third condition has generally been ac-
knowledged by philosophers engaged in epistemology at least 
since the time of Plato. It seems that mere true belief does 
not suffice for knowledge, for if it did, one would have to 
ascribe knowledge even to those who accept out of ignorance--
or simply on the basis of emotion--that a particular proposi-
tion is true. Shall we say that a trial jury that is swayed 
by pity to regard a defendant as not guilty knOIJ'S the defen-
dant is not guilty just in case their belief turns out to be 
• Let it be noted that the philosophers to be examined do 
not explicitly state their commitment to this conception of 
knowledge, but that it is implicit in the projects in which 
they are engaged. 
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true? It seems we would not ascribe knowledge under these 
conditions. What is required is that the person to whom 
knowledge is ascribed be able to offer justification for the 
propositions they hold true. Justification cannot consist 
merely in providing an exp2anat~on for why one believes what 
one does. For example, one might explain that one's belief 
was produced by pity, or that it was drilled into one by 
one's parents, or that one accepted it upon reading a fortune 
cookie. At most these explanations provide insight into the 
occasion under which a belief was formed or accepted, but in 
no case is justification offered, because in no case is ev~-
dence evinced in support of the proposition. The philoso-
phers to be examined below would agree to all this; what dis-
tinguishes them is what they require in the way of evidence 
or justification. 
The sharpest distinction holds between the rationalists 
and empiricists, examined below in Sections Two and Four re-
spectively. Rationalists, like Gewirth, accept Descartes' 
foundationalist epistemology. This requires that justifica-
tion consist in deductive evidence and that the premises of-
fered as evidence be self-evident (in the sense that their 
denial entails a contradiction). The empiricists, like 
Sturgeon and Boyd, are amenable to the methodology of science 
and, so, to inductive and abductive evidence. Moore's epis-
temology, which will be examined in Section Three below, is 
an interesting hybrid.' In an important way he is like the 
• Please note. that I am only concerned here with Moore's 
ve.zy ear2yepistemology, specifically the epistemology of his 
1899 article #The Nature of Judgment" which informs Pr~nc~'p~a 
Eth~ca (1903) and Eth~cs (1911). 
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model of knowledge employed by the rationalists, I shall 
focus upon Gewirth's attempt to establish the obJect~v~tyof 
his Principle of Generic Consistency (or PGC). For our pur-
poses it is not problematic to leave Gert's and Donagan's 
views unexamined; what is important about these theories is 
not so much their content but their method or logical form, 
and Gewirth's method is typical. After examining Gewirth's 
argument, the shortcomings of this kind of approach will be 
discussed. In particular I want to argue that such arguments 
fall shy of their mark, due to a regress which is generated 
in attempting to justify their 1~nk~ngprem.ises, i.e., the 
premises which supposedly sanction inferences from claims 
about one's own beliefs and desires to conclusions about ob-
jective moral facts. 
Let us begin by examining the Cartesian model employed 
by the rationalists. This model will involve arguments of 
the following form: 
(1) Subjective Premise S 
(2) Linking Premise L 
(3) Objective Conclusion O 
Subjective premises are premises concerning the acts or con-
tents of one's own mind. They carry no import whatsoever 
concerning objects or events which may occur external to, or 
independent of, the mind itself. Such propositions as that 
one is thinking, doubting, willing, judging, imagining, per-
ceiving (if this is understood not to involve the bodily sen-
sation but the cognition of what appears to be given to bodi-
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ly sensation), etc. are to be included, as well as such 
propositions as that one is aware (de d~cto) that a given 
proposition is the case (e.g., that I am thinking), or am 
aware of a mental image (e.g.,that of a unicorn), or of a 
perception (e.g., of what appears to be a red object), etc. 
For Descartes, such claims are foundational. One's be-
liefs concerning one's own mental acts are incorrigible. 
They are not to be doubted. The proposition that I am think-
ing passes the method of doubt test. One cannot doubt that 
one is thinking, because to doubt just is to engage in a kind 
of thinking; so to doubt that one is thinking appears to en-
tail a kind of contradiction: the proposition that one could 
doubt but not think is as self-contradictory as the proposi-
tion that one could be a bachelor but not be unmarried. 
Since to be a bachelor Just ~s to be (among other things) un-
married, to assert otherwise would be to assert that it is 
possible for someone to both be unmarried and not be unmar-
ried. But that is impossible without self-contradiction, so 
no such doubt can be entertained. Similarly, it is not pos-
sible to assert that one can doubt but not think, since that 
would entail that it is possible that one is both thinking 
and not thinking at the very same time. 
We are not concerned here with whether Descartes' argu-
ment is sound; clearly it is not sound due to its circulari-
ty.13 What is important is that the concept of doubt.ing 'con-
11 A contradiction is entailed only if one assumes that it 
is a fact that one is doubting. If this is assumed, then it 
would not be possible that one ~snot doubting. Thus the 
possibility that one is not doubting (thinking) would be re-
moved. Whether this assumption is true is precisely what is 
at issue, so the argument is question-begging. 
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tains' the concept of ch~nk~ng (as its genus), so that as 
long as Descartes finds himself engaged in doubting, he can-
not doubt without contradiction that he is thinking or that 
he exists as one who thinks: u1et him deceive me as much as 
he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I 
think I am something .... ! am, I exist, is necessarily true 
each time I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it" 
(1641, p. 150) . 
Typically the thesis of the incorrigibility of the men-
tal is taken to extend to other propositions about one's men-
tal life. So, while one may doubt whether one actually sees 
a red object on the horizon, one cannot doubt that one seems 
to see such an object. Although one may doubt whether one 
remembers an actual event like the sun rising, one cannot 
doubt that one seems to remember such an event. Presumably 
one cannot doubt what one desires, since to seem to desire 
something is (supposedly) indistinguishable from actually de-
siring it. 
Descartes' goal was to pass from subjective premises to 
an objective conclusion: from, for example, I seem to see ob-
jects extended in space before me to chere are objects ex-
tended in space before me. For this he needed linking 
premises. These premises contain criteria for saying that 
the contents of one's mental states correspond to external 
reality. For Descartes, these criteria consist of a mental 
content's clarity and distinctness. We need not rehearse 
Descartes' argument for why clarity and distinctness are the 
mark of correspondence. Suffice it to say that the formation 
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of clear and distinct ideas is essential to the function of 
the intellect, and, as also noted in the Hed~tat~ons, that 
such functioning could be in error only if God is a deceiver, 
a possibility to be discounted on the grounds that a perfect 
being could not be deceptive. Exactly what clarity and dis-
tinctness are is unclear. One reasonable interpretation is 
that a clear idea is tantamount to a definition, whereas a 
distinct idea is what is acquired when one discovers the en-
tailments of the definition. The model here is the axiomatic 
method of Euclidean geometry in which theorems are derived 
from particular axioms. So, for example, one would have a 
clear conception of a triangle if one knows a triangle is a 
three-sided polygon, and one's concept of a triangle would be 
distinct if one knows (among other things) that a triangle 
cannot be a circle. 
Essentially, then, Descartes' proof of the existence of 
the material world runs like this: 
(1) I seem to perceive that there is a material 
world. 
(2) My idea that there a material world is clear 
and distinct, and clear and distinct ideas 
must be true. 
(3) My idea that there is a material world is 
true. 
Premise (1) is the subjective premise which merely reports 
the occurrence of a particular kind of idea. Premise (2), 
the linking premise, asserts that the idea of a material 
world is a clear and distinct one. To c1ear1yconceive of 
matter is to conceive of something which (if it exists) is 
extended in space (extension in space is its essence). To 
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have a distinct idea of matter, one must have deduced that 
matter must be distinguished from mind (whose essence is in-
tellect) as well as from God (whose essence is infinite per-
fection). If matter is not essentially mind or God, then it 
must be a distinct substance that exists apart from the oth-
ers. What follows is the objective conclusion: matter must 
exist independent of the mind. 
It is not my purpose to offer a critique of Descartes' 
argument. Its flaws (the positing of a self which thinks, 
its inconsistent definition of substance, the invalidity of 
its ontological argument, and the unsoundness of its cosmo-
logical argument) are well known. On the other hand, the fa-
mous Cartesian Circle will become important below. Roughly, 
the problem is that Descartes must show that clear and dis-
tinct ideas are true, if he is to first maintain that it 
would be contradictory to deny that he is a thinking thing 
and to later contend that it would be contradictory to regard 
God as a deceiver. Since one clearly and distinctly con-
ceives of oneself as a thinking thing, one must be one; since 
God is clearly and distinctly conceived as infinitely per-
fect, God must have existence (as non-existence is a kind of 
imperfection) and must be no deceiver (since that would be an 
imperfection too). But the reason why Descartes must prove 
God exists and is no deceiver is that he must secure the ac-
curacy of clear and distinct ideas, that is, he must show 
that a properly functioning intellect does not produce error 
and falsehood. The problem of providing justification for 
linking premises is a major difficulty for correspondence 
32 
theories of knowledge. It is, indeed, one of the main rea-
sons philosophers have sought alternatives to correspondence 
theories. To what extent it is problematic for Gewirth, we 
shall see below. 
Gewirth's model is precisely that attributed to 
Descartes. He refers to his starting point as #dialectical" 
as opposed to #assertoric," and refers to his method as a 
whole as #dialectically necessary" (1978, P. 44). Simply 
stated, the dialectical method considers the nature or mean-
ing of concepts as they are entertained by the mind, quite 
apart from any sort of consideration of the actual objects 
that are asserted to fall under the concept. In this way 
Gewirth's starting point consists in one or more subjective 
premises; the dialectical method, he says: #proceeds within 
the standpoint of the agent, since it begins from statements 
or assumptions he makes• (1978, p. 44). This form of concep-
tual analysis is intended to yield necessary truths: 
[A]lthough the dialectically necessary method 
proceeds from within the standpoint of the agent, 
it also undertakes to ascertain what is necessarily 
involved in this standpoint. The statements the 
method attributes to the agent are set forth as 
necessary ones in that they reflect what is concep 
tually necessary ... {1978, p. 44). 
These necessary truths are analytic in nature. Once what is 
conceptually necessary has been elucidated, the dialectically 
necessary method goes forward by calling attention to further 
propositions which are entailed by or presupposed in those 
which are analytic. The subject who possesses the concepts 
in question must assent to these latter claims (if only im-
plicitly) on pain of contradiction {1978, p. 48). 
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Specifically, Gewirth attempts to deduce from analytic 
truths concerning the concept of action his First Principle 
of normative ethics, the Principle of Generic Consistency, 
which prescribes to M[a]ct in accord with the generic rights 
of your recipients [i.e., those who can be affected by your 
actions] and yourself" (1978, p. 135). As we shall see, the 
PGC is what is traditionally referred to as a synthetic a 
priori truth. It is not .mere2ya conceptual truth. It is a 
claim .ITlelde true by what he refers to as the #normative struc-
ture of action" (1978, p. 175). This normative structure 
provides the Mcorrespondence-correlate for moral judgments• 
(1978, p. 175). Whether Gewirth can legitimately infer the 
existence of such objective moral facts from subjective 
premises which reflect conceptual truths will be scrutinized 
below. I shall argue that his linking premise is not up to 
the task. 
Gewirth's analysis begins with the concept of act~on. 
It is not surprising that the concept of action would play 
center stage where, for Descartes, the concept of doubt had 
loomed large. Gewirth, after all, is interested in morality, 
which essentially concerns actions (which to prescribe, pro-
hibit, etc.). Ultimately the analysis of the concept of ac-
tion is designed to reveal what is essential to being an 
agent of an action. The PGC, in turn, is revealed as a con-
dition which must be satisfied (observed) for one to be an 
agent at all. 
An examination of the concept of action reveals two im-
portant features which all actions share in common. These he 
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refers to as the gener.ic features of actions. First, action 
is purposive. It is goal-directed behavior. There must be 
some end to which the agent is pursuant. This end need not 
be something consc.iousJy set before herself to attain. 
Rather, purposive behavior can be both dispositional and oc-
current (the latter Gewirth refers to as "purposeful" behav-
ior; 1978, p. 38}. Thus if one is in the hab.it of satisfying 
one's hunger .in a nutr.it.ionaJJy sound way, one may self-con-
sciously pursue the goal of satisfying one's hunger, while at 
the same time pursuing the latter goal with little or no 
thought whatsoever. Perhaps one must be trained to want nu-
tritionally sound food, but in the course of time this desire 
becomes latent. Its satisfaction becomes part of the "proce-
dure" _by means of which the conscious desire to overcome 
hunger is obtained (1978, p. 38). 
It should be recognized, too, that the goal of an action 
need not be identified with any particular material conse-
quence (overcoming hunger, receiving nutrition, attaining 
happiness, etc.} which may result from performing the action. 
One's goal may just consist in implementing a procedure or 
following a rule for its own sake. If one thinks one ought 
to obey the rule to always tell the truth, then one's goal 
may be to teJ2 the truth regardless of the consequences of 
doing so. Thus the goals of some actions can be the actions 
themselves. Such actions are: 
not aimless but rather goal-directed, at least 
in the sense that they envisage more or less clear-
ly a certain content to be effected or achieved, 
even if at one level this content consists 
only in a certain mode of acting or in observance 
of certain rules or formal requirements (Gewirth, 
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1978, p. 37). 
One can see from the fact that goals are extended to include 
more than simply the consequences of an action that Gewirth's 
concept of purposiveness is an extremely generic one. It is 
one which he believes both deontologists as well as teleolo-
gists would find acceptable. To the kind of Millian objec-
tion which states that one could not have as a goal the ful-
fillment of a given rule, unless the fulfillment of the rule 
were recognized as having utility, Gewirth would respond that 
it is not his purpose to exp2a1n the relation between differ-
ent kind of goals.it His purpose is to catalog the sorts of 
things which agents may count among their goals. Because his 
is purely a task of conceptual analysis, it remains wholly 
irrelevant what kind of explanatory account is to be given 
for the acquisition of goals. 
The second generic feature of action is vo2untar~ness. 
Actions are to be distinguished from other purposive or goal-
oriented events, like photosynthesis or oogenesis, by the 
fact that they must be conceived of as possessing goals that 
are the goals of some agent who engages in the action 1n 
order to bring about the goal. •voluntariness," Gewirth 
tells us, uinvolves a procedural aspect of actions in that it 
concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing events" 
(1978, p. 41). The voluntariness of an action •comprises the 
1• Mill argues that one can make a goal out of the following 
types of procedures and rules only because one recognizes 
them as means by which happiness is produced.. They are only 
conceived of as goals in their own right because, by virtue 
of their assoc~at~on with the happiness they produce, they 
come to be conceived of as a part of happiness (1863, pp. 
415-417). 
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agent's causation of his action, whereas the purposiveness 
comprises the object or goal of the action .... " (1978, p, 
41). Behavior that is coerced (that is, forced upon one by 
way of threat) or is automat~c (such as those which occur 
within one's autonomic nervous system or which result from 
diseases) does not count as voluntary behavior. Behavior 
that is the ~nev~tab1e result of a particular kind of chemi-
cal dependency, for example, would not count as an act~on at 
all. 11 In contrast, genuine action involves choice: one 
chooses th~s alternative over that: 
In its most complete sense, 'choice' connotes 
antecedent, informed deliberation between alterna-
tives and a reasoned decision based on that delib-
eration, with consideration being given to rele-
vant aspects of the organized system of disposi-
tions that constitutes the person and with knowl-
edge of relevant circumstances (1978, p. 31). 
To conceive of oneself as acting, it is important that one be 
able to conceive of oneself as acting otherwise. What dis-
tinguishes the activity of a person preparing a meal from the 
process of photosynthesis in a plant (besides their goal) is 
that the former weighs options (for example, whether to use 
this as opposed to that amount of basil) which are informed, 
not only by the goal, but by facts about the environment 
(e.g., how much basil is available) and facts about the agent 
11 Clearly there are some gray areas here. If one chooses 
to rob a bank rather than a convenience store in order to pay 
for one's drug habit, then surely one's behavior is not to-
tally determined by one's drug addiction in the manner that 
one's 'sweats' and 'shakes' are so determined. Yet, that 
some such course of action would be taken seems determined. 
Or consider the case of someone who chooses to take up smok-
ing cigarettes in full knowledge of the addictive nature of 
nicotine. Are the future 'actions' of the smoker not to be 
considered actions at all? 
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herself (e.g., how much basil she can tolerate). In the case 
of the plant, facts about its environment and facts about it-
self causally determine the course its life shall take. 
Needless to say, this or that could occur to the plant, but 
the point is that whatever occurs to it, occurs to it. In 
contrast, an action is not the sort of thing that simply oc-
curs to or happens in an agent; it arises from within the 
agent as something over which she exercises control. 
Because actions are purposive and voluntary, it would be 
inevitable for agents to express or describe their state when 
they do act with a sentence of the form "I do X for purpose 
E." Here both the voluntary or procedural element as well as 
the purposive element are made explicit. Often enough, how-
ever, one's description of one's action highlights one or the 
other feature (1978, p. 42). Nevertheless, all agents would 
have to recognize such a description as appropriate. 
Importantly, the statement expresses the conat~ve nature of 
action, that is to say, it expresses a positive or pro-atti-
tude on the part of the agent toward the goal in question 
(1978, p. 40). u[P]urposive action is conative and dynamic," 
Gewirth tells us, "in that the agent tries by his action to 
bring about certain results ... that he wants at least inten-
tionally, even if not inclinationally, to attain" (1978, pp. 
48-49) The distinction here between the inclination and the 
intention to do X for purpose Eis one between that of taking 
pleasure in or liking E and that of pursuing E ~n sp~tB of 
the fact that one takes no pleasure in E or even finds Edis-
dainful (1978, p. 39). For that reason E may be said to have 
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value for the agent. Because an agent can intend E but not 
be inclined towards E, the favorable attitude towards E need 
not be VBZJ' favorable at all. Accordingly, the value as-
signed to E may be extraordinarily minimal. To say E has 
value here means only that the agent recognizes it as a goal 
worth one's attention and effort. Indeed no one but the par-
ticular agent in question need have E for a goal and recog-
nize it as having a value. Because E has value for the 
agent, if she is committed to uI do X for purpose E" being a 
description of her action, then she is further committed to 
•Eis good" as a description of the goal she seeks to attain. 
This, it must be remembered, is not a claim to be taken as-
sertorically. Rather, it expresses that to which the agent 
is corcmitted in virtue of the concepts she exercises. It is 
what she must say or th~nk, if she says or thinks ur do X for 
purpose E." 
Since the goals towards which agents seek to attain must 
be regarded as goods (at least by the agent), anything found 
to be a necessary condition for the possibility of attaining 
these goods must be regarded good as well, according to 
Gewirth. Since an action's generic features are necessary 
for the achieving of goals, an agent is committed to regard-
ing voluntariness and purposiveness as goods. These are to 
be counted as •generic goods" (1978, p. 52). 
Voluntariness or freedom emerges as a good, not only be-
cause the exercise of freedom in a particular instance is a 
met!UJs for attaining a specific goal, but because the very 
8b~1~ty to exercise freedom at all is a necessary condition 
39 
for the possibility of action. Thus it is the capac~cyfor 
freedom and not just a specific exercise of freedom that is 
good. This point will become important later on as the basis 
upon which agents may claim a general right to non-interfer-
ence from others. 
Purposiveness itself may be a good in the following way. 
Let us say an agent recognizes a series of goals, E1, E2, 
E3, ... , En· The agent may be assigned, not only a desire to 
achieve a specific goal, but a desire to achieve her goals ~n 
general. Not only is the achieving of E1 good, but so is the 
general achieving of goals. E1 is good in itself, but it is 
also good to the extent that it constitutes Man increase in 
[the agent's] level of purpose-fulfillment" (1978, p. 53). An 
agent's level of purpose-fulfillment is what Gewirth refers 
to as the agent's well-be~ng. Well-being consists of three 
kinds of things, and each kind of thing must be regarded as a 
good. First, the agent must regard as good Mthose basic as-
pects of his well-being that are the proximate necessary pre-
conditions of his performance of any and all his actions" 
(1978, p. 53). I understand Gewirth to be pointing to the 
fact that some goods, those associated with one's well-being, 
supply the means by which other goods are attained. Thus in 
order to pursue goals at all, one must be in possession of a 
certain level of well-being, which, we are told, includes 
Mlife and physical integrity (including such of their means 
as food, clothing, and shelter) ... [as well as] mental equi-
librium and a feeling of confidence as to the general possi-
bility of attaining one's goals" (1978, p. 54). In addition 
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to these bas~c goods which contribute to one's well being, 
Gewirth acknowledges nonsubtract1·ve goods and add1· t~ve goods; 
simply put, that one's level of purpose-fulfillment is not 
diminished and that it is increased are regarded as goods as 
well. 
Notice that two things have been identified as mt!Jt!l.Ds by 
which goals in general are to be attained: the freedom to 
control one's actions and the well-being that stems from the 
attainment or acquisition of goods that are necessary for the 
attainment of other goods. Gewirth wants to maintain that if 
freedom and well-being are goods for the agent (to the extent 
that they are necessary conditions for agency), then the 
agent has a r1·ght to them: 
Since the agent regards as necessary goods the 
freedom and well-being that constitute the the 
generic features of his successful action, he logi-
cally must also hold that he has rights to these 
generic features, and he implicitly makes a corre-
sponding right-claim (1978, p. 63). 
This is most perplexing. It is not at all clear how the move 
from •Freedom and well-being are necessary goods# to •r have 
the r~ght to freedom and well-beingff is to be made. 
Presumably the key is that since these goods are necessary 
goods and agents cannot conceive of themselves as agents un-
less these goods are acquired, agents are entitled (indeed, 
required) to think that they ought to have these goods. 
Thus, their very conception of themselves as agents requires 
that they conceive of others as not being allowed to inter-
fere with their actions and as acknowledging and acting in 
accordance with their need for well-being {i.e., by acknowl-
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edging their need for the goods which constitute their well-
being). According to Gewirth, the agent who accepts that •My 
freedom and well-being are necessary goods" but denies that 
•I have rights to freedom and well-being" is embroiled in a 
contradiction. If one were to deny that ur have rights to 
freedom and well-being," then one would be committed to deny-
ing that 0 All other persons ought at least to refrain from 
interfering with my freedom and well-being." This, in turn, 
would require the agent to accept, uit is not the case that 
all other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering 
with my freedom and well-being." But it is quite impossible 
to accept this and at the same time accept "My freedom and 
well-being are necessary goods." To hold this latter claim 
Just ~s to hold that one's •freedom and well-being [should] 
be kept inviolate, so that they are not interfered with by 
other persons" (1978, p. 80). Another way to put the point 
is to say that if the agent thinks it is permissible for oth-
ers to interfere with her necessary goods, then that is tan-
tamount to regarding such goods as not necessary at all 
(1978, pp. 80-81). How can what is necessary not be neces-
sary? Since one cannot conceive of oneself as an agent with-
out having these conditions met, one cannot conceive of one-
self as an agent without conceiving of others as having an 
obligation not to interfere. Generic goods are thus the 
basis for gener~c r~ghts. 
The last step in the argument involves universalizing 
this obligation. If others can be conceived of as agents, 
then they must be conceived of BS agents for whom freedom and 
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well-being are goods (1978, p. 105). By virtue of the fact 
that they are agents, they are entitled to the same rights 
one would claim for oneself as an agent. To think otherwise 
would, again, be self-contradictory. If the very concept of 
an agent demands that to be an agent these conditions must be 
met, then to regard others as agents but not entitled to 
these goods would be inconsistent. Thus the agent must re-
gard herself under an obligation not to interfere with the 
freedom or well-being of others. It is at this point that 
the dialectically necessary method terminates in the PGC: 
0 Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as 
well as yourself." 
According to Gewirth, the PGC is more than just a neces-
sary belief that all rational agents must accept. It is a 
claim Dlilde true by the nature of action itself. The claim 
that one ought to act in accord with one's own and others' 
generic rights is made true by the fact that .if one .is to do 
X for puzpose E, then one ought: t:o regard E t!lnd t!l.1..1. .it:s nec-
eSSt!IIY cond.it:.ions (.inc.l.utb.'ng freedom and we.1..1.-be.ing) as good. 
The 0 ought" in this instance is a prudential one. The an-
tecedent here denotes a certain goal, namely, action itself 
(doing X for purpose E). The consequent states certain con-
ditions which must be met if action is to occur. Gewirth 
refers to these prudential dictates as the 0 normative struc-
ture of actionn (1978, p. 175). It is this that constitutes 
the 0 correspondence-correlate• of the PGC. Since actions and 
agency ex.ist, so must these constraints upon action and agen-
cy, constraints that must be observed by all rational agents. 
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I find Gewirth's view extremely problematic. How is it 
possible to move from what purport to be purely conceptual 
truths (and their entailments) to truths about obligations 
and actions? Earlier it was mentioned that Gewirth's argu· 
ment is similar in form to Descartes' argument for the exis· 
tence of the external world. Gewirth describes himself as a 
foundationalist by stating the following: 
from a logical point of view one may hold that 
this system (of morality) can be organized in a 
unilinear logical sequence in which some of its 
components can be logically derived from others, 
but not conversely ... The sequence is nfoundation· 
ist" in that it begins from [the statement that 'I 
do X for purpose E'] that every agent must accept, 
and ... I argue in a noncircular way from this 
premise to the conclusion that every agent logical· 
ly must accept for himself a certain supreme moral 
principle (1984, p. 193). 
The premises which constitute the foundation are subjective, 
insofar as they arise within the dialectically necessary 
method and are not to be interpreted assertorically. All the 
statements from ur do X for purpose E" and •Eis good" to MI 
have a right to freedom and well-being" are to be understood 
in this manner. In each case the sentence is an expression 
of how the agent must conceive of herself qua agent. Just as 
Descartes could not conceive of himself as doubting (engage 
in the act of doubting) apart from conceiving of himself as a 
thinking thing, so too agents cannot think of themselves as 
acting unless conceive of themselves in accordance with the 
contents of these sentences. 
The conclusion, as we have seen, is alleged to be a sub· 
stantive moral principle that is no more open to doubt than 
the premises upon which it rests. But it is a principle 
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which is true also because it corresponds to something. But 
now what sanctions the move from nthis is the necessary way 
of conce.iv.ing of actions" (an epistemological or semantic 
claim) to •this is the way actions really are (a metaphysical 
claim)? Let us grant that the mean.ingof the sentence •Act 
in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well 
as yourself• decomposes into the meanings of those sentences 
(•Eis good" and so forth) which entail it. Why should we 
regard the elements of its meaning as corresponding to gener-
ic features of actions? What we need to discover and exam-
ine, in order to answer this question, is the claim (or 
claims) which functions as Gewirth's linking premise. What 
does Gewirth have that is analogous to Descartes' claim that 
clear and distinct ideas are true? 
In what is perhaps his most explicit statement on the 
issue Gewirth says: 
The whole of my argument for the PGC, however, 
has undertaken to establish that the generic fea-
tures of action provide objective, ineluctable con-
tents for testing the truth or correctness of moral 
judgments, parallel to the objectivity and in-
eluctability of the contents that observable facts 
provide for testing empirical and scientific hy-
potheses. The gener.ic features of act.ion serve 
th.is funct.ion not by d.irect.ly be.ing correspon-
dence-corre.lates for mora.1 ,iudments but rather by 
sett.ing, through the normat.ivs structure of ac-
t.ion, certa.in rsqu.irements for mora.1 ,Judgments, 
wh.ich must confo.rm to thess featurss on pa~·n of 
contrad.ict.ion (1978, p. 176, emphasis added). 
I see no way out of the circle. Obviously Gewirth's 
problem is not Descartes'. We can grant that a claim should 
be regarded. as true if it does not entail a contradiction. 
But it does not follow from the fact that the set of beliefs 
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spun from a consideration of the concept of action is cons~s-
tsnt, that they (or, rather, the PGC) corresponds to some-
thing. At best consistency is a necessary, but not a suffi-
cient, condition for correspondence. What Gewirth must show 
is that the denying that the normative structure of action 
ex.ists entails a contradiction. This cannot be attained by 
withdrawing the generic features of actions into the mind (as 
it were) to serve as tests of a moral principle's correspon-
dence. That is a bit of a red herring. The issue just is 
whether these generic features inhere in the actions them-
selves, such that actions can possess the normative structure 
which Gewirth claims. The relativism which marks the dialec-
tically necessary method {ME is good for mt.I') makes this an 
issue of central importance. That relativism suggests that 
value is imposed upon goals, actions, and their necessary 
conditions by the subject. Their value is contingent in that 
(subjective) way (a point Gewirth does not deny). Whence the 
ob.Ject~v~tyof IOOral values? Apparently objectivity emerges 
at precisely the point at which rights-claims are universal-
ized. But is there some sort of contradiction in thinking 
that other agents might conceive of action and agency in 
terms other than my own? (To answer this question affirma-
tively is certainly to utter something other than a conceptu-
al truth.) The point is, though, that all Gewirth is enti-
tled to say here is that ~fwe are to understand what another 
means by •action• and •agency,• then he or she must apply the 
same concepts to those terms as we do. That, again, is an 
epistemological point, not a metaphysical one. The test that 
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something exists--in this case the nonnative structure of ac-
tion which finds its voice in various prudential dictates--
cannot consist in confonnity to our concepts. 
The passage cited above indicates that Gewirth recog-
niz.es the need for a linking premise. What he has in mind as 
a test of a moral principle's truth is its confonnity to or 
consistency with the statements that emerge from the analysis 
of the concept of action. So, if •one ought not murder inno-
cent personsw is true, then it must conform to such state-
ments as "Murder is a fonn of interference# and uAny form of 
interference with the freedom of another (except in self-de-
fense) is bad, etc. One looks to the features of murder to 
determine its permissibility or impermissibility. That is 
the sort of test to which such principles are susceptible. 
What I have tried to show is that at most such a test enti-
tles one to say this is permissible or impermissible (a point 
consistent with Hare's prescriptivism), but it does not enti-
tle one to regard these principles as corresponding to an ob-
jective moral fact such as the nonnative structure of action 
is alleged to be. As I shall argue in the next section, 
Gewirth's troubles are symptomatic of larger problems inher-
ent in correspondence theories. 
3 • MORAL INTUITIONISM 
Moore's Tntuitioniem_ 
G. E. Moore is one of many philosophers at the beginning 
of the Twentieth Century who abandoned correspondence theo· 
ries of knowledge and truth. His argument against correspon· 
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dence and for a fonn of direct realism forms the cornerstone 
of his epistemology, and to appreciate the manner in which 
the subject matter of ethics is objective such arguments will 
have to be looked at. The objectivity of ethics--of what 
words like •good,• •right," and •just• refer to--is the logi-
cal consequence of his thesis that all concepts or properties 
(terms he uses synonymously) have objective mind-independent 
existence. This fact is often not appreciated by meta-ethi-
cists who think Moore's accusation that a fallacy is involved 
in equating moral properties with natural properties embodies 
his argument for the objectivity of moral_s. Rather, two is-
sues must be distinguished: (1) whether moral properties are 
objective, and (2) whether moral properties are identical to 
natural properties. The first part of the section below ex-
amines the ontological status of properties in general and 
the epistemological status of moral judgments. In saying 
that Moore is a realist concerning concepts or properties, we 
assign to him the view that all properties (including, for 
example, the property of being a unicorn) are real and are 
not the mere products of any act of consciousness or judg-
ment. Moore's ontology, we shall see, requires a distinction 
between what is simply real and what is real and has exis-
tence. Properties that fall into the latter category are ca-
pable of entering into spatio-temporal relations; they are 
what Moore eventually calls natural properties. The second 
part examines the application of Moore's direct realism (with 
respect to properties) to moral properties in particular. 
When applied to moral properties, we get what is referred to 
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as nethical intuitionism,w which views goodness, etc. as non-
natural whose special mode of cognition is an act of intu-
ition. 
Moore directed various arguments against correspondence 
theories of truth and knowledge from 1899 on throughout his 
career. Here we are primarily concerned with the argument in 
his 1899 article nThe Nature of Judgment# which appears to 
exercise an influence upon his 1903 Prjnc~'pja Ethjca. It 
maintains that correspondence theories generate an infinite 
regress. The argument is a reductjo: since we do form judg-
ments, any theory that requires positing an infinite nwnber 
of further judgments, as correspondence theories do, to ex-
plain how a given judgment can be made must regarded as be 
false. 
Moore's adversary is F. H. Bradley (1883). Bradley had 
opposed the empiricist idea that content or subject matter of 
judgments consists merely in abstractjons from perceptions of 
particulars which may well not possess the property or prop-
erties ascribed to them by the judgment. For example, if it 
is judged that a given object is yellow, then the empiricist 
would maintain that the propsrtyof being yellow does not in-
here in the object itself but is rather a secondary quality 
attrjbuted to the object on the basis of an abstraction from 
whatever impressions were received by the subject. Theim-
plication of this view is that the ideas we form of objects 
are quite unlike the objects themselves; in that case false-
hood would not be an occasional occurrence, it would be the 
very lot of humankind. Bradley and Moore find this prospect 
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deplorable. Both share the view that the properties typical-
ly attributed to objects are real. Rather than being mere 
abstractions from impressions of particulars, properties like 
yellowness are to be construed as universals (1883, p. 4). 
Particulars (whatever they may be) exemplify or instantiate 
or (as Plato would say) participate in the universal. They 
do not possess the universal by virtue of their relation to a 
subject. 
What distinguishes Moore from Bradley is the fact that 
the latter but not the former holds that the mind forms men-
tal representations of universals and the objects which in-
stantiate them. Both philosophers are interested in vindi-
cating ordinary beliefs concerning the natures of objects. 
Moore, however, does not think that this can be done if it 
necessary to posit mental representations to mediate the act 
of judgment and its object; in that case the possibility of 
widespread falsehood could not be eliminated, because it is, 
he holds, impossible to 'get outside' of the relation that 
holds between content and object to ascertain whether the 
content is true to the facts. 
In opposition to the empiricist tradition which (at 
least as conceived by Bradley and Moore) regards the subject 
as the passive recipient of impressions, Bradley maintains 
that any act of judgment requires the subject to neut off" or 
ufix" a specifiable content (1883, p. 4). This mental con-
tent represents the properties in question and is sometimes 
said by Bradley to be uuniversal in character" (1883, p. 5) 
like that which it represents. 
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Moore's criticism of correspondence theories falls under 
the category of attacks which maintain such theories involve 
a kind of vicious regress. Arguments against Descartes which 
appeal to the Cartesian Circle are one such case. Arguments 
against Descartes are typically framed this way: to know if 
upn is true, we must know if "'P' is clear and distinct" is 
true, which in turn requires that we know if u•p• is clear 
and distinct~ is clear and distinct, and on ill1 ~nf~n~tum. 
Frege (1897) had argued that illlyconception of truth, and a 
fort~or~ any conception of truth as correspondence, would 
have to be formed using other semantic or epistemological 
terms. The ineliminability of semantic terms would thus gen· 
erate an infinite regress. Moore's own argument points to a 
regress even more bas~c than that brought directly against 
Descartes' linking premise. 
Moore is to be credited with showing that the problem 
with correspondence theories consists, not merely in ground-
ing the linking premise, but in determining the content of 
the objective premise to which the linking premise refers. A 
linking premise L asserts that a certain criterion has been 
met by subjective premises Sin such a way as to justify ob-
jective conclusion o. It establishes a link between the con-
tent of Sand that of o. Now Sis a proposition which as· 
serts that some subject (perhaps oneself) has a certain 
propositional attitude towards O: e.g., s judges Oto be 
true. So the content of O is conta~nedwithin the content of 
S. The occurrence of O within Sis not truth-functional; em· 
bedded within a verb phrase containing the psychological verb 
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"judges," it is rendered intensional: it simply does not 
follow straightaway from the fact thats judges O is true 
that O ~s true (not in the way that one can infer from up & 
Q' that 'P' is true). This is what necessitates a linking 
premise. Linking premises warrant the de-intensionalizing of 
the proposition that is embedded. 
Moore's point is that correspondence theories make it 
impossible to even ~dsnt~fy (know, determine, etc.) the con-
tent of 0, and so, for that matter, the content of S. For 
Moore the problem is not that the linking premise itself re-
quires justification, but that its content cannot be deter-
mined. Obviously, if a content cannot even be determined, 
the claim of which it is the content cannot be justified. 
One cannot justify a claim whose content one does not know. 
If S contains O, thens must be able to 'fix' or 'cut 
off' O from ths wor2d in order to represent it. That is to 
say, s must be able to isolate certain features of the world 
that are to be represented- -t!lnd thsn rsprsssnt thsm. But how 
is this to be accomplished? To fix the content of a true be-
lief, one must be able to determine wh.ich features of the 
world are to be "cut off• and ufixed." If one can do this, 
it becomes superfluous to posit mental representations to ac-
complish this very goal. If one cannot do this, then it 
seems impossible that representations of the relevant fea-
tures of the world could occur. If one cannot be aware of 
what makes O true, then how is one to determine the content 
of Osuch that one could judge it true (so that, therefore, S 
is true)? This is what Moore is getting at when he says: 
[t]he theory would ... seem to demand the comple 
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tion of an infinite nwnber of psychological judg-
ments before any judgment can be made at all. But 
such a completion is impossible; and therefore all 
judgment is likewise impossible. It follows, 
therefore, if we are to avoid this absurdity, that 
the 'idea used in judgment' must be something other 
than a part of the content of any idea of mine 
(1899, p. 178) ." 
One would have to know what O is true of before it is possi-
ble to for:m the judgment that O is true. But one could not 
do that, until one determines the content of O, which is ac-
complished by the for:mation of the content of S's judging 
that O is true. But that content cannot be formed unless S 
knows what O is true of; hence, the infinite regress. 
As the passage above indicates, if judgment (including 
true judgment) is possible, then entertaining a true belief 
cannot be mediated by mental representations. If true belief 
is possible, then one must have direct access to the objects 
of awareness. 
Consequently, if a subject forms an awareness of some 
kind of thing, of some property like yellowness, then the ob-
ject of awareness cannot be a mere representation of some-
thing else of which the subject is indirectly aware. To be 
aware of yellowness is to be aware of yellowness ~tself. 
So, for Moore, all properties or concepts have objectiv-
ity: the property of being yellow, being the current 
President of the U.S., being a unicorn, being good, etc, are 
all real. What distinguishes properties that are merely con-
ceivable from those that are perce~vable is that the latter, 
but not the former, also possess the property of existence. 
11 I want to thank Gary Levvis for calling this passage to 
my attention; his (1993b, pp. 6-7) discussion of this issue 
has provided valuable information on this topic to me. 
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That, in effect, means that they possess spatio-temporal 
qualities. The property of being a yellow object at a par-
ticular location at a particular time can ex~st, but the 
property being yellow (like the property of being a unicorn) 
considered in itself is merely real. All properties, howev-
er, including that which is denoted by •good" possess mind-
independent existence. That being the case, what remains to 
be determined is whether •good" denotes a natural property 
(i.e., something which must be existent) or whether it can 
denote that which is merely real. 
Moore's Pr~nci'p~a Eth~ca begins by asserting that the 
study of ethics must commence with an investigation into the 
nature of goodness prior to any discussion of what would con-
stitute good behavior, which was the typical starting place 
for most ethical theorists. Moore's emphasis on this point 
was due to his view that good is a property corrrnon to many 
things, not just behavior. And since good does denote such a 
property, it was necessary to explicate its meaning if one 
was to come to some understanding of the structure of morali-
ty. Moore likens the property of being good to the property 
of being yellow. The reasoning behind this analogy had to do 
with the fact that ye11owdenotes a simple property, i.e., it 
is something that is readily perceivable and immediately 
knowable. One cannot exp2a~n to another what yellow ~s: you 
just have to look and see in order to understand it. Moore 
points out that such a term cannot be defined; definitions 
are reserved only for complex properties, such as the prop-
erty of being a horse. This type of property can be broken 
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down into simpler parts. Ye11ow, however, cannot be reduced 
to any simpler parts: it just is what it is. 
One might ask, though, what would be wrong with defining 
ye11owas a certain set of light vibrations that stimulate 
the eye? The obvious problem with such a physicalistic re-
duction is that, as Arthur Danto (1989, p. 10) points out, 
the requirement of identity is not met in this situation: 
although the spectral distributions severally cause my per-
ceiving the color yellow, it is not the case that this color 
is identical with any one of them. Moore would agree with 
Danto; he said that the vibrations are •what correspond in 
space to the yellow which we actually perceive• (1903, p. 
10). And, as is pointed out by others, one could close one's 
eyes and experience something yellow. The point here is that 
ye11owis a simple, indefinable property. 
The same holds true for the property of goodness. 
According to Moore, it too is indefinable since it is a sim-
ple property. One doesn't have to reason to determine 
whether some action or state of affairs is good; one inmedi-
ately perceives it to be good if it in fact is good. Moore 
claimed that our perception of goodness was due to our abili-
ty to detect this property by means of a special innate fac-
ulty of intuition. Now, given that good is a simple and in-
definable property, it follows that no semantic reduction of 
this property to a natural property can be made. That is to 
say, the meaning of good cannot be given in terms of what is 
pleasant, what is conducive to the greatest amount of happi-
ness, what is desirable, etc. Simple concepts are autonomous 
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in this respect. But the ethical naturalists, in particular 
the classical utilitarians, did define goodness in physical-
istic terms (like the property of being pleasurable) and so 
conmitted, according to Moore, the Naturalistic Fallacy, 
i.e., they identified a moral property with a natural one: 
[E]thics aims at discovering what are those 
other properties belonging to all things which are 
good. But far too many philosophers have thought 
that when they named those other properties they 
were actually defining good; that these properties, 
in fact, were simply not 'other,' but absolutely 
and entirely the same with goodness. This view I 
propose to call the 'naturalistic fallacy' (1903, 
p. 10) • 
To say that good denotes a natural property is to say that it 
denotes an existent. Recall the distinction made earlier be-
tween an existent property and a simply real property: the 
latter has no temporal or spatial qualities and is not a 
unique combination or cluster of properties. As Moore points 
out, such a property 
... -[i]s simply something which you think of or 
perceive, and to any one who cannot think of or 
perceive it, you can never, by any definition, make 
its nature known (1903, p. 7). 
Goodness is an example of such a real, but non-existent, 
property. It is a universal as opposed to a particular prop-
erty, and as such can be predicated of many (existent) 
things. On the other hand, an individual object (or exis-
tent) is defined by Moore as a c2usterof properties, proper-
ties that exist independent of our awareness of them. 
Goodness, for Moore, is one of those properties. It is to be 
viewed as an object, even though it has no components. It is 
substantive and as such does not depend on other properties. 
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Since goodness is considered by Moore to be a real, but non-
existent object, he refers to it as a non-nacura2 property. 
One objection that can be raised against Moore's view 
concerns a difficulty which arises when two persons' moral 
intuitions differ. How are such differences to be resolved, 
what counts as a cssc for having a correct or true intuition, 
and how shall the occurrence of false intuitions be ex-
plained? Suppose, for example, that two persons differ over 
the moral permissibility of abortion. Let us assume both 
share a number of moral beliefs: that both mother and fetus 
are persons, that both have rights, etc. Neither has a 'the-
ory' of rights that might be used to rationally assign 
greater weight to one or the other's rights. Furthermore, 
neither is inclined to equate the good with any natural phe-
nomenon, such as an action's pleasurable consequences. So we 
have two individuals who are alike in all respects, except 
that one's intuitions tell her abortion is good (permissi-
ble), and the other's intuitions tell hsrthat abortion is 
bad (impermissible) , 17 How is this difference to be recon-
17 Let it be noted that Moore would be more inclined to 
speak, not of actions, but of the 2ovs of one's friends' ex-
ceptional mental and physical qualities as good. This does 
not diminish the relevance of the example used above. That 
example was selected for its simplicity. The discussion 
above could be adapted to what Moore would be more likely to 
regard as good by considering a case in which, for example, I 
regard my love for someone's character (i.e., the character 
of a person who has perhaps chosen to have an abortion) as 
good, but someone else regards my love for that person's 
character as bad. Here, as above, there would be differing 
intuitions. If it is objected that value judgments may per-
tain only to one's own love of character, the example could 
be further modified so that one and the same person regards 
his or her love of another's character as good and bad at 
different times. 
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ciled? How do we determine whose intuition is correct? 
Consider how such conflicts are resolved when perceptual be-
liefs are involved. 
Typically if two persons hold contrary perceptua2 be-
liefs, which of the two views is correct can be determined by 
further observations made under normal-to-ideal conditions by 
'ordinary perceivers' whose faculties are functioning proper-
ly. Ordinarily, a false perceptual belief may be explained 
by appealing either to (1) a breakdown in the faculty of per-
ception, (2) a breakdown in a faculty with which perception 
is causally interactive or in the causal connection between 
the two, or (3) inadequate environmental factors that degrade 
perceptual input. The point is that when false perceptual 
beliefs arise, there is a story to be told as to how they 
could arise. That we can explain false beliefs in these 
terms is important, for if they were not so explainable it 
would be difficult to understand how rational persons could 
have false beliefs. Since it is entirely possible for ratio-
nal persons to form false beliefs, but in such a way that 
false beliefs are the exception rather than the rule, one 
desideratum for an adequate theory of judgment is that it 
provide some sort of account of how false belief is possible. 
It seems to me that, ~f one accepts a just~f~cat~on~st ep~s-
temo2ogy, then an adequate theory of judgment must do more 
than simply provide a test for whether a claim is true; it 
must provide reasons for why the test is legitimate. In the 
case of perceptual beliefs, that means providing an account 
of what makes the.observations of 'ordinary perceivers' reli-
58 
able. Such an account would need to include a description of 
the factors which distinguish accurate from inaccurate per-
ception. So, an adequate theory of judgment should not only 
be compatible with the poss~b~J~tyof there being an explana-
tion of false belief, it must provide an actual explanatory 
account of how such beliefs arise. Otherwise the test for 
truth would appear ad hoc and in need of justification. 
But how shall the occurrence of contrary moral (i.e., 
normative ethical) beliefs be explained on Moore's view? 
Although the question of false perceptual beliefs would con-
tinue to exercise Moore during the first few decades of the 
Twentieth Century, the question of false moral beliefs would 
receive little or no attention. Hardly a word is devoted to 
the subject in Pr~nc~p~a Eth~ca or Eth~cs. 
Nothing comparable to the case of perception appears to 
be in the offing when it comes to divergent intuitions. 
Presumably one would have to resolve the conflict by appeal-
ing to the beliefs of 'ordinary intuitors.' But who are they? 
Are they the members of society whose views are prevalent?11 
Suppose a society is divided in its intuitions; what then? 
And why should the number of persons who hold a belief be in 
any way relevant to whether the belief is true? Unless some 
expJanat~on can be given as to why some persons' intuitions 
should count for more than others, any such test would appear 
merely ad hoc. 
11 One might, following w. D. Ross (1930), identify right 
intuitions with those of persons raised in the right sort of 
culture. But surely this is question begging, since a value 
judgment is involved in deciding which culture has the right 
values. 
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Yet there is nothing comparable to (1) - (3) in the case 
of the mysterious faculty of intuition. Is it possible to 
ascertain a breakdown in the faculty itself? Clearly one 
cannot examine the faculty of intuition to discover something 
analogous to, say, a damaged retina. But this, it might be 
argued, is an attack upon a straw man, since it assumes the 
faculty of intuition must be analogous to a phys~c41 faculty 
of perception. The view that all mental acts (of imagining, 
conceiving, intuiting, etc.) are physical events or involve 
physical events in the manner in which perception does cer-
tainly cannot be attributed to Moore. It would be a mistake, 
accordingly, to fault Moore's idea of intuition on the 
grounds that one cannot inspect its 'parts' to see if they 
are in working order. However, .my-point is that the lack of 
an analogy here is precisely what counts out the use of 
strategy (1). One who responds to the manner described here 
is burdened with providing an kind of account of how one 
would go about diagnosing problems with a faulty intuition. 
The second strategy would involve explaining the difference 
in intuitions by appealing to differences in either the fac-
ulties with which intuition interacts or in the abilities of 
those faculties to interact with intuition. Confronted with 
someone whose intuitions differ from his own, Moore might at-
tempt to locate and prove false some belief the other has 
concerning the morally relevant facts. Once the falsehood is 
removed, their intuitions could coincide. But in the example 
above we are assuming that the persons are alike in terms of 
their non-moral beliefs. Moore would have to respond by 
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saying that it is impossible for two persons alike in every 
respect to differ with respect to their intuitions; that is, 
he would have to rule out the example as somehow illegiti-
mate. But the example does not describe a logically impossi-
ble situation, so it is difficult to see how it could be re-
garded as illicit in some respect. Explaining how it might 
be is precisely the burden Moore faces. 
Perhaps strategy (2) 'WOuld be more effective if applied 
to the re1at1on between intuition and other faculties. It is 
hard to make sense out of this proposal, however. Since 
Moore is in no way a materialist, the relation cannot be a 
causal one. Indeed, the very idea of intuition 1nteract1ng 
with other faculties is problematic, since for Moore, acts of 
intuition are autonomous: one can form an awareness of the 
concept or universal to which "good" refers quite apart from 
any perception of particular good objects. He describes in-
tuition as a mental act that involves an ~mmed1ate relation 
to a proposition or fact (1903, p. 148). One perceives a 
given fact and 1ntu1ts among its constituents the simple, 
non-natural property to which "good" refers. 19 These mental 
acts operate in tandem, as it were. That a particular action 
or fact is good cannot, on pain of committing the naturalis-
tic fallacy, be 1nferred from the physical (or natural) prop-
erties of the fact. This precludes the possibility of apply-
ing strategy (2) in the second manner. 
Similar considerations can be brought to bear upon the 
"It is helpful here to remember that for Moore (at the 
time of Pr1nc1p1a Eth1ca) objects and facts are nothing more 
than clusters of properties or universal. 
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third kind of strategy. In the case of differing perceptual 
beliefs it is possible to appeal to environmental factors. 
Inadequate lighting can make vision difficult. A voice that 
is too soft is hard to hear. But nothing comparable to ~his 
is possible in the case of intuition. This sort of explana-
tion is possible for differences of perceptual belief only 
because perception is a physical event in which interaction 
occurs with physical features of the environment. An act of 
intuition, on the other hand, is not a physical event, and 
that which is its object is not a physical feature of the en-
vironment. Now perhaps one might want to defend Moore by 
saying that the property of goodness might somehow be dimin-
ished in its appearance. But it is difficult to reconcile 
this claim with Moore's contention that ngood" refers to a 
s1mp1e property. The reason we can speak, for example, of 
different shades or luminosities of blueness in the visual 
field is because a color's hue is distinguishable from its 
shade and brilliance. Colors are comp1ex, not simple, prop-
erties. It is because of this complexity that we may speak 
of the diminishment, and not the absence, of blueness in the 
visual field under certain conditions. If goodness can ap-
pear to a greater or lesser degree before intuition, then 
goodness would have to be complex. Consequently, strategy 
(3) must be ruled out. 
So, it appears there is no way for Moore to explain dif-
ferences in moral intuitions. The upshot of this is that he 
can provide no way to distinguish true from false moral intu-
itions, should such differences occur. 
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Moore's argument against naturalism can be criticized as 
well. Has he adequately demonstrated that "good" refers to a 
non-natural property? It does not appear that he has. My 
main concern here is that his analysis does not deal with how 
we can legitimately compare objects with each other. 
Although he does point out in Pr1nc~"p1a Ech1ca that he is 
only interested in understanding the nature of goodness (p. 
12) and so seems content upon staying at the meta-level, one 
wonders how we are to say that some object is beccer than an-
other. In order to say that xis better than y, one would 
have to be able to understand how the predicate nis good" re-
lates to x, i.e., how it is better, in what respect it is 
better. But in doing so, one would have to know something 
about the natural characteristics of that object. Applying 
the predicate #is good" to x would involve, then, a contin-
gent relationship between the subject and the predicate, and 
in that event, one could not hold that goodness was a non-
natural property. 
Given that Moore's intuitionist account of the objectiv-
ity of moral properties fails to distinguish true from false 
intuitions as well as fails to show how moral properties as 
non-natural properties do relate to natural objects, one can 
conclude that such an account falls short of proving that 
moral realism is a viable theory. 
Meta-ethical Implications .o.f Platonistic semantics. 
Before proceeding to the accounts offered by the empiri-
cists I would like to examine the meta-ethical implications 
of J. J. Katz's recent work in semantic theory. Although his 
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recent work The HBtaphys.ics of Hean.ing (1990) does not ex-
plicitly pursue meta-ethical issues, it does carry relevant 
implications which are hard to dub as either purely 
Platonistic or naturalistic. His semantic theory entails a 
form of realism which doBs appeal to Platonic entities to ex-
plain the nature of moral discourse: however, it is a form of 
realism which does not .ident.ifythe referents of such dis-
course w.ith Platonic entities. I do think Katz's view can be 
subjected to criticisms which cut to the heart of his seman-
tic theory and which, interestingly, form the basis for the 
sort of view which will later be attributed to Arrington. 
Katz is what is known as a semantic realist or 
Platonist. He holds that the sensBs of expressions, moral 
expressions not withstanding, are abstract entities which in 
no way depend for their existence upon the practices of lan-
guage-users or upon the customs of linguistic communities. 
Even if there were no language-users at all, meaning or sense 
would exist. More importantly, for our purposes, even if 
there could be a group of language-users who do not engage in 
moral discourse (or in some arBa of moral discourse--for ex-
ample, the area of moral discourse which concerns justice), 
the meanings of such terms would continue to exist. Those 
meanings would be there to be grasped in the event that the 
group undergoes an evolution in its (moral) linguistic capac-
ities or practices. What is interesting about Katz's view is 
that he alleges it to be the best of the competing sc.iBDt.if.ic 
theories concerning the nature of linguistic sense and of the 
relations (synonymy, antonymy, etc.) which hold among senses. 
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He maintains that the very sorts of considerations which led 
Chomsky to posit deep syntactic structures to explain certain 
facets of linguistic behavior lead h~m to posit deep semantic 
structures which are Platonic in nature. 
Katz's semantic Platonism competes against three other 
theories of meaning with which it is incompatible; these re-
spectively identify the meaning or sense of an expression 
with (i) the expression's referent or truth-condition, (ii) 
the use to which tokens of the expression are put, or (iii) 
some psychological entity which plays a causal role in the 
production of tokens of the linguistic expression. According 
to Katz, none of these competing theories can adequately ex-
plain speakers' knowledge of such semantic facts as are de-
scribed in (1)- (6) below (1990, pp. 28-29). 
(1) Although •soluble" and "insoluble" are 
antonyms, •flamnable• and •inflammable" are syn-
onyms. 
(2) "Valuable" and •invaluable" are neither 
antonyms nor synonyms. 
(3) uPocket watch" is similar in meaning to npock-
et comb," but the similarity does not extend to 
upocket battleship." 
(4) The expressions "free gift" and ntrue fact" 
are redundant. 
(5) •sank" and udust" are ambiguous, but only the 
latter is an antilogy, i.e., a word with antonymous 
senses. 
(6) The sentences •A sister is a sibling" and •A 
square is a rectangle" are analytic, i.e.,have 
pleonastic predicates.• 
The knowledge which speakers have of such facts, which is 
21 This is only a portion of the list actually offered by 
Katz. 
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manifested more in their linguistic behavior than in their 
willingness to assent to claims like (1)- (6), cannot be ac-
counted for by the competing theories. Linguistic behavior 
can be explained only if we attribute to speakers a capacity 
to grasp (or intuit) abstract semantic properties (like amb~-
gu.ity, and relations (like synon..YJTI.Y} • 21 
Against referential accounts of meaning, Katz urges the 
traditional Fregean objection. Linguistic expressions can be 
co-referential yet vary in their sense. For example, uthe 
Morning Star• and uthe Evening Star" both refer to Venus, but 
they are not synonymous with one another. This fact counts 
against truth-conditional analyses of sense, because sen-
tences into which these expressions figure--for example, uThe 
Morning Star will rise at 8:00 p.m tonight• and "The Evening 
Star will rise at 8:00 p.m. tonight•--have identical truth-
conditions but vary in terms of their sense. Typically this 
is put by saying that the two sentences express different 
contents or propositions. 
Katz directs t-wo arguments against the thesis that mean-
ing is to be equated with use (a view associated with 
Wittgenstein). The first argument is that expressions which 
have the same sense can have different uses (1990, pp. 40-
41). Consider the difference in connotation -psychiatrist," 
and ushrink." Such terms, according to Katz, have the same 
meaning but vary in terms of their connotation and, there-
fore, their use. Clearly Katz is correct in that these terms 
21 What follows is necessarily condensed. A fuller presen-
tation and critique of Katz's arguments may be found in 
Levvis (1993). 
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would be used in different contexts. ushrink," for example, 
would more likely be used in the context of an individual who 
does not hold psychiatrists in high regard. But should we 
regard these terms as alike in their meaning? Why should we 
not treat the connotations of··the images and emotions evoked 
by--these terms as a component of their meaning? Katz antic-
ipates this objection and responds that meaning or sense is 
the sort of thing which supports valid inferences, whereas 
connotation does not. For example, it follows from the mean-
ing of the word ubachelor" that if uJohn is a bachelor" is 
true, then "John is unmarried" is true. Similarly it follows 
from the meaning of the word "shrink" that if "She went to 
see a shrink" is true, then "She went to see a mental health 
expert" is true. What "She went to see a shrink" does not 
entail, however, is that the person speaking is in effect 
dissatisfied with or against psychiatric treatment. It is 
conceptual content, rather than connotation, which con-
tributes to the meaning of an expression. The three terms 
above share the same content (a menta1 hsa1th worker of a 
certa1n sort ... ), even if they cannot be used in the same 
way. 
Katz's second argument against equating meaning with use 
is that some expressions can have a meaning but no use what-
soever (1990, pp. 42-43). Some grammatical strings are sim-
ply too long to be comprehensible to human beings; they will, 
for that reason, fail to have a use. Or, again, legitimate 
syntactic operations may be performed upon a sentence (embed· 
ding operations, for example) which produce sentences of mod-
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erate length which are incomprehensible and useless: uThe 
man who the boy the students recognized pointed out is a 
friend of mine" happens to be the product of syntactic opera-
tions performed upon •The man is a friend of mine and the boy 
pointed out the man and the students recognized the boy." 
Since there can be meaningful linguistic expressions which 
have no use, meaning cannot be equated with use. To identify 
meaning and use would leave one unable to explain how speak-
ers who are led through the syntactic transformations one 
step at a time are able to recognize the product as hav~nga 
meaning. 
Finally, Katz attacks the view that meaning may be iden-
tified with some psychological entity that is causally effi-
cacious in the production of utterances and other linguistic 
tokens. Such theories are often referred to as conceptua1~st 
semantic theories (which is something of a misnomer, since 
Katz's own theory adverts to conceptua1 content). 
Conceptualist semantic theories come in a variety of forms. 
One form taken seriously today is that which is grounded in 
Chomsky's generative grammar and which has among its advo-
cates Jerry Fodor and others who think that language compre-
hension should be modeled along linear computational process-
es.n This means that linguistic competence and performance 
consist in fo.DTM11 operations performed upon syntactic units 
of a language. The syntactic units upon which operations are 
performed are not identical to the (surface) syntactical 
22 Such models are questioned even from within the camp of 
computational linguistics, for example, by proponents of neu-
ral network models. 
68 
units of natural language. Rather they are deep syntactic 
structures of which the language-user may have no direct 
awareness. That deep syntactic structure exists and plays a 
causal role in the production of linguistic tokens is evi-
dent, for example, from the fact that NSave yourself!• is 
grammatical but #Save herself!" is not. To understand why 
the first is grammatical and meaningful but the latter is 
not, it is necessary to attribute to connnands a suppressed 
second-person subject,even if there is no corresponding pro-
noun within its surface structure. All commands must have a 
second-person subject which agrees in person with the reflex-
ive pronoun contained in the sentence; that is why •save her-
self!" is ungrammatical and meaningless. 
Katz agrees with Chomsky and his followers that there 
must be deep syntactic structures. He disagrees, though, 
with their contention that the underlying syntactic units 
thus posited may be counted as themean~ngs of the tokens 
which they serve to produce. The semantic properties of a 
language, he maintains, are simply not isomorphic with its 
syntactic properties, not even if we count in such underlying 
syntactic structures. A word like 0 bachelor" is syntactical-
ly simple,and presumably it deep structure counter-part would 
be simple too. Yet it is a term which is semantically com-
plex. The meaning of •bachelor" decomposes into uI2/118rr~sd 
adu.lt hU111t!U1 JM.le ,,,ho .is e.1.ig~b.le for marr~age. In order to 
explain speakers' readiness to count #bachelor" and 0 unmar-
ried adult human male who is eligible for marriage" as syn-
onymous expressions, one must attribute to speakers more than 
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simply a tacit knowledge of syntax. Knowledge of sense or 
meaning must be more than a knowledge of syntax. 
Deep syntactic structures there may be, but they must be 
understood. for what they are: linguistic tokens which have a 
meaning. Like any linguistic token they require ~nterpreta-
t~on. This process of interpretation cannot amount simply to 
mapping one syntactic unit onto others, for they too would 
simply be tokens which have a meaning. A linguistic token 
(whether an utterance, an inscription, or a sentence in the 
head) can serve as a locus for meaning; but it cannot be a 
meaning. 
According to Katz there is little left for senses to be 
other than abstract Platonic entities. If the sense of an 
expression cannot be identified with the expression's refer-
ential or truth-conditions, with its usage, or with some fea-
ture within the mind of the language-user, there is nothing 
left in the natura1 world for senses to be. Senses are ab-
stract entities. 
This view has major implications for meta-ethics. 
Because Katz does not accept referential accounts of meaning, 
his view is incompatible with Moore's. For Moore, ugoodnessu 
refers to a simple unanalyzable property; that is its mean-
ing. For Katz, the meaning of •goodness• as well as other 
moral terms must be an abstract entity. It must consist in a 
conceptual content capable of being grasped by language-
users. If there is disagreement among language-users as to 
how to define •goodness,• •justice," and so on, that only at-
tests to a certain ~ncapac~tyon the parts of the language-
70 
users in question. It demonstrates merely that humans' lin-
guistic capacities have not evolved sufficiently enough yet 
for humans to grasp the meanings of these terms. What ugood-
ness" means is something abstract and unchanging. Likewise, 
the semantic relation of antonyrny which holds between ngood-
ness" and ubadness" is unchanging and eternal. 
The move from semantic realism to moral realism comes in 
the following way. Although Katz's theory does not identify 
the referents of moral terms with abstract entities, it fol-
lows that whether some object, action or event may be re-
ferred to as 0 good" or ubadw is determined wholly by its re-
lation to the concepts which are expressed by those terms, 
and those concepts are not in any way human constructions. 
So, whether burning a cat is bad will depend upon, and on1y 
upon, whether that kind of action fa11s under the concept ex-
pressed by "bad." Since the senses of expressions are not 
human constructions, this qualifies as a form of moral real-
ism. An action's being good or not is a determinate matter. 
One and the same kind of action cannot be good for one lin-
guistic community but not for another. Disagreements over 
what to call ugood," stem from an underdeveloped (or unex-
ploited) linguistic faculty. Human psychological faculties 
do not determine the sense--or, therefore, the reference--of 
moral terms. 
This theory is interesting in that it circumvents at 
least one main criticism of Moore's intuitionism by not 
equating the referents of moral terms with abstract entities. 
Because it does not equate the meaning of ugood" with some-
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thing unanalyzab1s, it is able to avoid traditional objec-
tions which are sensitive to the multiplicity of syntactic 
contexts into which Ngood" may figure (particularly various 
adjectival forms). 
Another problem, that will become of greater importance 
below in our consideration of enq;,irical justificatory ap-
proaches, is that sc~BJJt~f~c approaches to meta-ethics (and 
Katz claims his is a piece of empirical linguistics) are 
guilty of leaving their subject matter behind. A scientific 
investigation into the nature of moral judgments and dis-
course will not appeal at the theoretical level to what is 
essential to such judgments and discourse, namely, their nor-
RMlt~vs content. Rather the product of such an investigation 
will be a piece of psychology or linguistics. An explanation 
of moral discourse along those lines will appeal to the pos-
session of certain beliefs and to the fact that those beliefs 
are hs1d (asslll11Bd, des.ired) to be true, but they will not ap-
peal to the truth of those claims: a normative claim cannot 
serve an explanatory role. 
Katz's view avoids this problem entirely. It is scien-
tific in its methodology, yet it, in the end, appeals to en-
tities (senses) which play a normative role. The senses of 
expressions prescribe what counts as meaningful discourse. 
The sentence •John is a married bachelor• (if not uttered as 
a joke) is nonsensical precisely because the senses of its 
expression are not compatible; thus the ru1s ••married' may 
not be used to modify 'bachelor'" reflects a certain relation 
among the senses of those expressions. Now it's true that 
72 
Katz's theory does not appeal to the normative in the ethical 
(as opposed to the normative in the semantical or syntacti-
cal); nevertheless, it is a theory in which the normativity 
of the semantical does determine the reference of moral 
terms. So while the referents of those terms (goodness or 
badness itself, let us say) play no explanatory role, what 
they are ~s determined by something which plays an explanato-
ry role. 
Katz's view seems to be immune to the kind of criticism 
that may be leveled against other empirical approaches. I 
would, however, like to criticize Katz on grounds that are 
not unrelated to my advocacy of the positions which are held 
by Arrington and Blackburn (to be described below). Their 
views, particularly Arrington's, are heavily influenced by 
Wittgenstein and my own criticism is Wittgensteinian in na-
ture. Basically my criticism is that our judgments concern-
ing what counts as the correct application of a term include 
an arbitrary and conventional element. This is a criticism 
directed against foundationalist accounts of knowledge, in-
cluding foundationalist accounts of our knowledge of the 
meanings of linguistic expressions (among which I count 
Katz's theory). Foundationalism within the theory of knowl-
edge maintains that knowledge consists of propositions which 
are self-evidently true (perhaps because their denials entail 
a contradiction, as Descartes thought) or which are entailed 
by propositions which are self-evidently true. The problem 
with foundationalism is that it must employ a method by means 
of which propositions of one kind or another may be declared 
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either as or as not foundational, and that methodology (or 
the propositions which describe that methodology) cannot it· 
self be foundational. This is the problem which gives rise 
to the famous Cartesian Circle: Descartes counted the cog1to 
as foundational on the grounds that it is clear and distinct; 
clarity and distinctness (particularly the latter) are to be 
understood in terms of a proposition's inability to entail a 
contradiction; yet it is precisely that inability which is 
supposedly to be secured by a proposition's being clear and 
distinct. The only way out of the circle is to st1pu2ats 
that propositions which meet a certain criterion will be 
counted ilJTIOng those which constitute knowledge. This fact, 
however, undermines foundationalism. Methodologies may, of 
course, be justified on pragmatic or other grounds, but at 
some point (to echo Wittgenstein, 1958, sec. 485) Just1f1ca-
t1on camss to an end. It is at that point at which one 
reaches bedrock and is inclined to say #'This is simply what 
I do' " ( 19 5 8 , sec . 21 7 ) . 
It is clear that Katz's descriptions of semantic facts, 
(1)- (6) above, are intended to play a foundational role. Put 
in their material mode counter-parts they express what are 
traditionally regarded as analytic truths. To deny the mate-
rial mode equivalent of #The term 'bachelor' is synonymous 
with that of 'unmarried adult human male who is eligible for 
marriage'# would be to utter that which cannot possibly be 
true (Descartes' criterion). Similarly, to deny that HA sis-
ter is a sibling" is analytic--entails that it is possible 
for there to be a sister who is not a sibling, but (given the 
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meaning of usisterw) this is not possible. It is this which 
accounts for the normativity of Katzian senses. Relations 
among senses are necessary; they are true by virtue of their 
meanings. Such relations prescr~bs how you can speak. If 
the sense of •bachelor• just is •an umarried. adult human male 
who is eligible for marriage•, then one cannot go around say-
ing that Susie is a bachelor. 
But how does one know that one knows the sense of a par-
ticular linguistic expression? According to Katz, knowledge 
of the semantic features of a language requires a special 
kind of linguistic intuition. We need not concern ourselves 
with Katz's account of linguistic intuition (let it suffice 
to say that it involves psychological representations of 
senses and their relations); even if there is such a faculty, 
those who employ this faculty must have some criterion for 
when this faculty has been correctly utilized. How is one to 
verify whether one's linguistic intuitions are accurate? 
Let's suppose that Joe is an unmarried adult human male and 
that we describe him as such, what sort of procedure are we 
to employ to judge the appropriateness of labeling Joe a 
•bachelor•? Our intuitions tell us this is permissible, but 
how do we know? How many times should we consult our intu-
itions? The point is that what counts for us as the correct 
way of going on (i.e., what we consider justifiable) is not 
itself justifiable (•If it did not it would not be justifica-
tion,w Wittgenstein, 1958, sec 485). 
Katz would like to deny that meaning or sense is somehow 
a human construct, but he cannot avoid the criticism that 
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judgments as to whether we have exercised our linguistic.in-
tuitions in the proper way involve a conventional element. 
This is a point which seems to me to count in favor of anti-
realist semantic theories and ultimately anti-realist meta-
ethical theories, a matter which will await further examina-
tion below. 
4. ETHICAL EMPIRICISM 
Many moral realists must be categorized as empiricists 
rather that rationalists or intuitionists. For them, the 
methods of the sciences provide the requisite justification 
for claims. Realists such as Sturgeon (1988) and Boyd 
(1-988), for example, do not fall within the Cartesian tradi-
tion of doubting sense experience but rather in the Lockean 
tradition which looks to sense experience as the source of 
knowledge. However, calling these justificatory moral real-
ists uethical empiricistsn is problematic, as there are also 
moral realists who are not justificationists but who do ap-
peal to natural facts about how subjects do form moral judg-
ments. The two camps of naturalist realists are most immedi-
ately the philosophical heirs of Quine and Wittgenstein re-
spectively. 
All the philosophers examined in this section of this 
chapter may be described as Quinean Naturalists, because they 
share a certain way of construing the issues that stems from 
Quine. Each accepts the premise that 1f no.rmat1ve ethical 
theories are amenable to realistic interpretation, then such 
theories must be analogous in certain relevant ways to scien-
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tific theories. In calling them {)u.:inean Naturalists I do not 
mean to suggest that they accept Quine's own conclusion con-
cerning the status of ethical theories; indeed, they do not. 
Quine (1981, pp. 55-66) actually denies that ethical theories 
can be interpreted realistically, on the grounds that they 
are methodolog.ica.1.ly .inf.:irm. What makes it possible for 
philosophers to accept Quine's premise without accepting his 
conclusion are the varying views as to what are the relevant 
features of science which ethics must share. This particular 
section examines these competing realisms and the arguments 
which can be leveled against them. 
Without going into Quine in any great detail let me say 
that Quine is the ultimate empiricist: For Quine, all state-
ments--even those commonly regarded as analytic and apr.:ior.:i-
-are subject to revision with respect to their presumed truth 
or falsity. This is the crux of his dissolution of the ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction. That distinction, according to 
Quine, assumes that certain individual sentences of a theory 
can be meaningful apart from the other sentences in that the-
ory or can be true come what may. Quine rejects such an as-
sumption and opts instead for a holistic view, a view that 
regards a scientific theory as a network of sentences. The 
truths of statements from logic and mathematics which have 
traditionally been regarded as analytic are now to be con-
strued simply as more intransigent than those which are more 
obviously contingently true. Ultimately, wlJat there :is is to 
be determined by what is in accordance with the methods and 
theories of the best science of the day. It is with this in 
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mind that Quine argues in "On the Nature of Moral Values" 
that ethical theories lack the potential to carry ontological 
commitment on the grounds that they are methodologically in-
firm. Quine's view rests on the apparent fact that there is 
nothing in ethics which is comparable to theory confinnation 
and disconfirmation which is the earmark of the physical sci-
ences. Science, unlike ethics, permits the forming and test-
ing of hypotheses. Characteristic of this process is the 
forming of predictions which are followed by observations 
which either confirm the hypothesis to some degree or discon-
firm it. Ethical judgments, however, do not employ predic-
tion and observation. 23 In what follows we are concerned with 
the views of philosophers who, like Quine, are basically un-
willing to quantify over anything (sets being an exception 
for Quine) that is not instrumental to empirical investiga-
tion. 
Contemporary moral realists such as Sturgeon and Boyd 
maintain that ethics shares a sense of continuity with sci-
ence in that both involve the testing of hypotheses. If a 
hypothesis passes the relevant tests, it can be said to be 
ev.idence for the overall theory of which it is a part. What 
these moral realists intend to show is that certain moral hy-
potheses can be shown to be true and, as such, are to be as 
explanatorily relevant to our observations and evaluations of 
behavior. In what follows, I first examine Sturgeon's view 
21 W.V.O. Quine, "On the Nature of Moral Values," in 
Theor.ies and Th.ings, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981, pp. 55-66. For a detailed discussion of Quine's view, 
see R. Gibson's En1.ightened J'bnp.ir.ic.ism: An Exam.inat.lon of 
fJT. V. (}u.ine 's Theory of KnoAT1edge, University of South Florida 
Press, Tampa, pp. 155-176. 
78 
and then move on to Boyd's realist position. My PUrPOSe in 
doing it in this way has to do with the fact that (i) 
Sturgeon's view is an attack on Gilbert Harman's view that 
moral observations add nothing relevant to our explanations 
and (ii) that his view is a weaker version of moral realism 
than that which is presented by Boyd. Boyd's generally 
stronger view is, I feel, more supportive of the ethics-sci-
ence analogy. 
As pointed out above, Sturgeon (1988) responds to 
Harman's charge that moral observations are explanatorily ir-
relevant to why we make the moral judgments we do. Harman 
(1977) speaks of uthe problem with ethics• in the opening 
chapter of The Nature of Nora1~tyand his investigation cen-
ters around the question of how one is to test and confirm 
moral principles and whether such principles can help in the 
explanation of our observations. Ultimately, the problem 
with ethics has to do with its inability to explain why we 
observe what we observe, that it cannot confirm moral princi-
ples in the way that science would be able to do so. Toil-
lustrate his point, Harman begins his analysis by showing the 
relation between perception and observation in both science 
and ethics. uperception,• according to Harman, uinvolves 
forming a belief as a fairly direct result of observing some-
thing; you can form a belief only if you understand the rele-
vant concepts and a concept is what it is by virtue of its 
role in some theory• (1977, p. 5). The relation between per-
ception and observation is an intimate one, and points to the 
fact that observation is theory-1aden (1977, p. 4). What is 
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perceived will depend to a certain extent on what principles 
and theories you hold. Harman presents us with the following 
example to illustrate the role of perception and observation 
in science and their link to the confirmation of a theory: 
Consider a physicist making an observation to 
test a scientific theory. Seeing a vapor trail in 
a cloud chamber, he thinks, uThere goes a proton.• 
He can count his making the observation as confirm-
ing evidence for his theory only to the extent that 
it is reasonable to explain his making the observa-
tion by assuming that, not only is he in a certain 
psychological •set", given the theory he accepts an 
his beliefs about the experimental apparatus, but 
furthermore, there really was a proton going 
through the cloud chamber, causing the vapor trail, 
which he saw as a proton (1977, p.6). 
What this example shows is that the scientist must assume 
certain physical facts (at the very least, that there rsa22y 
is a proton) in order to sxp2a~n his observation of a vapor 
trail in a cloud chamber. Now, according to Harman, a theory 
should include only those facts that would be considered nec-
essary for the explanation of an observation. If, as Harman 
maintains, the physicists's observation of the vapor trail 
which led to his conclusion that a proton existed in the 
cloud chamber could have been more economically accounted for 
by reference to his psychological set alone, then everything 
else presented should be considered ~rre2svant to the making 
of that observation. But, of course, reference to the other 
factors, including the existence of a proton, is necessary 
and reasonable in this and other types of similar situations, 
since the physicist's observation does serve as evidence for 
the theory itself. And, for Harman, scientific observations 
are best explained by assuming that the events they report 
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cause them. 
Can, however, this analysis be applied to the moral sit-
uation? A moral theory, like a scientific one, should con-
tain only those principles that are relevant to the making of 
some moral observation. Consider what is being observed in 
the following scenario, to use one of Harman's examples. You 
see teenagers pouring gasoline on a cat. You then observe 
them setting the cat on fire. Are there any specifically au-
tonomous mora2 facts that must be assumed in order to arrive 
at your conclusion that this type of behavior is wrong? Does 
one have to infer the existence of moral facts in order to 
explain our moral observation? Hannan argues that the intro-
duction of mora2 facts adds noth.ing to our explanation of why 
we act as we do, why we observe what we do observe. In 
ethics, one doesn't have to assume that there really exists 
some moral property of wrongness, say, in order to explain 
his observation that what the teenagers are doing is wrong. 
As Hannan points out, 
If you round a corner and see a group of 
young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ig-
nite it, you do not need to conc2ude that what 
they are doing is wrong; you do not need to 
figure anything out; you can see that it is 
wrong (1977, p. 4). 
Whether the act in question is rea22ywrong, then, does not 
matter to the explanation of your observation. Unlike scien-
tific observations, moral observations never have to assume 
that the moral events (or facts) reported cause them. 
Explanations of moral observations need only involve refer-
ence to theories regarding the observer's moral psychology or 
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sensibility (1977, p. 4). Moral judgments, as it were, could 
be described as the result of the observer peering through a 
nonnative lens, her judgment being the coloring (i.e., the 
evaluating) of some particular state of affairs as morally 
right or wrong. In contrast, the scientist's thinking that 
MThere goes a proton." serves as evidence for his observation 
of a vapor trail in the cloud chamber. The scientist will 
have to make· assumptions about certain physical facts (that 
there really is a proton) in order to explain his observation 
of a vapor trail in a cloud chamber. So, according to 
Hannan, once we realize that we need only appeal to our par-
ticular normative or psychological theories, i.e., once we 
realize that M[a]ll we need to assume is that we have certain 
more or less articulated moral principles that are reflected 
in the judgments we make, based on our moral sensibilities" 
(1977, p. 7) for explanations of our moral observations, talk 
of moral facts is explanatorily impotent. 
What Harman is claiming is that our assumptions about 
moral facts do not explain our moral observations. What he 
means by 'explanatorily irrelevant' is that reference to 
moral properties adds nothing to the explanation that will 
help us to understand why we made the moral judgment that we 
did. According to him, it is not that there exist moral 
properties out thsrs to refer to that will Just~fyour saying 
that 'xis good,' for instance, but, rather, it is the case 
that, because of effective socialization, we have come to 
view certain things this way rather than in other ways (he 
does not dispute that we make moral judgments) and so have a 
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certain amount of agreement with those who share our inter-
ests on these issues. But appealing to •the wrongness• of 
some situation tells us nothing and, according to Harman, 
adds nothing to our observation that •xis wrong• once we 
have described the situation. What we see when we observe 
teenagers setting a cat on fire is not fllrongness per se; what 
we see is what is before us: some particular cat being set on 
fire by some particular teenagers in some particular way at 
this time and place. What we want to say is that this par-
ticular action ~s fllrong, yet saying so would not add to our 
explanation of our evaluation about that particular case and 
so, as a result, the introduction of moral facts would not 
Just~fyour saying that what the teenagers are doing is 
wrong. At most, what is shown is a reference to the fact 
that we have been socialized to give this type of judgment; 
it has not been shown that there rea11yare moral facts. 
Hannan has so far pointed out that moral properties and 
facts are explanatorily impotent since our moral judgments 
and behavior can be partially explained by reference to natu-
ral and social scientific facts about ourselves, specifically 
reference to our psychological make-up, and, as such, bring-
ing in or positing moral facts and properties is unnecessary. 
But that does not quite limit ethics to being reduc~b1e to 
the natural facts. If anything, Harman claims, ethics will 
only turn out to be part~a11yreducible to the natural and 
social scientific facts. By showing what is wrong with a re-
ductive ethical naturalist view, Harman will conclude that a 
scientific approach to meta-ethics will not adequately ac-
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count for the nature of moral decision-making. 
A reductive ethical naturalist will claim that a moral 
fact is reducible to some natural or social scientific fact. 
By reducing moral facts to natural ones, we could use assump-
tions about those facts to help explain our observations of 
behavior. Harman (1977, p. 14-15) discusses whether moral 
facts might be reducible to natural ones. One possible way 
in which this reduction could take place is if such moral 
facts were to be recognized as facts about functions, roles 
and relevant interests in particular situations (1977, p. 
15). We can at least talk about non-moral evaluative facts 
in this way in that things are judged good or bad depending 
on whether or not they fulfill their intended functions, an-
swer to their expected roles, or are able to respond to the 
relevant interests of certain situations. For example, to 
say that this particular knife is a good knife is to say that 
it cuts well, among other things. And when one says that 
some knife is a good knife, we take it as a matter of fact 
that it cuts well. We would even go a step further and and 
say that we expect it to fulfill that specific function, that 
it ought to cut well if it is a good knife. To say that Mary 
is a good teacher could be to say, for example, that she is 
able to present her lectures to her students in a clear man-
ner, among other things. There are other objects, though, 
that cannot be called •good# with respect to some fun~tJon or 
ro1e (e.g., a rock) and so must be related to some particular 
Jnterest in a certain context (a good rock is one that will 
break that window). The question is, though: will this type 
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of analysis work for ethical judgments as it does for non-
moral evaluative judgments? The goodness of one's watch is 
determined by such facts as its ability to keep time, its 
simple upkeep, the length of its life, etc. The (moral) 
goodness of an action, however, cannot just be said to be 
solely determined by its physical characteristics or in terms 
of some relevant interests in that such physical facts do not 
quite define or exp1a~n the moral sense of goodness. Yet 
whether some action is good also cannot be explained by mere-
ly appealing to some moral property of goodness, not just be-
cause such a property's existence is doubtful, but because 
such a concept by itself explains nothing. 
Harman constructs the following uthought experiment# to 
illustrate that this type of analysis is not adequate for 
showing how moral facts might be reducible to or constructed 
out of observable facts: 
You have five patients in the hospital who are 
dying, each in need of a separate organ. One 
needs a kidney, another a lung, a third a heart, 
and so forth. You can save all five if you take 
a single healthy person and remove his heart, 
lungs, kidney, and so forth, to distribute to 
these five patients. Just such a healthy person 
is in room 306. He is in the hospital for routine 
tests. Having seen his test results, you know that 
he is perfectly healthy and of the right tissue 
compatibility. If you do nothing, he will survive 
without incident; the other patients will die, 
however. The other five patients can be saved only 
if the person in Room 306 is cut up and his organs 
distributed. In that case, there would be one dead 
but five saved (1977, pp. 3-4). 
The question that Harman poses at this point is whether some 
moral fact can be defined in terms of some relevant interests 
in this particular situation. The purpose behind isolating 
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the relevant interests in this situation is to help us decide 
what to do. In this particular situation most of us, I 
would guess, would go with our initial intuitions and say 
that we should not cut up a healthy person to save the lives 
of other people and that would be the end of the discussion. 
But remember that we are interested in finding out whether or 
not we can refer to this judgment as a factual judgment. If 
we call it a factual judgment, we are committing ourselves to 
the view that we can justify and explain our observation that 
Mkilling a healthy person to save others is wrong" by appeal-
ing to some moral fact of wrongness. Is this moral fact a 
fact about some relevant interest? More than just a vague 
indication would be needed if a precise reduction is to be 
possible. Keep in mind that such an identity is the goal of 
the reductive ethical naturalist. And the interests, roles 
and functions must be of a kind that is able to exp1a~n our 
observations in the situation at hand. Does specifying the 
relevant interests in this particular context adequate1y ex-
plain our observation of such an action being wrong? 
Harman argues that such a reduction is not possible, 
given that we do not have to appeal to moral facts (since, 
for Hannan, there are no moral facts) in order to explain our 
moral observations. According to Harman, the introductio.n of 
moral facts adds noth~ng to our explanation of why we act as 
we do, why we observe what we do observe. An explanation of 
why we would not want to sacrifice the life of the patient in 
room 306 does not have to appeal to any moral facts; it can 
be given in terms of what moral views we hold along with an 
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assessment of our moral sensibilities which are relevant to 
that situation. And such moral views are the result of ef-
fective socialization, according to Hannan. They have no 
status independent of our particular upbringings. 
Hannan claims that all that needs to be appealed to is the 
psychological make-up of the agents which would include some 
reference to their particular moral views. Whether the act 
in question is rea11ywrong does not matter to the explana-
tion of their observation that cutting up the healthy patient 
would be wrong and, hence, undesirable. 
But does it follow from this discussion that an account 
of our moral decision-making can adequately be justified by 
psychological and sociological facts about ourselves? No. 
According to Harman, these latter facts only serve to exp1a~n 
what we are doing when we make a moral observation; they do 
not, however, serve as the ,iust~f~cat~on for our observation 
(that what we are saying ~s true). Consider a situation in 
which an ethics teacher asks one of her students why he says 
that abortion is wrong and the student responds by saying 
that "That is the way I was raised to see it.". The student 
has offered an explanation, but clearly the goal of the 
teacher here is to have the student justify his explanation, 
i.e., say why it is true. Merely describing the psychologi-
cal and sociological facts, then, is not sufficient for the 
justification of our moral beliefs. And such a justification 
is what the nonnative ethicist is after. 
Hannan, then, cannot be considered to be an extreme 
moral nihilist since he does accept the existence of moral 
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judgments and does believe that normative ethical theory has 
a role to play, namely in the justification of our moral be-
liefs. He states, 
... [i]t is worth pointing out that extreme moral 
nihilism is not an automatic consequence of the 
point that moral facts apparently cannot help ex-
plain moral observations. Although this is grounds 
for nihilism, there are more moderate versions of 
nihilism. Not all versions imply that morality is 
a delusion and that moral judgments are to be aban-
doned the way an atheist abandons religious judg-
ments. Thus, a more moderate nihilism holds that 
the purpose of moral judgments is not to describe 
the world but to express our moral feelings or to 
serve as imperatives we address to ourselves and 
to others. In this view, morality is not under-
mined by its apparent failure to explain observa-
tions, because to expect moral judgments to be of 
help in explaining observations is to be confused 
about the function of morality (1977, p.12). 
And so, if ethical reductivist naturalists continue to hold 
their view, believing that such a reduction is possible, 
Harman concludes that moral nihilism will be victorious over 
reductive ethical naturalism. If one can show that moral 
facts and properties cannot explain why we observe what we 
observe, and in that sense can be shown to be irrelevant, 
doubt is cast on their very existence. And, if there are no 
moral facts or properties to speak of, there cannot be moral 
knowledge. Moral realism is then left without an ontological 
basis. As such, then, Harman finds that comparing ethics to 
science does not do justice to the nature of ethics. A sci-
entific approach to meta-ethics only serves to offer a de-
scription of what is going on when we make moral judgments; 
it does not pre~cribe what we ought to do. 
Ha:anan's view is that moral realists have misconstrued 
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the function of morality. Harman concludes that ethics can-
not be compared to science since science is primarily con-
cerned with description. Ethics cannot be adequately de-
scribed merely by reducing it to the natural and social sci-
entific facts, given its primary normative nature. The non-
reduct~ve ethical naturalist view of Sturgeon, however, rais-
es questions as to the legitimacy of Harman's view that any 
talk of moral facts is pointless as well as to whether his 
supposed disanalogy between science and ethics is as great as 
he makes it out to be. Sturgeon claims to be able to demon-
strate that moral facts do enter into our explanations of our 
moral observations, and thus is critical of Harman's overall 
analysis. If such a demonstration is possible, Sturgeon be-
lieves that moral realism is a possibility. 
So, the question is: can Sturgeon defend himself 
against Harman's charge? He responds in the following way. 
He takes up Harman's challenge by showing (i) that moral 
principles are not inmune from observational testing and (ii) 
that moral facts are relevant to the explanation of the moral 
judgments we make. In making a case for (i), Sturgeon gives 
the following example: 
From the surprising moral thesis that Adolf 
Hitler was a morally admirable person, together 
with a modest piece of moral theory to the effect 
that no morally see the degradation and death of 
millions of persons, one can derive the testable 
consequence that Hitler did not do this. But if he 
did, so we must give up one of our premises; and 
the choice of which to abandon is neither difficult 
nor controversial (1988, p. 232). 
Sturgeon also poi~ts out that the testing of any principles, 
scientific or moral, is not done in isolation. He is very 
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much a Quinean here, accepting the latter's naturalized epis· 
temological approach. The confinnation of a scientific prin-
ciple depends on its coherence with the overall theory, and 
the truth of the theory itself depends on how it answers to 
experience or corresponds to the world. Sturgeon believes 
that the confirmation of a moral principle or theory likewise 
depends on whether it f~ts w~th or answers to experience, as 
the Hitler example shows above. 
Making a case for (ii), however, is what Sturgeon be-
lieves will significantly affect Hannan's overall argument 
for moral skepticism. Sturgeon sets out to argue that 
"[m]oral facts do fit into our explanatory view of the world, 
and in particular into explanations of many moral observa-
tions and beliefs• (1988, p.236). Sturgeon gives the follow-
ing example (1988, p.244) to illustrate his point that a 
moral fact cannot only explain our evaluation of some person 
or action, but can account for the best or most reasonable 
explanation for that judgment: 
Bernard Devoto, in The Year of J)ec.is.ion: 18~5, 
describes the efforts of American emigrants already 
in California 
to rescue another party of emigrants, the Donner 
Party, trapped by snows in the High Sierrras, once 
their plight became known ... Relief efforts were put 
under the direction of a recent arrival, Passed 
Midshipman Selim Woodworth ... But Woodworth not only 
failed to lead rescue parties into the mountains 
himself, where other rescuers were counting on 
him (leaving children to be picked up by him, for 
example), but had to be •shamed, threatened, and 
bullied• even into organizing the efforts of others 
willing to take the risk; he spent time arranging 
comforts for himself in camp, preening himself on 
the importance of his position; and as a pre· 
dictable result of his cowardice and his exercises 
in vain-glory, many died who might have been 
saved ... DeVoto concludes: "Passed Midshipman 
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Woodworth was just no damned good" (1942, p. 422). 
Sturgeon's point is that if the evidence that Devoto cites is 
correct, then part of the best explanation that we have of 
his belief that Woodworth was no dammned good was that he was 
no damned good (1988, p. 244). Other examples involving 
moral facts as part of explanations of our moral beliefs and 
observations can also given. Sturgeon gives the example of a 
judge who, because of her compassion, gives a lighter sen-
tence to a convicted criminal (1988, p. 244) as well as the 
example of the abolition of American slavery due to the fact 
that human bondage was seen to be evil (1988, p. 245). What 
Sturgeon wants to get across here is that all of the explan-
tions given in the above cases involve an appeal to some 
moral fact. Yet, as I will point out later on in this dis-
cussion, Sturgeon's explanation of a belief in this sense 
only accounts for the existence of the belief; the explana-
tion does not serve to Jusc~fy that belief. 
What Sturgeon wants to understand at this point is how 
Harman can actually say that such facts are not explanatorily 
relevant. Sturgeon pursues the matter in the following way: 
could it be the case that the observation would have been 
made even if it turned out that that explanation was false 
(1988, p. 245)? Would Devoto have believed that Woodworth 
was no damned good if Woodworth did not have the characteris-
tics he did? Prejudices aside, and provided that Devoto can 
give evidence (such as evidence of cowardice and vani.ty) for 
his belief, then Woodworth's cowardice and vanity are rele-
vant to DeVoto's conclusion. The same point applies to the 
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cat-burning incident We say that what the hoodlums did 
(burning the cat) was wrong. But how it is determined that 
such an action is wrong? Being an ethical naturalist, 
Sturgeon claims that certain moral facts supervene upon a 
certain set of natural and social scientific facts. If there 
had been other kinds of facts, we would not have made the 
same moral observation. If we're going to say that their be-
havior is not wrong, we will have to look for some change in 
the physical facts. Perhaps we missed something. Perhaps it 
is not really gasoline they are pouring over the cat. 
Perhaps what we see is not a fire being set; maybe it is a 
reflection of one in a mirror. In that case, we would not 
say that what they are doing is wrong. But perhaps it is re-
ally what we thought we saw originally and our original as-
sessment of the case is a correct one. In any event, the 
truth of our explanation that it is wrong behavior would 
depend on the kinds of physical facts before us. 
Suppose, though, that there exists disagreement over 
whether the hoodlums' action of cat-burning is wrong, that 
while I say that what they did was wrong, another individual, 
John Smith, says that it was not. What would account for 
this disagreement given that we have the same situation be-
fore us? The first thing to question here is whether we are 
in fact seeing the same thing. We both see that some cat is 
set on fire by some teenagers. The difference, then, must 
lie in what we take to be the morally relevant features of 
the situation. My reason for thinking this behavior wrong 
might be a utiltarian one, one that says that unjustifiably 
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causing any sentient being pain (and death) is wrong. John 
Smith, though, adheres more to a Kantian outlook and believes 
that only rational beings should be spared pain. What this 
seems to indicate, though, is that we are each focusing on 
different aspects of the action that has just taken place. 
So, in one sense, then, we are not seeing the action of cat-
burning in the same way. However, if we shared the same 
moral theory or outlook and, hence, agreed on what facts were 
to be the morally relevant ones, then, according to Sturgeon, 
we could at least claim that there was a moral fact of the 
matter here, that what the teenagers were doing was wrong. 
Another example given by Sturgeon (1988, p. 247) may 
also help to clarify his point. Imagine a situation in which 
we have an individual (call her Jane Doe) who sees the 
teenagers setting the cat on fire, but her reason for calling 
their behavior wrong is not because she holds a particular 
moral theory per se, but rather because she believes that 
teenagers are always doing something wrong and mischievous. 
So it does not necessarily matter what they are doing, since 
whatever they will do in her eyes will be wrong. Her aware-
ness of the situation is colored by her prejudice against 
teenagers in general. But, in her case, her moral outlook 
will remain the same despite the fact that her judgment is 
based on a false belief. She is not being reflective in her 
decision-making unlike the utilitarian and the Kantian. If, 
though, she removed such biases from her perception, chances 
are that she would see the situation in a different light, 
possibly agreeing with the utilitarian or Kantian outlooks. 
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It seems that Sturgeon's point here is that what we per-
ceive as the relevant moral facts will make a difference in 
the explanations of our beliefs about some situation. And, 
so, as Sturgeon himself realizes, his realist analysis of the 
situation depends on having a background moral theory to- re-
late to. Harman's position does not rely on any background 
moral theory. So, it is in that regard that Harman can say 
that the observation would have been made regard1ess of the 
truth of the situation. 
The important question, though, with regard to 
Sturgeon's analysis of moral judgments is this: has he an-
swered Harman's charge? Is Sturgeon's scientific approach to 
meta-ethics guilty of leaving its subject matter behind? A 
scientific investigation into the nature of moral judgments 
and discourse will not appeal at the theoretical level to 
what is essential to such judgments and discourse, namely 
their normat2ve content. Rather, the product of such an in-
vestigation will be a piece of psychology or linguistics. An 
explanation of moral discourse along those lines will appeal 
to the possession of certain beliefs and to the fact that 
those beliefs are he1d (assl.Ull6d, des2red') to be true, but 
they will not appeal to the truth of those claims: a norma-
tive claim cannot serve an explanatory role. To put it in 
another way, the goal of science is explanation, but the goal 
of normative ethics is justification of our moral judgments. 
Returning to our analysis of Sturgeon's account of moral 
judgments, it only speaks to the explanatory side. It does 
not offer justification of such moral judgments. What his 
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analysis shows is that moral consensus is due to our sharing 
a background moral theory. And given that he accepts that 
there exists moral disagreement, as in the case of the 
Kantian and utilitarian who disagree over whether cat-burning 
is immoral, his case for moral realism is a weak and uncon-
vincing one. Cases of moral disagreement are, of course, not 
rare but even in the cases where we are in agreement (by 
virtue of accepting the same moral standard), we still need 
to say something about why we are justified in continuing to 
hold such standards or offer the explanations we do. In 
other words, we have to be able to say why our theory or 
principle{s) is true. A realist position in ethics has to be 
able to do this. 
Richard Boyd, another non-reductive ethical naturalist, 
however does claim to offer justification. But he claims to 
be able to do so by pointing out that there is a parallel 
left to draw between ethics and science. According to him, 
an analogy between the two disciplines can still be main-
tained. He defends a realist semantics for moral discourse 
according to which conflicts arising in ethics are to be re-
solved in much the same way as disputes arising in science 
have been. Boyd takes his approach to be representative of 
Quine's naturalist bent in that his goal is to show how moral 
properties such as goodness are natural properties and not 
the simple unanalyzable non-natural properties envisioned by 
Moore and others. The centerpiece of Boyd's realist seman-
tics for moral discourse is a notion of reflective equilibri-
um {borrowed from a theory of decision procedures in science) 
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which when applied within the moral domain appears to presup-
pose a particular version of consequentialism. His theory is 
called homeostatic consequentialism. It tries to model moral 
decision-making after a scientific model which involves test-
ing hypotheses (if we can consider a proposition like uMary 
is unkind- as a hypothesis) against (i) observations and (ii) 
pre-existing theories by means of (iii) reliable procedures 
and techniques. Just as science must strike a balance be-
tween observation, theory and method by not letting any one 
ride rough shod over the others, so must ethics. Like sci-
ence, ethics requires observation and theory, and the two are 
in fact intertwined from a child's earliest moral development 
to that point at which it encounters moral beliefs contrary 
to its own and must seek to either confirm or revise its be-
liefs. 
We may go as far as to say that human beings are by 
their very (physical) nature reliable indicators of what is 
valuable or not. We learn from our parents what sorts of 
things are to count as valuable. Humans are, as it were, 
hard-wired with a concern for their own well-being. We have 
an aversion to pain as well as a definite preference for what 
is pleasurable. In our on-going attempts at avoiding the 
former and enhancing the latter, we form and test hypotheses 
concerning the values of things by identifying and observing 
potential sources of pleasure and pain. Humans naturally 
promote the k~nds of things which contribute to the pursuit 
of pleasure and the avoidance of pain; and, so, they encour-
age attitudes (like mutual respect) and develop social pro-
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grams and institutions which will lead to that end. These 
various goods and the methods for attaining them form a home-
ostasis, an equilibrium. These goods are tested through 
their implementation, for example, in social programs. A 
program that is implemented but fails to produce the goods 
expected (that is, when what was hypothesized as good turns 
out not to be so), is rejected in much the same way that a 
scientific theory would be rejected. When the theory fails 
the test, measure is taken of the theory (i.e., the hypothe-
sis), the observation and the methods used (in this case the 
way the program was implemented). New theories and methods 
are drawn up and new observations are made. If homeostasis 
could be achieved (and it's an open question whether it 
could), it would no longer be necessary to revise our be-
liefs. As long as the revision of beliefs is necessary, how-
ever, it will be guided by a concern for striking a new bal-
ance among those goods which continue to be accepted, the 
methods of their implementation (and determination) and fu-
ture goods which are hypothesized and the~rmethod of imple-
mentation. 
Boyd's account of ethical judgments and belief revision 
requires this teleological notion of a homeostatic state 
which optimizes the happiness of the members of society. 
Thus his meta-ethics, that is, his account of moral judgments 
and moral discourse, require building into subjects an in-
grained utilitarian psychology. Subjects' utilitarianism 
(indeed, their ru1e utilitarianism) forms the backdrop 
against which particular moral judgments are deemed true or 
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false. Moral subjects are 
guided teleologically to the truth. 24 
Quine (1981) does not think, however, that this type of 
view establishes realism in ethics. Quine would hold that 
moral realists, even Boyd, have not met the challenge of 
demonstrating that the theory or principles they hold are in 
fact true, i.e., true in virtue of correspondence to the 
world. According to Quine, moral statements can only be 
judged true in relation to the moral standards themselves, 
i.e., according to how they cohere with other sentences of 
the theory. His main reason for claiming that this is the 
case has to do with his view that there are no moral observa-
tion sentences to speak of (1986, p.664). According to 
Quine, an observation sentence is defined as a sentence that 
any qualified witness to the observation could agree to, 
without benefit of acollateral information# that is not pub-
licly shared. Such an agreement is agreement with regard to 
the truth-value of the sentence. The sentence "It is rain-
ing# , for example, qualifies as an observation sentence. 
There, however, does not appear to be any analogous type of 
sentence in the moral domain. The closest we could come to a 
moral observation sentence 'A'Ould be a sentence like "That's 
horrible#, a response that some of us would agree with when 
observing the hoodlums igniting the cat. Quine, however, 
N Boyd's case is not atypical. David Brink has a similar 
theory. Cf. Chapter 8 in Brink's .HoraJ ReaJ.iSITI and the 
Foundat~ons of Eth~cs, (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
where he discusses his consequentialist position, objective 
utiltarianism.The fundamental features of David Brink's ver-
sion is similar to Boyd's view and both views are non-reduc-
tive naturalist views. 
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points out that such a consensus is possible only because we 
(those of us who find the response #That's horribleff asap· 
propriate to the hoodlums' behavior) already accept a partic· 
ular moral theory, a theory not in general shared by all ob· 
servers of the event. Such a theory is collateral informa· 
tion that not all witnesses could or would accept. 
Now it might be objected at this point that science it· 
self cannot offer conclusive proof that its currently accept· 
ed theories are undeniably true, and so ethicists should not 
have to worry that they cannot meet Quine's challenge. Yet 
they do need to worry since science is unlike ethics in that 
most scientific theories combine theoretical statements with 
observation statements. Ethics, however, lacks empirical 
checkpoints. As Quine points out, 
... one regrets the methodological infirmity of 
ethics as compared to science. The empirical 
foothold of scientific theory is in the predicted 
observable event; that of a moral code is in the 
observable moral act. But whereas we can test a 
prediction against the independent course of ob· 
servable nature, we can judge the morality of an 
act only by our moral standards themselves. 
Science, thanks to its links with observation, re· 
tains some title to a correspondence theory of 
truth; but a coherence theory is evidently 
the lot of ethics (1981, p. 63). 
From this it follows that while Quine is a realist with re· 
spect to science, he is an anti-realist with respect to 
ethics. Whether something is to be judged moral or inmoral 
will depend upon the particular moral theory you hold. And I 
think Quine is correct here. In many cases, it would seem 
that at the base of our decision to find something morally 
wrong (or right) is a certain subjective element, namely that 
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we have accepted to view certain types of actions as wrong 
(or right) and that that acceptance depends on what moral 
theory we adhere to. What Sturgeon's theory does show us is 
that we need not be total skeptics about the relevance of 
certain moral qualities to the explanations of our observa-
tions and beliefs. Yet that by itself does not support a 
full-fledged moral realism. On the contrary, experience 
seems to indicate that for the most part what we have is a 
multiplicity of moral outlooks with their own •facts of the 
matter." 
In addition to Quine's criticisms of moral realism, all 
of the aforementioned non-reductive ethical naturalists are 
subject to criticism based on the fact that they rely upon a 
certain (questionable) assumption for justifying their moral 
realist positions. Quinean Naturalism assumes that there is 
some single set of standards for rational acceptability which 
all good sciences either have adhered to or do adhere to, and 
that these standards can be discovered once and for all by us 
and then used as a basis for comparison with ethics. If Kuhn 
(1962) is correct, then there is no reason to suppose that 
the 'growth' of science occurs in any sort of continuous and 
unequivocally rational way. For Kuhn, scientific revolutions 
usher in new paradigms: not only new theories, but new 
methodologies and research goals. New methodologies intro-
duce new standards for rational acceptability. For example, 
the emergence of artificial intelligence during the late 
1950's made unacceptiflb1e any theory concerning the nature of 
psychological processes that was incapable of being instanti-
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ated in a computer program. Indeed, even if we attribute a 
greater continuity to science than does Kuhn, who can deny 
the advent of new methodologies and new standards? Certainly 
the advent of computers has introduced standards for statis-
tical inferences unimaginable to good science one hundred 
years ago; sample sizes, analyses of variables, etc. once 
considered adequate no longer are. Were the experiments con-
ducted by Mendel, therefore, not good science? Contemporary 
science also admits of a plurality of goals and methodolo-
gies. Does the fact that paleontology is strictly explanato-
ry but not predictive make it a deficient science? If the 
mentalistic jargon in which psychology is conducted turns out 
to be fictive as opposed to factual, will the fact that psy-
chology is only predicative (of human behavior) and not ex-
planatory be regarded as a flaw? How should we view other 
sciences which make 'reference' to fictitious entities (fric-
tionless planes, absolute zero and the like) to formulate 
predictions? And even if there were consensus among contempo-
rary scientists and watchdog philosophers of science concern-
ing what counts as good science, would that ensure that the 
standards might not change? For this reason I think the 
whole enterprise surrounding the hope that in the workings of 
science can be d~scovered standards for rational acceptabili-
ty and ontological conmitment is mistaken. Wittgensteinian 
Naturalism, which will be discussed in the next section, does 
not rest upon this assumption. 
What has been shown so far is that the project of com-
paring ethics to science is a mistaken one. If moral facts 
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could be totally reducible to natural facts, then non-reduc-
tive ethical naturalists would have a case of the method 
(meta-ethics) and the subject matter (the normative content) 
passing each other by. Explaining our moral observations via 
a description of our upbringing and psychological make-up 
only serves to give a descr~pt~oD of our moral beliefs; such 
explanations by themselves do not serve to justify our moral 
theories, i.e., tell us why they are true. A meta-ethical 
theory is not just concerned with explanation or description; 
its concern is largely over what we ought to do and why we 
are justified in believing that some of our moral prescrip-
tions are true. Truth in science is correspondence to the 
world. Yet, since these ethical naturalists are unable to 
show that our moral judgments correspond to the world in the 
way that scientific judgments do, they are unable to offer a 
defense of moral realism. 
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CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTIVIST FORMS OF MORAL REALISM 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The authors to be examined in this chapter, in one way or 
another, reject the assumption that sense can be made out of 
realism only if moral judgments can be proven to cor~espond 
to facts of some sort. That assumption has traditionally 
been associated with cognitivism, but it is implicit in non-
cognitivist rejections of realism as well. That assumption 
is certainly operative in theories examined in the previous 
section. Each of the philosophers to be considered here of-
fers an alternative to ethical rationalism and cognitivism, 
yet each lays claim to being a moral realist. As we shall 
see, a different conception of objectivity emerges from their 
debate. 
I begin by examining the view of Mark Platts who is not 
much influenced by the later Wittgenstein's work. However, 
Platts' view is similar enough to the views of McDowell and 
the other Wittgensteinians that it warrants examination. In 
a certain respect it serves as a foil, since many of its dif-
ficulties are overcome by adopting particular claims advocat-
ed by McDowell. In an important respect Platts occupies a 
position midway between those of the naturalists of the pre-
vious se.ction and the Wittgensteinian naturalists considered 
here, since he does seem to require that moral statements 
satisfy conditions of correspondence while yet relinquishing 
the ideal that moral judgments must be rationally justifi-
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able. It is the latter thesis he shares in common with the 
Wittgensteinians. What Platts fails to realize is that that 
position is not compatible with the first. 
2. PLATTS 
In Nays of Hei!U1~ng (1979) Platts argues that some of the 
moral judgments we make are factually cognitive, i.e., that 
moral beliefs are no different from other factual beli~ts in 
that they can be assessed as true or false. And their truth 
or falsity depends on the independently existing world·and 
not on what individuals believe to be the case. As he 
states, Nif a moral judgment is true, it is true in virtue of 
the (independently existing) real world, and is true in 
virtue of that alone" (p. 246). He claims, as Wittgenstein 
and McDowell do, that our linguistic practices are social 
practices. Such practices are governed normatively by human 
concepts and standards and as such cannot be judged as irra-
tional outside of our form of life. The concepts and stan-
dards employed are formed, as it were, by our interests and 
concerns; this much we realize when we study our language. 
The realists who hold this view are following the position 
held by Wittgenstein that we will only understand the meaning 
of our discourse by looking and seeing how it is used. Here 
is where the use of ethical ~ntu.i t.ions comes into play. 
Platts refers to himself as an ethical intuitionist but he is 
concerned not with the f8cu1tythat Moore focused upon, but 
rather with the intuitions themselves. Ethical intuitions 
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for him are basic ethical beliefs, or what Williams calls 
spontt1neous conv.1.'ct.ions: 
[I]ntuition in ethics, as a faculty, is no more. 
But .intu.it.ions--the beliefs which, when there was 
supposed to be a faculty, were supposedly given by 
it are very much part of the subject. These are 
spontaneous convictions, moderately reflective but 
not yet theorized, about the answer to some ethical 
question, usually hypothetical and couched in gen-
eral terms. They are often questions about what to 
do {1985, pp. 94-95). 
Such ethical beliefs are, in fact, that--ethical be1iefs. 
But Platts, unlike Williams, does not want to associate this 
type of belief with desires. He cites Elizabeth Anscombe's 
distinction between factual belief and desire, which are for 
her two separate categories of mental states. The distinc-
tion is made in terms of the d.1.'rect.1.'on of f.1.'t these two types 
of mental states have with the world: true beliefs fit the 
way the world is whereas the goal of desires is to be real-
ized., that is, there is a hope that at some point the world 
will accomodate them. Platts insists that moral beliefs and 
judgments belong to the category of beliefs whereas non-cog-
nitivists hold that such judgments belong to the category of 
desires. As Platts points out, we do not always desire to do 
what is right; •we perform many intentional actions in the 
moral life that we apparently do not desire to perform# (p. 
293). It may, for example, be terribly inconvenient for me 
to stop and help a distressed motorist, but I nevertheless 
should do so. Why? Because that person needs my help, and I 
should help those who cannot help themselves, if it is within 
my power to do so. But is this something I enjoy or want to 
do? Not always. So, how is it that we get realism out of 
105 
this view? Couldn't my obligations in this and other like 
instances be construed as the result of effective socializa· 
tion as Harman would like us to think? 
We are trained to use these concepts in certain ways as 
opposed to others. This process involves educating us as to 
the proper use of the terms we apply. And just as we learn 
to use the term 'red' to apply to fire engines rather than to 
rabbits, the· same type of process occurs when we learn to 
apply the term 'kind' to those persons who exhibit gentle and 
thoughtful behavior to others, rather than to those who set 
cats on fire. What is objective about this whole process is 
the fact that we cannot just apply these terms in any 
arbitrary manner. There are certain standards in operation 
that must be adhered to if we are to be able to use the same 
concepts over and over. For instance, it would not be in 
line with the public standards governing the use of the term 
'kind' if we applied the term to those cases that did not de· 
pict kind-behavior. It would be wrong, for example, to say 
that Hitler was a kind person in light of the fact that he 
ordered the mass killings of German Jews during World War II. 
With regard to this particular case, there is a great amount 
of social consensus confirming his malicious actions. The 
moral judgments of society, then, regulate and guide our 
moral judgments and actions. 
It should be noted at this point that many contemporary 
realists have left behind the goal of trying to analyze con· 
cepts like goodness and rightness, the main reason being that 
we learn more about our moral discourse by focusing on con· 
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cepts like courage and kindness than we do on the former. 
Goodness and rLghtness are general as well as ambiguous con-
cepts whereas concepts such as courage and kindness can be 
more specifically demonstrated. The latter are referred to 
as thLckmoral concepts, a label given to them by Williams. 
Williams points out (1985, p. 129) that such concepts do not 
recognize the fact/value distinction per se: 
The way these notions are applied is determined 
by what the world is like (for instance, by how 
someone has behaved) and yet, at the same time, 
their application usually involves a certain valua 
tion of the situation, of persons or actions. 21 
Let's now turn to Platts' argument for why the union between 
the two elements is a necessary connection. 
Platts is not an ethical reductivist, but he does claim 
that the non-moral or natural facts fLx the moral ones. The 
mystery to uncover here is how the moral facts are fixed by 
or supervene upon the non-moral facts in light of the fact 
that Platts also claims that such moral facts cannot be in-
ferred from or entailed by the non-moral or natural features 
of the world. This problem of how to account for superve-
nience is not just a problem for Platts; it's also a problem 
for any contemporary naturalist realist. Platts presents us 
with what he believes to be an appropriate analogy for dis-
pensing with this problem. He asks to imagine a grid ar-
rangement of black dots on a white card. We then see Lt as a 
face. As Platts points out, we wouldn't be able to picture 
25 It's important to mention that Williams himself does not 
accept this view ~nd points out that an account that weds to-
gether factual and evaluative elements is a mistaken account. 
For more on Williams' own view with regard to this matter, 
see his EtbLcs and the ~1111.its of PhLlosophy, 1985, Chapter 8. 
107 
it as a face if the dot arrangement wasn't the way it was. 
In this case, the dots f2x the face that is seen by us. 
Now, compare this type of judgment with one of our moral 
judgments, say, that the teenagers behaved badly when they 
lit fire to the cat. What would be the non-moral facts in 
this instance? The main non-moral features would be that 
setting cats (or any sentient creatures) on fire is painful 
and fatal, we dislike pain and death in most instances, and 
we see the teenagers performing this action. Given a certain 
type of moral education, we see this situation as morally 
bad. But not all people will see it as bad, some might sug-
gest, even in the case of these teenagers. What Platts wants 
to emphasize here is that we could perceive all of these non-
moral features and still not render a moral verdict in the 
situation. This is what he means when he says that we do not 
2nfer the moral facts from the non-moral ones. This would be 
obvious in the case where we travel to an alien culture and 
are able to observe only their behavior. We would have no 
clue as to what their value system is or how to apply it to 
the behavior at hand. But this fact by itself does not mean 
that there is no moral judgment to be made. The non-moral 
features are there; they do fix the situation in such a way 
that a person who has a certain amount of moral perception in 
that society could make some moral judgment about the behav-
ior observed. Keep in mind that, according to Platts and 
other realists like McDowell and Boyd, such moral facts are 
determined. by the interests and concerns of a society. As 
children, we learn what these interests and concerns are and, 
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accordingly, learn the rules for protecting these interests 
and concerns. Our moral training, then, is concerned with 
developing our sensitivity to such interests as well as our 
ability to detect the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of some sit-
uation. But, it follows, if we don't have the right kind of 
perception or sensitivity or training, no true or appropriate 
judgment can be rendered in such situations. It seems to be 
the case here that one has to be in a certain frame of mind, 
as it were. It is possible that you could spend all day long 
staring at the dot arrangement and nseew only dots. It is 
the same in the moral situation. It is possible that you 
could attend only to the non-moral or natural and social-sci-
entific facts and Mseew only that. What is missing in both 
cases is a certain type of perception or education that is 
relevant to the situations at hand. 
Now Platts does recognize that the judgment that a face 
is seen and a moral judgment that the teenagers are behaving 
wrongly are not totally analogous simply because, in the 
first case, there is not a face literally there to be seen 
whereas, in the second case, what we judge to be the case ~s 
or cou2d be the case. As Platts states, 
[U]nlike the picture case, when we make moral 
judgments about the situation, what we say can be 
literally true or false and, again unlike the pic-
ture case, there is no question of that truth or 
falsity being the result of conventions. It is the 
result of the (independent) world (pp. 283-284). 
The moral realist in this case claims to be able to show that 
our being morally educated in the way that we are allows us 
to be able to observe certain traits in others and ourselves 
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and be perceptive and attentive in particular ways to these 
others. And this process has nothing to do with whether we 
individually desire it or whether morality is to be viewed as 
a practical institution. The moral judgments we make, like 
other perceptual judgments made, are objective; you and I as 
individuals do not decide to abandon our particular moral 
discourse and evaluation; it is part of our sharBd form of 
l~fB, to use Wittgenstein's phrase. To abandon it is to 
abandon ourselves. And the use of thick moral concepts al-
lows us to see this point more readily than staying with very 
general concepts such as goodness or rightness. To illus-
trate my point, consider the situation in which we call some-
one courageous. In order to sBs someone as courageous, we 
have to observe or know something about the other (non-moral) 
features in that situation. Arrington (1989) as well as oth-
ers uses the example of George Washington crossing the 
Delaware. To say that George Washington was courageous at 
that time has to do with the military and social factors in-
volved along with his own view of things at that time. This 
would, of course, include his own psychological make-up. If 
he was a lunatic while crossing the Delaware, we would not 
want to call him courageous. Nor would we want to if that 
time period was not a time of war or of great hardships. The 
concept of courage embodies our standards as to what const~-
tutss courage. Not just any description will do. Clearly 
our desires are not directly involved in this assessment. 
To regard the non-moral features of the above situation 
as constituting courage is in line with what Harman refers to 
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as a moral property being a funct1on of the non-moral or nat-
ural properties. {Recall that Harman raised this point as 
part of his overall criticism of the moral realist position. 
Harman's point is that the only sense in which one could ever 
talk about moral facts or properties was if such properties 
could be reduced to the non-moral facts. Yet reducing them 
to the non-moral facts or features of some situation is tan-
tamount to not having them at all.) But, of course, as we 
saw, Harman's position emphasized that the positing of moral 
facts and properties added nothing that was relevant to the 
explanation of the so-called moral observation. No realist 
would want to co:rmrlt herself to that, and Platts is no excep-
tion here. When the realist says, for instance, that courage 
just 1s these other features, two things need to be clari-
fied. First, given Platts' description of moral facts as not 
being inferred from the non-moral facts, he was left to deal 
with the problem of what else is required for explaining 
moral observations. His response was that there needed to be 
in addition to these features some particular moral training 
that would allow us to detect the moral property. If one had 
this type of upbringing, then one would be able to pe~ceive 
the existence of the questioned moral fact or property. 
Kindness, for instance, is instantiated in kind actions; 
those of us who have learnt what kindness means can immedi-
ately see it when we come across it, much the way we can im-
mediately see the color red when we come across objects which 
instantiate it. Those who do not perceive kindness or any 
other of our moral properties are lacking in our moral in-
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sight and experience. The amoralist may fall into this cate-
gory. Platts, however, wants to emphasize that there will be 
times when we make mistakes about what is moral in some situ-
ation, mistakes that are not to be accommodated simply by 
reference to a lack of inforrnation concerning non-moral 
facts. He attributes our moral fallibility along with the 
making of different moral judgments about the same case to 
our thick moral concepts having semancic depch. As Platts 
maintains, 
Moral concepts exhibit the characteristic of 
semanc.ic depch. Starting from our grasp upon them 
through our knowledge of the austere truth-condi-
tions of sentences containing them, we have to 
struggle to improve our sensitivity to particular 
instantiations of them. This process proceeds 
without limit; at no point, for the realist, can we 
rest content with our present sensitivity in the 
application of these concepts. So at no point can 
we rest secure in all our present judgments involv-
ing these concepts (p. 287). 
There exists, then, no true certainty that what we have de-
cided to do in some particular instance is the morally right 
thing to do. What we have at best is an approximation to the 
truth of the matter. We cannot say unequivocally that all of 
our moral beliefs are true and justified. When we find or 
discover that we have erred in our judgments, we must revise 
our beliefs. Revision will be necessary, according to Platts 
and others, because of the infinite complexity of our world 
and our finite relation to it. As he states: 
[c]ertainty plays no role in this form of intu-
itionism. This is a consequence of taking realism 
seriously. By the process of careful attention to 
the world, we can improve our moral beliefs about 
the world, make them more approximately true ... But 
this process of attention to improve beliefs and 
understanding will go on without end; there is no 
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reason to believe that we shall ever be justified 
in being certain that most of our moral beliefs are 
true ... Our moral language, like all the realistic 
parts of that language, transcends our present 
practical comprehensions in trying to grapple with 
an independent, indefinitely complex reality; only 
ignorance of that realism could prompt the hope for 
certainty (pp. 285-286). 
All of what has been said thus far, Platts maintains, points 
to the autonomy of moral facts and to their relevancy with 
regard to explanations of moral behavior in that once the 
moral features of some situation are detected, behavior can 
be judged as correct or incorrect with respect to how it re-
lates to those features. Yet something further needs to be 
said with regard to both of these claims. When he says that 
courage just ~s the union of these other features in the 
world, he is not using the 'is' of identity. Rather, his 
'is' is to be interpreted as the 'is' of const~tut~on. 
Courage is constituted by these particular features, but is 
not identical to them. Platts emphasized this earlier when 
he stated that one could understand all the non-moral fea-
tures of a situation and be totally ignorant of the moral 
facts. So, even though such moral facts are not inferred 
from the non-moral ones, they are constituted by them. This 
fact about moral concepts, then, is the first important char-
acteristic that needs to be emphasized by the realist if she 
is to be able to give some adequate explanation of their in-
dependence and their role in the evaluation of our behavior. 
Clearly, Platts' version of ethical intuitionism is more 
plausible than the intuitionism of Moore. Yet it is still 
not clear how this gets us moral realism. One could still 
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question, as Harman does, why we should not attribute the 
moral beliefs that Platts holds to a process of effective so· 
cialization. It seems that we could still give an account of 
the nature of moral decision-making by this process just as 
well as by Platte's intutionism. My main criticism, to which 
I will return later, is that Platts has not made a distinc· 
tion between objectivity and inter-subjectivity. What he 
calls objective seems really to be inter-subjective, and as 
such it is difficult to see how inter-subjectivity automati· 
cally gets one realism as opposed to anti-realism. 
What makes the views of Wittgensteinian naturalists in· 
teresting is the way in which this problem is circumvented by 
a modification of what is to count as objective or real. 
Wittgensteinians, in effect, reject the assumption which goes 
back at least to Descartes that the way to metaphysics is 
through epistemology. Descartes had maintained that in order 
to know what there 1s one had first to ascertain those fea· 
tures of propositions or judgments which guarantee their 
truth. Hence, for Descartes, the clarity and distinctness 
characteristic of certain ideas (such as the cog1to) guaran-
tee their correspondence to certain facts. 
The Quinean naturalists carry on the justificationist 
tradition by virtue of the emphasis they lay upon the correct 
methodology of the physical sciences. This is not to say 
that Boyd and the others accept (in any way!) Descartes' con· 
caption of science as being deductive and of (some) scientif· 
ic claims as being known with certainty; on the contrary, all 
the authors examined earlier would regard the matter of theo-
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ry confirmation as one of degrees of probability. What is 
important, though, is that each regards science as paradig-
matic of a body of know1edge. By examining the standards ac-
tually employed by successful scientific practice we may de-
termine criteria for saying what there is. Our examination 
of Platts reveals a dual tendency: on the one hand, the use 
to which he puts intuitions (conceived of as spontaneous con-
victions) distances him from that tradition running back to 
Descartes, since Platts does not seek criteria for the ratio-
nal justification of moral beliefs; but, on the other hand, 
his concern to exhibit the semantic depth of our moral con-
cepts lands him squarely back within this tradition. 
According to Wittgensteinians, there is something both 
right and wrong with the naturalistic approaches described 
thus far. The philosophers taking these approaches are quite 
correct to appeal to actual pract~ces in their attempts to 
ascertain what there is, but they are mistaken in thinking 
that sc~ent~f~c practices alone carry ontological corranitment. 
Wittgensteinians believe that what counts as real is deter-
mined by sets of social practices which constitute our form 
of life. According to them, forms of life are described as 
shared sets of dispositions. Stanley Cavell, a 
Wittgensteinian, describes forms of life as consisting of 
shared: 
... routes of interest and feeling, modes of re-
sponse, senses of humour and of significance and of 
fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is sim-
ilar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, 
of when an utterance is an assertion, when an 
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appeal, when an explanation .... 2' 
Lear, another Wittgensteinian, describes forms of life as 
shared "perceptions of salience, routes of interest and feel· 
ings of naturalness in following rules. " 27 And following 
Lear, Lynn Rudder-Baker states that a form of life is to be 
counted among the social conditions which make meaning possi· 
ble. 21 
According to these Wittgensteinians, there can be no 
meaningful discourse whatsoever outside of our form of life. 
The matter is put pointedly by Lear who is intent upon draw· 
ing a contrast between Wittgenstein's view (so interpreted) 
and forms of semantic Platonism (such as found in Katz): 
... If the platonist tries to step outside the form 
of life in order to tell those within how things 
really are, then he must come to grief. For out· 
side the form of life there is nothing: no rules, 
no universals, no sameness, no reality (1983, p. 
80) . 
Those who share a form of life are viewed as .l.ike·m.inded by 
Lear (1982, p. 385). He believes that a form of life sets 
the bounds of sense and that it would be impossible to say 
anything whatsoever about what it would be like to be other· 
minded: 
... [b]eing minded as we are is not one possibility 
we can explore among others. We explore what it is 
2• Stanley Cavell (1966) , "The Availability of 
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," in G. Pitcher, ed. 
lv.i ttgenste.in · · The .Later Ph.ilosophy. Anchor Doubleday, Garden 
City, N. J., pp. 160-161. Also quoted in Emmett (1990), p. 
213. 
27 Jonathon Lear (1982) "Leaving the World Alone," Journa.l 
of Ph.i.losophy 79, p. 385. The same passage appears unaltered 
in Lear (1983) "Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism," in 
Sayre-McCord (1988), pp. 76-93. 
21 Rudder-Baker (1984) "On the Very Idea of a Form of Life," 
Inquiry 21, p. 288; quoted in Emmett (1990). p. 214. 
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to be minded as we are by moving around self-con-
sciously and determining what makes more or less 
sense. There is no getting a glimpse of what it 
might be like to be other-minded, for as we move 
toward the outer bounds of our mindedness we verge 
on incoherence and nonsense (1982, p. 386). 
Rudder-Baker, expanding on this point, believes that no sense 
can be made out of the idea of COR/ParLng forms of life and it 
is no mistake that her title parodies that of Davidson's •on 
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.n According·to her, if 
what are presumed to be two forms of life can be compared, 
e.g., the way of life of the Aleuts versus the way of life of 
the American Teenager, then there must be some common element 
which forms the basis of the comparison. For example, some-
one from a technologically advanced society might find the 
practice of infanticide abominable; yet its practice in some 
societies, rather than being symptomatic of a radically dif-
ferent way of valuing children, may reflect a need to take 
drastic measures to insure the preservation of the family. 29 
(Often infanticide occurs when food and other resources are 
scarce.) In order to compare what the members of the two so-
cieties are doLngwhen the one conmits infanticide and the 
other takes every measure possible to assist a sickly infant, 
those persons' goals must be taken into account. In this 
case, the common goal of preserving one's family provides the 
answer, and it provides the basis of comparison. Thus what 
initially looks like diverse forms of life turns out to be 
different ways in which the same value may be manifested. 
One should be aware that it is not possible in thi~ dis-
sertation to discuss Wittgenstein's argwnent for why human 
29 This example comes from Rachels (1986), pp. 20-21. 
117 
activities are to be considered the essential determinants of 
meaning, as that would require a lengthy digression. Yet, 
suffice it to say that there are two arguments against seman-
tic platonism within Wittgenstein's philosophy. One argument 
points out that sentences like •All bachelors are male" do 
not express necessary truths but reflect linguistic conven-
tions (i.e., are actually disguised assertions about lan-
guage). Wittgenstein, like Quine, abandons the analytic/syn-
thetic distinction. The other argument has it that even if 
there were abstract entities such as senses, they--like the 
expressions for which they are senses--would require inter-
pretation (a 'grasping'). The positing of senses neither 
helps explain nor offers any guarantee that persons mean the 
same thing by the words they use. Ultimately, the final 
court of appeal as to whether two persons mean the same thing 
by the linguistic expressions they use is the use to which 
those expressions are put. Wittgenstein is to be considered 
a naturalistic philosopher, because he holds that meaning is 
to be understood as a soc~a1 phenomenon. 
That being the case, one will still have to show how 
Wittgenstein's work could support moral realism. The point, 
I think, is that if sharing a form of life involves, among 
other things, the sharing of certain values, then there is 
nothing which we could conceive of as fa1s~fy~ng our shared 
moral judgments. It thus becomes unnecessary to engage in 
traditional epistemological worries over criteria for distin-
guishing truth from falsehood. This is not to say that false 
judgments are not possible: an individual can make mistakes 
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when doing things. What counts as making a mistake and what 
counts as correcting a mistake, though, are determined by the 
social standards with which one's conduct is compared. The 
grounding of meaning in social practices makes a refutation 
of skepticism unnecessary. 
The upshot is that a kind of realism may be said to fol-
low. Since there is nothing at all outside our form of life, 
there could not be anything which would falsify our shared 
beliefs. One could view this matter through Davidsonian 
eyes, as transcendentalists like Rudd.er-Baker are wont to do. 
Davidson {1983) attacks the scheme/content distinction, main-
taining no sense can be made out of the conception of a lan-
guage as a kind of conceptual scheme which stands over and 
either fits or is fitted by the facts. Language is rather to 
be thought of as an expression of our embeddedness in the 
world which is by and large true. 
Lear does agree with this view and goes one step further 
by pointing out that there are certain practices within our 
form of life that we engage in for which there are no alter-
natives. Examples of such practices are addition and modus 
ponens: 
[C]onsider, for example, the alternative answers 
to the following questions: 
What does 7 + 5 equal? 
(a) 12. 
(b) Anything at all, just as long as everyone is so 
minded. 
What fallows from P and If P, then (7l 
{a) Q. 
(b) Anything at all, just as long as everyone is so 
minded.· 
To each of these questions, (a) gives the correct 
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answer ... anyone who tries to offer a different in-
teger as an answer is in error ... anyone who, say, 
claimed to derive not-Owould be in error. (1982, 
p. 385) 
Consider, for example, the case where we come across someone 
who engages in the practice of adding by tNO but does so by 
continuing the series u2, 4, 6, ... " with u9, 12, 15, ... ". 
Assume we assign the same reference to the numerals (so, for 
example, we both agree there are 12 marbles on the table), 
but that we would not continue the series in the same way. 
Should we not say that this is a case where one of us is 
right about what uadding by two" means? The Wittgensteinian 
responds that this sort of scenario does not suggest that 
there might be two different ways of adding by two or that 
what makes our way of adding by true r.ight is what makes the 
other's way of adding by two fc'Tong. Rather the answer is 
that what we call •adding by two• is a different practice 
than what the other calls "adding by two.• There is no al-
ternative way for us to add by two; if we acted as the other 
acts, we would be engaging in something we would not call 
•adding by two" (Enmlett, 1990, pp. 224-225). Were we to now 
continue the series as the other does, we would not be 
switching from a practice which yields what is true to one 
which yields what is false; at least it would be misleading 
to put matters that way, and to leave it at that. Much de-
pends upon the standards of the society we occupy. If in our 
society such a practice does not conform to standards of 
counting by two, then we can say one who engages in that 
practice is adding uwrongly• or that their answer to acer-
tain problem is "false•--but what that means is that what 
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they are doing falls away from our own societal norms. 
Suppose the other belongs to a different society in which it 
is a corranon practice to continue the series in the way de-
scribed. (Imagine this way of counting playing a role in 
certain forms of commerce.) Within that context were we to 
switch to that way of adding by two, we would not be abandon-
ing a practice which yields the truth for one that yields 
falsehood: we would simply be changing what""" do and what 
we call •counting by two." What would count as a correct an-
swer would be something different then, something determined 
by that society's norms. 
The same seems to hold true for examples from ethics (al-
though Lear himself is not willing to coimlit to this view, 
given that uwe can recognize the existence of other groups 
who have alternative moral outlooks" (1983, p. 83) and,as 
such, arriving at universalizability or objectivity in ethics 
appears to be an impossibility, according to him). There are 
certain things which we do which we call utreating others 
kindly." Were we to come upon a tribe whose members make a 
habit of violently abusing their loved ones, and upon asking 
for an explanation of their behavior were we told "We do 
this, because we were taught to treat others kindly," we 
would not infer "Well that's a novel way to treat another 
kindly." Nor would we raise the issue of what happens to be 
the r~ght way to treat others kindly. Rather we would say 
that what they call "treating others kindly" is a very dif-
ferent sort of practice than what goes by that name for us. 
The dispute that follows, then, is over linguistic (and ad-
121 
joining) practices, and we condemn their behavior in our own 
te:rms. To say that our disagreement is over 1.ingu.ist.ic prac-
tices is slightly misleading, though. That makes it sound as 
if we merely disagree over what the right words to use are. 
In fact, our linguistic practices are woven more intimately 
into the fabric of our lives. To condemn what they call 
Mtreating others kindlyw is to condemn what they are doing 
and their standards for appropriate and inappropriate behav-
ior. We are saying we would not want to do that sort of 
thing, i.e., engage in that sort of practice. And that is 
just Wittgenstein's point. 
I want to examine John McDowell's position here, as his 
is an elaboration of the Wittgensteinian approach to these 
issues. Earlier I criticized Platts on the ground that his 
realism is perhaps little more than a kind of inter-subjec-
tivism. It is here that McDowell takes up the fight, showing 
that what was criticized as inter-subjective is actually uni-
versal among moral agents. And he also describes a person's 
inability to conceive of practices different from his or her 
own as a kind of b1.indnsss to alternative practices (what 
Wittgenstein refers to as mean.ing bl.indnsss). 
3. MCDOWELL 
In most of his work on moral realism John McDowell's ef-
forts are aimed at undermining Hume's projectivism as well as 
non-cognitivism in general. His basic criticism of these po-
sitions concerns their acceptance of a strict prescript-
ive/descriptive distinction. McDowell claims that these com-
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components are inseparable from each other, and, in this re-
gard, science is no different from ethics. If this claim can 
be substantiated, then, perhaps, the moral realm could gain a 
certain amount of objective status. Before going on to 
McDowell's arguments against the non-cognitivists, then, it 
seems that a small discussion of the perspective of this lat-
ter group of philosophers, especially Hume, is in order. 
In An Enqu.iry Concern.ing the Pr.inc.ip1es of Hora1s, Hume 
makes a distinction between the role of reason and the role 
of taste and sentiment in the making of moral evaluations. He 
points out that reason is concerned with the apprehension or 
inference of matters of fact or relations among ideas or im-
pressions of sensations in the world (1751, p. 308) whereas 
taste gives rise to sentiment which is defined by him as uan 
immediate feeling and finer internal sensen (1751, p. 274) 
and which is connected with our motivation to action. As 
Hume states, 
The distinct boundaries and offices of reason 
and taste are easily ascertained. The former con-
veys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: the lat-
ter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, 
vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they 
really stand in nature, without addition and 
diminution: the other has a productive faculty, 
and gilding or staining all natural objects with 
the colors, borrowed from internal sentiment, rais-
es in a manner a new creation (1751, p. 311). 
Hume argues that the passions or sentiments and not reason 
are the source of our motivation. Since reason discovers 
only ob.Jee ts as they rea11y stand .in nature, i.e., only facts 
that obtain independently of our subjective states, it cannot 
be used as the sole basis for our moral judgments. Reason 
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would have to be capable of motivating us to act, a charac-
teristic that Hume does not find in our ability to reason. 
It is our feelings or sentiments that motivate us to respond 
in certain ways and such feelings are grounded in considera-
tions of utility, i.e., they are based on a universal capaci-
ty for sympathy and not self-love. Hume believes that all of 
us have the ability to feel what others feel and from this 
capacity comes a sense of what is generally beneficial for 
us. Our moral judgments express sentiments or feelings of 
approbation and blame toward those actions and persons who 
either contribute to our welfare or do not, toward those ac-
tions and persons that give rise to virtue or vice. And, as 
he points out in A Trsat~ss of HuRliln Nature, 
... the distinction of vice and virtue is not found 
ed merely on the relations of objects, nor is per-
ceived by reason (1739, p. 424). 
It must be remembered that our judgments are not to be 
based on self-interested motives if they are to be considered 
moral. Our sentiments must not arise from a personal per-
spective; they must arise from the perspective of a rational, 
impartial evaluator, one who views the actions in question in 
abstraction from her own personal interests. In doing so, 
the impartial evaluator must appreciate all the non-moral 
facts that are relevant to a moral judgment before making 
that moral judgment. Yet Hume does not want to imply any 
form of reductionism or supervenience claims by this belief 
since he firmly belives that no Mought" can be derived from 
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that 
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it should be observed and explained; and at the 
same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this relation 
can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it 1739, p. 423). 
The others referred to are, of course, those objective facts 
and properties in the world, or what ~s. Hume likens vices 
and virtues to such phenomena as colors and sounds which ac-
cording to him are not properties of objects in the world: 
... [w]hen you pronounce any action or character to 
be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the 
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or 
sentiment of blame from contemplation of it. Vice 
and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, 
colors, heat, and cold, which, according to modern 
philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but per-
ceptions in the mind (1739, p. 423) 
Or as it is stated in the Enquiry : 
It is the nature, and indeed the definition of 
virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable 
to or approved by everyone who considers and con 
templates it (1751, p. 307). 
Such perceptions, then, must not be treated or projected as 
objective features of the world. Doing so, however, will 
give us the appearance that our moral pronouncements really 
exist apart from our subjective viewpoints. Yet this would 
be a delusion on our part. What we notice when we observe a 
bad act are such characteristics as anger and pain and other 
non-moral facts. There is, however, no additional objective 
fact beyond these. There is no objective property of wrong-
ness that we a.lso observe; there is nothing more to the eval-
uation than our reacting affectively to those relevant facts 
that are present before us. 
Earlier it was stated that the sentiments alone were the 
source of our motivation. But this does not entail that rea-
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son has no further role in the making of our moral judgments. 
On the contrary, since we can make true and false judgments, 
reason does play a significant part. Since we are human, we 
can err in our moral judgments as we do in any of our other 
judgments. The main reason why this occurs in our moral 
evaluations is due to the possibility of our self-interest 
overriding the interests of others, when our inclination to 
be sympathetic is replaced by certain vicious tendencies on 
our part. Here reason is needed to get us back on course. 
It guides our judgments: 
Reason instructs us in the several tendencies of 
actions, and hUJ118IJjtyrnakes a distinction in favor 
of those which are useful and beneficial (1751, p. 
308) • 
Our ability to reason, then, informs us of the means by which 
we can satisfy our desires and such means will only be under· 
stood from an impartial perspective. Therefore, what consti-
tutes a true moral judgment involves both sentiment and rea-
son. Each by itself is insufficient as the grounds for es-
tablishing truth in morality. In order to appropriately ana-
lyze our judgments, the analysis must be in terms of the re-
lations between our affective reactions and their objective 
bases. 
Although Hume is considered by some philosophers30 to be a 
subjective or relational realist with respect to our moral 
judgments and properties, he is not the kind of realist with 
which McDowell is sympathetic. McDowell criticizes Hume on 
the grounds that Hume as well as non-cognitivists in general 
"Alan Goldman maintains this view throughout his book 
Hora1 Know1edge, Routledge, London, 1990. 
126 
describes the reaJ world as only consisting of primary quali-
ties and their objects. What this entails is a belief in a 
strict prescriptive/descriptive distinction. So, according 
to Hume and others, what the world is reaJJylike is to be 
described independently of our reactions or of how we view 
it. And, in addition, this view adheres to a claim prominent 
in the 18th century philosophy of mind which states that our 
cognitive capacities are strictly independent of our senti-
mental or passionate non-cognitive capacities. We have, ac-
cording to this view, a sensitivity to the world as it really 
is but this sensitivity is separate from our value experience 
as such. Hurne, of course, referred to this as his distinc-
tion between impressions of sensations (ideas) and impres-
sions of reflection (values). 
McDowell finds such a position to be untenable. Can one 
really occupy an external impartial perspective as to how 
things are? McDowell voices his concern over, 
[w]hether, corresponding to any value concept, 
one can always isolate a genuine feature of the 
world--by the appropriate standard of genuineness: 
that is, a feature that is there anyway, indepen-
dently of anyone's value experience being as it is-
to be that to which competent users of the concept 
are to be regarded as responding when they use it; 
that which is left in the world when one peels off 
the reflection of the appropriate attitude (1979, 
p. 144). 
McDowell believes that the prescriptive and descriptive com-
ponents cannot be disentangled in the way envisaged by the 
non-cognitivists. According to him, the apprehension and un-
derstanding of concepts cannot take place "without embarking 
on an attempt to make sense of (the community's) admiration 
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(of actions falling under those concepts} ... an attempt to 
comprehend their special perspectiven (1979, p. 144). Such 
understanding involves a regard for rule-following and public 
standards. Wittgenstein's influence is apparent in this po-
sition. The notion of objectivity in his conception of lan-
guage and its connection to our form of life is derived from 
a commun~ ~Y of human response: 
Consider, for instance, concepts whose applica 
tion gives rise to hard cases ... there are disagree-
ments, which resist resolution by argument, as to 
whether or not a concept applies. If one is con-
vinced that one is right on a hard case, one will 
find oneself saying, as one's arguments tail off 
without securing acceptance, 'You simply aren't 
seeing it', or 'But don't you see?'. (1979, p. 151) 
Although McDowell doesn't agree with all of Wittgenstein's 
views concerning language, he does agree with his analysis of 
how the public manifestation of a concept bestows objectivity 
on that concept. McDowell points out that the sense of ob-
jectivity that is depicted by traditional non-cognitivists, 
according to which that objectivity which is created by the 
rules and standards which we follow and which exists apart 
from our beliefs about such rules, is an illusory type of ob-
jectivity. These non-cognitivists maintain that rules are 
what f.ix what can and cannot be done or said in a society and 
that it is they which keep our practices in line. There is 
some truth to this, yet they also want to maintain that our 
reactions or responses to such rules have little to do, if 
anything at all, with whether our language and our actions 
are objective. Feelings and reactions are outside the de-
scriptive side of our world. They describe the role of rules 
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and standards using the analogy of train rails: 
... What counts as doing the same thing, within the 
practice in question, is fixed by its rules. The 
rules mark out rails along which correct activity 
must run. These rails are there anyway, indepen-
dently of the responses and reactions a propensity 
to which one acquires when one learns the practice 
itself; ... Acquiring mastery of the practice is 
pictured as something like engaging mental wheels 
with these objectively existing rails (1979, pp. 
145-146). 
But as McDowell points out, one also needs to consider what 
is involved in learning rules. He cites Stanley Cavell's de-
scription of Wittgenstein's view on this: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, 
and then we are expected, and expect others, to be 
able to project them into further contexts. 
Nothing insures that this projection will take 
place (in particular, not the grasping of univer-
sals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as 
nothing insures that we will make, and understand, 
the same projections. That on the whole we do is a 
matter of our sharing routes of interest and feel-
ing, senses of humor and of significance and of 
fulfillrnent .. all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein 
calls 'forms of life'. (1979, p. 149). 
McDowell defends this view by arguing that it is an illusion 
to think there is anything more to objectivity than the lan-
guage and its rules we have been taught to use and appreci-
ate. We experience a sort of vertigo if we believe that 
there is not something more to ground our objectivity. Such 
is the case for the non-cognitivists who desire this kind of 
security. They believe that if there is not the kind of ob-
jectivity they envisioned apart from their own thoughts and 
activities, the world around them just whirls around and past 
them. Once it is realized that what objective grounding 
there is depends upon our own thoughts and their rela.tion to 
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reality, in part due to the way we are trained to see things, 
and not due to an independent impartial perspective, we will 
be able to deal with the vertigo. But this then would re-
quire not positing a strict prescriptive/descriptive distinc-
tion. According to McDowell, it is a fundamental mistake to 
think that one could disentangle the two elements. As he re-
marks, with respect to our system of mathematics: 
We tend, confusedly, to suppose that we occupy 
the external standpoint envisaged by platonism, 
when we say things we need to say in order to re-
ject the reduction of mathematical truth to human 
natural history. For instance, we deny that what 
it is for the square of 13 to be 169 is for it to 
be possible to train human beings so that they find 
such and such calculations compelling. Rather, it 
is because the square of 13 really ~s 169 that we 
can be brought to find the calculations com-
pelling ... But this is an illusion ... we are speaking 
not from the midst of our merely human mathematical 
competence but from the envisaged independent per-
spective instead. (As if, by a special emphasis, 
one could somehow manage to speak otherwise than 
out of one's own mouth.) We cannot occupy the in-
dependent perspective that platonism envisages 
( 197 9, P. 15 0) . 
The objectivity of moral properties, according to 
McDowell, is founded on and supported by a community of human 
response. To put it simply, it is our trained reactions and 
responses that regulate our particular practices or give us 
this sense of objectivity. The attractiveness of this view 
lies in (once again) placing moral properties within our 
reach and by emphasizing the impossibility of disentangling 
our cognitive from the conative or affective capacities. How 
things really are, then, cannot be characterized according to 
primary qualiti~s alone. 
In McDowell's Va.lutJJs and StJJcondary "ut!I.Z.it~tJJs (1988), the 
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same theme re-emerges. Here he draws an analogy between 
color properties and value properties. Color ascriptions, 
like value ascriptions, are dependent upon our inter-subjec-
tive responses and -rationally optimal• or cognitive sensi-
bilities. Both types of judgments are inextricably bound to 
the exercise of a perceptual or sensible faculty. We are 
trained to call certain shades of color by certain names; 
this is what McDowell means by his reference to a deve1oped 
sensibility for such properties. Colors are present to our 
experience, but only as secondary qualities. Awareness of a 
secondary quality is perceptual awareness of a genuinely pos-
sessed property of some object in the world. An object can 
be said to be disposed to present a particular perceptual ap· 
pearance of itself to its perceiver. What we see when we 
look at a fire truck, for example, is some particular shade 
of red (as well as other qualities) but the fundamental sci-
entific explanation of its being red is not its redness. 
Rather, as science will tell us, explanations of why we see 
the color we do have to do with our physiological make-up and 
how light interacts with our eyes, and there is no need to 
bring in the colors themselves as reasons for why we see red 
as opposed to green. The explanation is fundamentally -col-
orless•. Like moral properties, color properties are outside 
the natural/causal explanatory order of things; neither are 
fundamental to the explanation of our behavior. In this re-
gard, McDowell refers to such properties as non-natural. 
Our propensity to detect these non-natural properties, 
then, is heightened by how developed our sensibility is for 
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these properties. And such sensibilities are regulated by 
standards; one cannot just say anything is red (or good), for 
example. We could make mistakes about something being red 
(or good) and some of us might make finer distinctions among 
the different colors (or value properties) present to us. 
And so we revise our color evaluations in light of these 
findings. It is important to mention at this point that 
McDowell himself only pushes the analogy between colors and 
values so far, since he realizes that there does remain a 
crucial distinction between the two. As he remarks, u[a] 
virtue is conceived to be not merely such as to elicit the 
appropriate 'attitude' (as a color is merely such as to cause 
the appropriate experiences), but rather such as to merit itn 
(1988, p. 175). He believes, though, the analogy works well 
enough for his purposes, namely for making a case for moral 
realism. 
As McDowell points out, our affective natures allow us 
to detect these types of properties. However, there are cer-
tain individuals who appear to lack these sensibilities due 
to physical handicaps or insufficient training. Using the 
example of comedy, a sensibility theorist would ask why it is 
that most of us would find some situation funny whereas some 
other individual would not. His response is that this indi-
vidual does not see or detect the humour in the situation. 
Such an individual may grasp the cognitive aspects of the 
situation, but for some reason is unable to find the situa-
tion funny (i.e., lacks that particular sensibility). 
McDowell is unable to come up with an account of the nature 
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of these reasons except to say that such a person is not d.is-
poaed to (i.e., trained for) finding these things comical. 
Anyone who does not share our comical sensibility cannot per-
ceive the situation in the same way that we do. What is com-
ical to us just is not comical to them. And it is the same 
case with ethics. Someone who has not been trained to see 
certain actions as immoral, for example, and, as such, does 
not call them immoral, does not share our specific moral sen-
sibilities. McDowell points out that such an individual (or 
individuals) can be said to have an inability or insensitivi-
ty for detecting the moral properties in question. This in-
dividual can be said to be b1~nd to those aspects noZ111a.11y 
found to be moral or immoral. The moral property, then, 
fails to be action-guiding or motivating for this person 
since she fails to detect it. 
The moral case is likened to a case in which a child 
cannot arrive at the right answer in mathematics. The child, 
one says, is unab.lB to perceive or find the correct response. 
In this case, we would say that the child has not yet come to 
understand the situation in the proper way; she needs to 
learn the necessary procedures or rules so that she will ar-
rive at what we wou1d ca11 the correct answer. If she cannot 
correctly apply the rules-, for whatever reason, we are 
justified in saying that she does not know the real answer, 
but what that means is that her actions are not in accord 
with socially inculcated standards. 
133 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Thus far, Wittgensteinian Naturalism appears to offer a 
viable alternative to the Quinean Naturalism discussed earli-
er in this chapter. Unlike Quinean Naturalism, it avoids 
treating the practices of science as the paradigms of onto-
logical commitment. This it does by rejecting the Cartesian 
assumption that metaphysics must be grounded in an adequate 
epistemology. The idea that members of society share a form 
of life provides the basis for rejecting that assumption. In 
McDowell's particular account of realism the inter-subjec-
tivism attributed to Platts re-appears in a new light, name-
ly, as a characteristic attributable to all moral agents. 
For Platts, moral disagreement signifies error on someone's 
part, i.e., that someone is engaging in moral reasoning but 
is doing so incorrectly. For McDowell, moral disagreements 
are chalked up to an inability to recognize and engage in 
certain kinds of practices. 
McDowell's criterion for objectivity, then, has to do 
with what is acceptable to agents sharing a form of life. In 
our particular communities, we are trained to see matters 
from certain perspectives rather than others. In the process 
of learning what type of behaviors count as good (or bad), we 
come to realize that we cannot do anything we want. We see 
that there is a right way to look at things, and anything 
that diverges from this way is wrong. Our training, then, 
exercises a certain necessity over our minds and our actions. 
So in the case of the individual who fails to see, for exam-
ple, that murder is wrong, then she is considered meaning· 
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blind. The only way for such an individual to understand the 
rule would be for them to see it .in the s8111B "'"Y that their 
community does. There is, then, only one way, i.e., the com-
munity's way, for understanding the meanings of moral terms 
and their related practices. And so, what 'N'Ould seem to 
follow from this description is that there is a moral fact of 
murder being wrong, in the event that the cozmnunity cannot 
conceive of the elimination of the practices of prohibiting 
murder, pronouncing it wrong, etc. 
Tying objectivity to what is acceptable to all (or at 
least the majority of) agents within a society is not, of 
course, a novel view. There has been an historical tendency 
to view objectivity in this way, although most traditional 
objectivists specify that the agents must be rational. Kant 
(1785), for example, held that a moral law must be something 
that all rational people could give their voluntary assent 
to. A moral law was considered to be objective and binding 
so long as it was accepted by all rational people. And, as 
Rachels points out, 
... [e]ven the emotivists recognized the need to 
give so.111B account of the place of reason in ethics 
(1986, p. 35). 
Rachels himself follows the tradition by referring to moral 
truths as truths of reason. He writes, 
A truth of ethics is a conclusion that is backed 
by reasons: the •correctw answer to a moral ques-
tion is simply the answer that has the weight of 
reason on its side. Such truths are objective in 
the sense that they are true inde-pendently of what 
we might want or think. We cannot make something 
good or bad just by wishing it to be so, because we 
cannot merely will that the weight of reason be on 
its side or against it. And we can be wrong about 
what is good or bad, because we can be wrong about 
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what reason commends. Reason says what it says, 
regardless of our opinions or desires (1986, p.35-
36) . 
Rachels points out that moral disagreements are disagreements 
about facts or an individual's or a group's beliefs about 
those facts (1984, pp. 13ff.). Rachels grounds his realism 
in certain empirical facts. He recognizes that an under-
standing of some particular practice cannot be understood 
apart from the conditions surrounding that practice. He uses 
the following example to illustrate his view. He holds that 
the Eskimo practice of killing infants, particularly infant 
girls, can be understood only against the backdrop of their 
social and economic conditions. The Eskimos who have occu-
pied great expanses of arctic and sub-arctic terrain from 
Alaska to Greenland are forced to live a nomadic lifestyle. 
They acquire food by hunting which, in turn, requires them to 
be highly mobile so that they can follow herds of caribou and 
the like. Food is often scarce, and often survival is at 
best tenuous. The mortality rate among hunters is quite 
high, so the bearing of children, particularly 111t!l1e children 
upon whom that office falls, is highly prized. However, dur-
ing times when food is scarce young .children, as well as the 
elderly who are unable to perform duties related to survival, 
become a liability. Not only must they be fed, they mu.st be 
transported. Consequently, if infanticide were not per-
formed, the very survival of the group would be hampered. 
Having to transport the very young or the very old would in-
terfere with the ability of the band to track game. Feeding 
the very young and the very old would result in a scarcity of 
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food for the hunters which, in turn, would increase their own 
risk of being ha:rmed as they engage in the physically demand-
ing process of hunting. Under such conditions, infants are 
reluctantly put to death. Young girls are more often put to 
death than boys because of the high mortality rate among 
males due to the danger involved. in hunting: if males and 
females were killed in equal numbers, the number of mouths to 
feed would grow disproportionately to the number of hunters 
(Rachels, 1984, pp. 20-21). 
Some might argue that this example, rather than support-
ing realism, seems to support relativism instead. This crit-
icism appears particularly poignant in light of the fact that 
the Eskimos only engage in this activity as a last resort; 
typically, other alternatives--such as adoption--are sought. 
It would seem that what the Eskimos do is contingent upon the 
economy forced upon them by the environmental niche they oc-
cupy. Were these sorts of facts other than they are, the 
need to practice infanticide would no longer exist. For exam-
ple, if the Eskimos were employed by U.S. petroleum companies 
and were given both housing and a wage with which to purchase 
food, then the practice of infanticide would be seen as vari-
able and, therefore, not universal in nature. Hence, it 
would be said that there is not some fact of the matter to 
infanticide rs811ybeing wrong, but neither can it be said 
that infanticide is rs41.lypermissible. Whether or not one 
practice·s infanticide is a matter of convention. 
Rachels, of course, does not agree with this analysis. 
He argues that argues that the case involving the Eskimos' 
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acceptance of the permissibility of infanticide demonstrates 
t!l common set of va.lues rather than divergent sets of values. 
What the Eskimos share in conmon with members of industrial-
ized nations is a concern .for the preservation of their fami-
lies (or bands). The different economies and environmental 
niches occupied by the tWQ cultures necessitate that the mem-
bers of the cultures observe different secondary rules in 
achieving their goals. Proceeding in a Kantian manner, 
Rachels argues that certain sets of values must be accepted 
by societies as necessary conditions for their own survival. 
For example, since human infants are extremely helpless and 
require care for an extended period of time, if a society did 
not care for its young,the young would not survive. The 
older members of the society would not be replaced, and even-
tually the society would cease to exist. Rachels concludes 
that any society which continues to exist must place acer-
tain amount of value upon caring for the young, and that in-
fanticide must be the exception rather than the rule (1984, 
p. 21) . 
Again, could a society exist which fails to place value 
upon truth-telling? In a society in which truth-telling was 
no more valuable than lying, conununication would be extremely 
hampered (e.g., no sense could be attached to asking direc-
tions, reporting incidents, etc.), promises and commitments 
among individuals would lose their force, and so forth. 
Since a society depends for its existence upon a great deal 
of cooperation among its members, it is difficult to see how 
it could exist under such conditions (1984, p. 21-22). 
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It seems that certain values must be invariant or uni-
versal across cultures. As Rachels aptly puts it: 
[C]ultures may differ with regard to what they 
regard as legitimate exceptions to the rules, but 
this disagreement exists against a background of 
agreement on the larger issuesw (1984, p. 22). 
Does this view, then, show that we must be moral realists? 
Are there alternative approaches to the study of morality? 
Following Arrington, I hold that this tendency to view 
objectivity along these lines has not allowed us to see and 
appreciate what we are actually do~ngas moral agents. 
Objectivity, according to the cognitivists, is conferred upon 
our principles. 31 Rachels, like other rationalists, uses a 
top-down strategy in arriving at our moral principles. He 
points out that we rationally deduce our secondary moral 
rules from general moral principles. A moral rule just is a 
rule that is justified rationally. Reason will, as it were, 
allow us to srr~ve st the moral truth. Arrington (as well as 
descriptive realists like Platts and McDowell), on the other 
hand, speak of our general normative principles as being 
groundless; they are just to be viewed as necessary or essen-
tial to our way of life, but not transcending our way of 
life. Viewing morality in this way, as Arrington will argue, 
will give us a better picture of what our moral practices are 
"Throughout the history of ethics there have been philso-
phers who would be unwilling to base objectivity solely on 
rationality, but would be more comfortable, for example, with 
basing it on intuitions (as in the case of Moore). Yet suf-
fice it to say that there has been a tendency overall, 
whether rationali~t or not, to tie objectivity to what is 
agreeable to all beings who are using their mental talents ~n 
an opt~ms2 way (whether such talents refer to their reason, 
their intuitions, or whatever). 
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like. 
However, even though Platts and McDowell are descrip-
tivists in that they do not accept that moral rules are ra-
tionally justifiable, Arrington finds that their approaches 
do not take account of the different levels of moral claims. 
A distinction needs to be made between those claims that we 
hold to be more basic and those claims which we find to be 
controversial. Arrington is unwilling, as we will see in the 
next chapter, to regard all moral claims as being interpreted 
realistically (at least in the way envisioned by these objec-
tivists). 
A complete account of morality, according to Arrington, 
must pay sufficient attention to the logical and semantical 
roles of our different moral claims. His conceptual rela-
tivism, which I examine in the following chapter, is a more 
sophisticated view compared to the accounts offered by de-
scriptive realists such as McDowell. Unlike McDowell's theo-
ry, Arrington's view does take account of the different lev-
els of moral statements we use within our particular communi-
ty; some are necessarily true whereas others are contingent. 
What status these statements have depends on what role they 
play in our form of life. Some moral claims just are more 
relative than others. In order to be able to do such an 
analysis, then, requires that one look at how these sentences 
in general behave in our lives. I now turn to Chapter Three 
where I begin with an analysis of Arrington's view and then 
proceed to an examination of Blackburn's quasi-realist ac-
count of morality. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO MORAL REALISM 
1. OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE 
This chapter evaluates two alternative accounts concern-
ing the ontological status of the presumed objects of moral 
judgments. These authors are indeed sympathetic to the kind 
of criticism offered against Quinean Naturalism by the 
Wittgensteinians, yet they are unwilling to draw the same 
conclusion as do the realists. 
As pointed out at the end of the last chapter, one crit-
icism to which McDowell and other descriptive realists are 
susceptible is that they fail in their accounts of moral 
practice to distinguish between relevantly different kinds of 
claims which make up our moral discourse: meta-ethical 
claims (e.g., •Relativism is false,• •Moral facts exist,• 
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etc.), general normative claims (e.g., •Murder is wrong•), 
and singular nonnative claims (like •The murder of Johnson by 
Smith was wrong.a). Arrington, in contrast, makes the rele-
vant distinctions and provides a unique version of moral 
anti-realism (which he describes as a kind of conceptua1 re1-
at~v~sn/J. In the end, though, Arrington's view will be crit-
icized on the grounds that it contains a peculiar inconsis-
tency, The inconsistency stems from the fact that he asserts 
certain meta-ethical claims while professing a theory which 
would render such clainis meaningless. 
It is Blackburn who finally offers a version of anti-re-
alism (which he calls guas~·rea1~sni> which both recognizes 
the relevant distinctions and avoids the inconsistency. As 
we shall see, quasi-realism offers an alternative to the idea 
of ontological commitment implicit in Wittgensteinian real-
ism. In fact, Blackburn is heavily influenced by 
Wittgenstein (as well as by Hume) and criticizes these real-
ists for their failure to appreciate the subtlety of 
Wittgenstein's view. In an important respect these realists 
have fallen victim to the very temptation they find most re-
pugnant among Platonists and Quinean Naturalists; their at-
tempt to identify realistically interpretable discourse with 
sets of practices which are transcendental (to which no al-
ternatives can be seen) juet is part of an attempt to ground 
moral judgments in a foundationalist epistemology. Using 
Blackburn's quasi-realism as a basis, I argue for what may be 
called the autonomy of mora1 d~scourse. This is the thesis 
that moral discourse does not require epistemological justi-
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fication, and that the cognitivist requirement that such 
foundations be forthcoming (in order to guard against the 
possibility of moral skepticism) is itself unjustifiable. 
The chapter concludes with an account of the way in which 
certain meta-ethical claims may be viewed from a quasi-real-
ist perspective. 
All of the moral realists mentioned earlier shared a 
conmon belief: that at least some of our moral principles are 
more intransigent than others, and so such principles must be 
true. And what makes such ~rinciples true is how they relate 
to our rationality, intuition, dispositions, etc .. 
Arrington, however, points out that this way of viewing our 
moral principles does not do justice to the actual way we use 
and understand our moral statements. He points out, that 
those which lay claim to being universal (for example, 
Rachels' claims concerning the value of caring for the young 
and truth-telling) cannot be judged true or false relative to 
some standard (transcendental or otherwise). These kinds of 
value statements must be seen as an essential p~rt of our 
form of life, as necessary beliefs related to our form of 
life. Given that such values are found within, and not out-
side of, our form of life, Arrington claims that it would 
make no sense to talk about these general normative claims 
(what he later refers to as grammatical propositions) as 
being true or false per se. Acceptance of those kinds of 
claims do, however, make it possible to form true and false 
moral judgments of a more particular nature. We can say Joe 
acted wrongly in killing his son (or that the sentence MJoe 
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acted wrongly .... w is really true) precisely because Joe's 
action goes against the rule that no one should commit infan· 
ticide (for which reason the sentence #Joe acted wrongly .... " 
goes against our rule for assigning truth). But there is no 
rule to which the rules answer. So, as paradoxical as this 
seems, the generB1 claims which make part~cu1armoral claims 
(those containing singular terms) true, cannot themselves be 
judged true or false. It is to this fact that I was refer-
ring earlier in saying that the objectivists mentioned earli· 
er do not accommodate different kinds of ethical statements. 
The general ethical statements are a sub-class of what 
Wittgenstein refers to as granmatical propositions. A fuller 
consideration of why gramnatical remarks must be regarded as 
nonsensical (in a special sense of that term) rather than 
true or false shall arise in my examination of Blackburn's 
and Arrington's views. Also, it is from that perspective 
that the status of meta-ethical claims, like #Relativism is 
false,• can best be understood. 
2. ARRINGTON 
Arrington is greatly influenced by Wittgenstein. He 
thinks the Wittgensteinian repudiation of the possibility of 
ultimate epistemic justification for moral claims leads, not 
to realism, but to anti-realism. And a further difference 
between him and the descriptivist realists is that he distin· 
guishes between different levels of moral claims in terms of 
their semantic properties. 
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Arrington's conceptual relativism takes what he refers 
to as soc.ia.1-ru.ls rs.lat.iv.lam as its foil. Relativists of the 
latter kind, e.g, Harman (1977) and Wong (1984), hold that 
moral rules emerge from certain social pressures (for sur-
vival, companionship and the like) requiring the use of human 
cognitive faculties. For Harman the rules result from a ra-
tional process of bargaining and mutual adjustment in which 
agents reckon with one another in full cognizance of their 
respective powers (1977, p. 104), whereas for Wong they are 
tools employed by members of society to resolve conflicts in 
ways rational agents would deem fair (1984, pp. 63ff.). For 
both authors, the process of rule-formation is a rational 
one; specific moral rules are subject to standards of ratio-
nality shared by all members of the co:nnnunity. For individu-
als to diverge from the rules that accord with acceptable 
standards of rationality is for those individuals to reveal 
themselves as either irrational or in error. Such a view is 
considered problematic by Arrington, and rightly so, since 
often the beliefs of individuals at odds with the co:nnnon 
morality may be more justified than those acknowledged by the 
co:nnnunity at large. 32 Besides that somewhat obvious flaw, 
Arrington cites a particular dilemma the theories must face. 
These theories, described by their proponents as forms of 
re.lat.iv.ism because they ground moral rules in soc.ia.1.ly ac-
ceptab.le standards of rationality, can escape neither the 
charge of being covertly realistic nor that of being extreme-
12 In this respect dynamical models such as that employed by 
Boyd which appeal.to processes of reflective equilibrium are 
preferable to those which identify the product of rule-fonna-
tion with what is optimally rational. 
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ly arbitrary. Arrington's charge may not be entirely fair, 
but it is worth examining since he regards his own conceptual 
relativism as a means of passing between the horns of the 
dilemma, as avoiding talk of rational justification while at 
the same time not committing himself to a purely subjective 
view of morality. 
According to Arrington, the grounding of moral rules in 
human rationality presupposes absolutism, and absolutism pre-
supposes realism (Arrington uses the word '"objectivism" 
here). If moral rules are the products of rat~ona1 process-
es, then preswnably they must hold for a11 rational agents. 
But what holds for all rational agents must, according to 
Arrington, be nothing subjective. If moral rules may be said 
to be rationally justified, then they must answer to some-
thing other than merely subjective states. Hence, they must 
be objective or mind-independent. The fact that these au-
thors require moral rules to be rationally justifiable makes 
their views susceptible to a certain kind of criticism. Are 
the rules rea11yjustified? Since the standards of rational 
justification attending rule-formation are themselves no.I111t!l· 
t~ve standards, how are they to be justified? It seems these 
relativists find themselves on a slippery slope: once the 
process of requiring justification begins, where shall it 
end? Clearly the task of providing a justificationist epis-
temology is not one to be embraced by a relativist (or anti-
realist). 
So how is the charge of arbitrariness to be avoided? 
Here is the other horn of the dile11111a. If one requires jus-
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tification, but is unable to provide it, then adherence to 
standards of rationality appears arbitrary. Without an epis· 
temological justification to which to appeal, no basis can be 
provided for saying that divergent views on morality either 
are irrational or in error. Which view of morality one holds 
would in that case hang in the air with the standard of ra· 
tionality underlying it. Because these authors believe 
morality is not arbitrary in this sense, such a consequence 
is not desirable. 
Social-rule relativism relativizes moral rules (or the 
application of moral concepts) to standards of rational ac· 
ceptability which are problematic insofar as they are said to 
confer epistemic warrant upon moral claims. Conceptual rela· 
tivism, on the other hand, denies that general nonnative 
principles are capable of, or in need of, epistemic warrant. 
Our moral concepts fonn a linguistic faJ11~1y (as I will ex· 
plain in greater detail below), and whatever justification is 
required for specific moral claims must come in appealing to 
other members of the family. In an important respect morali· 
ty--making moral claims, applying moral concepts··is an au-
tonomous activity. It answers to nothing outside itself. He 
puts the matter this way: 
[C]onceptual relativism •.. rejects the metaphysi· 
cal idea that we can meaningfully speak of there 
being something··moral properties of right and 
wrong, and moral facts incorporating them··that is 
independent of our moral concepts and practices, 
something that could be ascertained independently 
of those concepts and detennined to be in or out of 
accord with them. It also rejects the idea of a 
practical or instrumental validation of moral con· 
cepts (1989, p. 259). 
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In a manner of speaking, the problems posed in the terminolo-
gy of the family cannot be posed in any other terminology. 
Arrington's theory manages to acconunodate moral claims which 
perform different semantic roles, and it serves to distin-
guish those which have.any role to play from those, like 
•There are moral facts• which play no role at all. 
Like many of the other philosophers considered so far, 
Arrington is heavily influenced by Wittgenstein, Indeed he 
cites two arguments from Wittgenstein to support his belief 
in the autonOD{Yof morality, his view that the general moral 
rules are ground1sss, that is, they are not rationally justi-
fiable. 
The first argument, stemming from a consideration of 
Wittgenstein (1974a, pp. 53-55; 1974b, p. 186), contends that 
the attempt to provide epistemic justification for all nor-
mative claims would be specious (Arrington, 1989, pp. 259-
260). The argument purports to show that the very idea of 
justifying a family of moral concepts in terms other than 
their own is not possible. Moral grammar is to be viewed as 
autonomous. Suppose that the the so-called justification 
were conducted by appealing to .1110ra1 facts and properties. 
In that case the explanation would be specious for the very 
reason that the concepts in need of justification would be 
employed in the justification. On the other hand, if the 
justification were not conducted in moral terms, if, for ex-
ample, the moral phenomena were reduced to non-moral phenome-
na, then as Wittgenstein would say in another context: it 
would be the case that •problem and method pass one another 
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by" (1958, p. 232). If one asks, for example, "What makes 
casting a ballot the exercise of a right?• and is told 
"Casting a ballot is equivalent to ... which, in turn, is iden-
tical to a moral fact (that is, t:hemoral fact which is the 
exercising of a right,• one is likely to think one's question 
had not been answered. What a moral fact is, or what a moral 
fact is reducible to was not in question. If moral claims 
are to be understood, they must be understood in te:r:ms of the 
(moral) context in which they are found. Blackburn (1988, p. 
369) also agrees with this view by noting that, "Ethical no-
tions require ethical sensibilities to comprehend them." 
What, then, is called the just.lf~'ct:1t.lon of moral claims is an 
activity w~th~n the family of discourse in which the termi-
nology is applied. 
The second argument, cited by Arrington, concerns at-
tempts to justify the application of moral concepts by iden-
tifying some got:11 external to their use (Wittgenstein, 1970, 
sec. 320; 1974b, p. 184). Could our moral rules be justified 
in terms of some purpose they achieve? If one thinks so, 
then one is conceiving of the rules for the application of a 
moral concept as analogous to, say, a cooking recipe which 
can indeed be judged according to its end result. The activ-
ity of judging a recipe just ~s the activity of judging (in 
accordance with canons of taste, nutritional value and ap-
pearance) what is produced. The recipe is a means to an end, 
and it i·s judged according to its ends. Can the same be said 
for the rules pertaining to the application of moral con-
cepts? Let us suppose that the rule for applying the concept 
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murderer (which I shall here suppose to be the same as the 
rule for applying the predicate •xis a murderer•) runs some-
thing like this: if x takes the life of another person with 
malintent, then it 11li!IY be said that •xis a murderer.• Now 
what is the goal of this rule? Is it not just to give the 
conditions underlying the application of the concept? One 
could, of course, object that the purpose of rule for apply-
ing the concept may be identified with whatever purposes we 
have for labeling someone a murderer. But in that case con-
siderations arising from the first argument become pertinent. 
What would the purpose of calling someone a murderer be? 
Would it be to effect a form of retribution, or to achieve 
some sort of societal goal (such as the maximizing of happi-
ness)? Clearly if such ends justify the practice of calling 
someone a murderer under certain conditions, we have not es-
caped the circle of moral terms. 
This shows that the way we apply our moral concepts, and 
our moral rules themselves, are not capable of being given 
any sort of epistemic warrant from without (metaphysical or 
instrumental). But neither is there any need for such war-
rant. Nhat M9 caJJ •giving justification• just is something 
we do in tht11t vocabulary. The request that something further 
be offered. as justification is uttered by someone for whom, 
to use Wittgenstein's phrase, language is on a holiday (1958, 
sec.38). 
What Arrington thus refers to as the autonomy of moral 
grammar (1989, pp. 150 and 160) is a special case of the gen-
eral autonomy of grammar (i.e, of grammatical practices) 
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urged by Wittgenstein. Basically what this means is that all 
of our linguistic practices must be understood. in their own 
terms: there is no such thing as stepping outside one's lin-
guistic practices in order to provide them with warrant. At 
some point explanations come to an end, and one says: •This 
is simply what we do.•. 
Although Arrington holds the view that the practices 
which constitute one's form of life, whatever they may be, 
are without traditional epistemological justification, and as 
such allows him to be open to the possibility of alternate 
moralities, he does believe that that there are certain moral 
principles which would be acceptable to all human beings. As 
he puts the matter: 
Whereas conceptual relativism can easily accom-
modate alternative concepts of morality, it is also 
compatible with the possibility that all human be-
ings agree in some ultimate or basic way as to what 
they would call moral rules and moral ends ... (1989, 
p. 262). 
[N]o attempt is made to derive the thesis of 
relativism from the diversity of moral beliefs. 
Indeed, as we have seen, conceptual relativism is 
consistent with the possibility that all people 
agree on basic moral principles (1989, p. 263). 
For the conceptual relativist, the issue of moral realism 
hinges on whether one may step outside moral grammar to de-
termine its warrant. Yet whether or not the application of 
(some) moral concepts is invariant, given that no objectivist 
moral epistemology is in the offing, one must be committed to 
relativism (anti-realism). The lack of an epistemological 
foundation for moral claims is, as should be apparent from 
what went earlier, not a flaw according to Arrington. We are 
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not doomed to moral skepticism. Instead it is the claims of 
the skeptic which are suspect. 
The moral realist, according to Arrington, is engaged 
in the old game of looking for epistemic warrant. The desire 
to identify that which is real with what is relative to ~n-
var~ant practices--practices whose non-existence is pragmati· 
cally incoherent··is the contemporary counterpart of 
Descartes' desire to treat as real only that whose existence 
is inconceivable. The moral realist believes that if one 
cannot act (talk, think, believe) otherwise in certain situa-
tions, then those specific ethical practices ought to be 
granted an objective status. 
The difference between Arrington and the moral realists 
becomes even more striking when we consider their respective 
stands on meta-ethical claims. For the realists, invariance 
provides the M!lrrant for saying something is real. According 
to Arrington this sort of ethical pronouncement would have to 
be considered nonsensical for precisely the reason that it is 
an attempt to go beyond the linguistic resources of the prac-
tice itself. Here it does not matter that descriptive real-
ists want to relativize objectivity to a form of life; the 
fact is that sentences like •Moral facts exist• or •Moral 
facts do not exist• play no role in the language-games of as-
cribing blame, value, etc. If one is told moral facts exist 
(or do not exist) upon inquiring whether John is really 
blameworthy, one would likely say: •but no such thing was in 
question.• One issue that will become more important below 
is whether Arrington can avoid a similar charge. 
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The fact that Arrington's conceptual relativism is com-
patible with the possibility that some moral practices are 
invariable while others may be variable enables it to accom-
modate a wide range of moral claims which vary according to 
degree to which they are susceptible to revision. Off hand 
it seems fairly obvious that some kind of distinction along 
these lines must be made by any adequate meta-ethical theory. 
For example, one is much more likely to revise one's belief 
that John is blameworthy than to revise one's belief that 
blameworthiness is something bad. In fact, we can imagine a 
realist attacking Arrington on the grounds that some sort of 
onto1og~ca1 difference must account for (or at least be en-
tailed by) the difference in the degree to which they are 
susceptible to revision. To Arrington's credit, he does pro-
vide such an account. 
Arrington distinguishes between eight classes of moral 
propositions (1989, pp. 302-303): 
1. Grammatical propositions which serve as basic 
moral principles. 
(a) •It is wrong to tell a lie." 
(b) •0ne ought to keep one's promises." 
(c) •one ought not to harm other people." 
(d) •It is wrong to treat others disrespectfully.• 
(e) •one must not take the life of an innocent per-
son." 
2. Grammatical propositions concerning the order 
of priority among basic principles. 
(a) •one ought to tell the truth unless doing so 
would cause grave harm to others." 
(b) •one ought to keep one's promises unless doing 
so would involve taking the life of an inno-
cent person.• 
3. Substantive moral principles. 
(a) •Premarital sex is wrong.• 
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(b) none ought to be patriotic.n 
(c) nMercy killing is wrong.• 
(d) •one ought to live a simple and frugal life." 
(e) •0ne ought to give a quarter of one's income to 
charity." 
4. Grammatical propositions converted into sub 
stantive moral principles. 
(a) none ought never to tell a lie." 
(b) •0ne ought always to keep one's promises,n 
(c) none should never kill another human 
being, in war, peace or self-defense.• 
5. Principles of moral permissibility. 
(a) •tt is morally permissible to let a de-
formed fetus die." 
(b) Suicide is morally permissible. 
6. Statements of nthe lesser evil." 
(a) •You ought to lie to her; otherwise she 
will be deeply hurt.n 
(b) n1 had to tell the truth, so I could not 
keep my promise.• 
7. Exceptions to moral principles. 
(a) n0ne ought always tell the truth, unless one is 
a prisoner of war.• 
(b) none ought to turn the other cheek, unless 
one's family honor is at stake." 
8. Particular moral judgments. 
(a) •You ought to pay him back." 
(b) n1t was wrong of you to cheat on him.• 
The items which make up this list vary according to their 
epistemological and semantic status. One immediately notices 
upon examining the list that meta-ethical propositions are 
nowhere to be found. That is because they are not to be as-
signed any epistemic or semantic role. 
According to Arrington, the most important division 
among the categories is that which holds between the first 
two and all the rest. The first two categories are said to 
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express nscsssBry truths, whereas all the rest are contingent 
(1989, p. 303). Perhaps, in order for Arrington to be loyal 
to his Wittgensteinian origins, it would be better for him to 
say that the distinction runs among those which are bs1d to 
be necessary and those bs1d to be contingent.) The defense 
of those comprising (3)-(9) will involve an appeal to those 
contained in (1) and (2). 
The propositions in (1) and (2) bear an important resem-
blance to what traditionally are referred to as analytic 
propositions, i.e., those which are true in virtue of the 
meanings of the words contained within them. Sentences like 
•A bachelor is an unmarried adult human male who is eligible 
for marriage• are true because the meaning of •bachelor• just 
is that of uunmarried adult human male who is eligible for 
marriage.• Analytic sentences are regarded by many philoso-
phers as necess~rily true, since their denial entails a con-
tradiction: to deny that a bachelor is an unmarried adult 
human male who is eligible for marriage, given what •bache-
lor• means, is tantamount to saying that a bachelor is not a 
bachelor. The person who utters such statements utters an 
absurdity. Charity, however, would have us assign to the 
person an ignorance of the meaning of the relevant term(s). 
Reflection upon when we actually do utter such sentences re-
veals that usually they are uttered in order to instruct 
someone concerning the meaning of a particular word. Because 
that is the typical function of these utterances, they may be 
referred to as gr4111B18t~ca1 propositions. The same function 
may be fulfilled with the formal mode equivalent in which the 
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fact that the utterance is about language itself becomes ap-
parent; one could say, for example, #The word 'bachelor' is 
used to refer to unmarried adult human males who are eligible 
for marriage." 
Arrington points out that calling these grammatical 
propositions should not be taken to mean that they are merely 
about language and nothing else (1989, p. 292). Nor should 
they be taken, as Katz believes, to express relations among 
Platonistically construed senses of expressions. Their prin-
cipal function is to prescribe action; specifically, they 
prescribe what can be said, but one must remember that, for 
Wittgenstein, our linguistic practices are not divorced from 
the rest of our lives. Our linguistic practices occur in 
concrete social and physical contexts. Our utterances are 
occasioned by events, including others' verbal behavior, 
which occur within such contexts; our own verbal behavior 
provides the context for others' utterances. What gramnati-
cal propositions do is provide an account of the context in 
which particular utterances may be made. Suppose we carry 
out the further formalizing of •A bachelor is an unmarried 
adult human male who is eligible for marriage•: •The word 
'bachelor' is used to refer to the very same thing to which 
'unmarried adult human male who is eligible for marriage' 
refers." We might paraphrase, saying: •The word 'bachelor' 
may be used in precisely those contexts in which 'unmarried 
adult human male who is eligible for marriage' may be used." 
(There may, however, be pragmatic principles like •Avoid 
wordiness in this context,, which may predominate.) 
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According to Arrington, utterances of the propositions 
contained in (1) an (2) fulfill this sort of function. For 
example, (la) conveys the infonnation that in a context in 
which one observes someone lying, or is to1d that someone is 
lying, one may say "It is wrong." The propositions in the 
second category provide the link to further actions. 
Presumably (2) might include (2c) "One ought to prevent or 
rectify wrongdoing unless doing so would cause hann to one-
self or others." Thus in a context in which one may say "It 
is wrong," one may do (and say) many other things as well, 
and what one does and says will become part of the context 
which occasions the actions and words of others. 
To fully appreciate Arrington's position it is necessary 
to consider the way in which acquiring a moral granmatical 
proposition contributes to our understanding of moral con-
cepts. The proposition (la) ,,It is wrong to tell a lie" is 
coJll)arable, Arrington says, to "Red is a color" (1989, p. 
283). One acquires one's concept of color, not first by 
being given a general definition (in tenns of genus and dif-
ferentia, for example) from which one deduces that red, 
green, yellow, etc. are colors. Rather one acquires the con-
cept color by being exposed to particular colors. 
Propositions like "Red is a color" serve to define both ,,red" 
and "color." The former is defined to the extent that its 
genus is stated. (No pretense is made to this being a defi-
nition in terms of genus anddifferentia.) The word "color" 
is defined to the extent that one type of color is specified. 
One might wonder what sanctions calling such propositions 
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def1n1t1ons. After all, they appear to be little more than 
ordinary predicative propositions. A useful antidote to this 
puzzlement is that one must bear in mind that we do not ac-
quire our concept of co1or by being given an analytical defi-
nition. We acquire our color vocabulary through ostensive 
definitions, thus •color is a determinable property and one 
that is defined through its determinants--color is red, yel-
low, green, blue, and so on• (1989, p. 283). 
Moral grammatical propositions serve as definitions in 
much the same way. One does not acquire moral concepts, like 
those of ob11g8t1on or wrongness, by first being given ana-
lytical definitions which are then used to deduce specifical-
ly what is obligatory or wrong. One acquires these moral 
concepts in the course of being trained what things are obli-
gatory and what things are wrong. When one is told that •one 
ought to keep one's promises• or •1t is wrong to tell a lie,• 
one is learning what keeping one's promises and telling lies 
are, but more importantly one is being provided with the de-
terminants of the determinable concepts of ob11gat1on and 
wrongdo1ng. Robert Milo, cited approvingly by Arrington 
(1989, pp. 283-284), puts the matter aptly: 
I do not see how anyone who claims to know what 
it means to say that it is mora11ywrong to do 
something can deny that an act's causing pain, in-
jury, or death to someone is at least 4 reason for 
judging it to be morally wrong. Indeed, it is 
terms of such criteria as these that people are 
taught the meaning of •morally wrong.• ... we are not 
first taught the meaning of •Morally wrong" and 
then taught that such acts are morally wrong; 
rather, such criteria define, for the ordinary per-
son, what it means to say that an act is morally 
wrong (1984, pp. 195-196). 
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We may refer to moral grammatical propositions as definitions 
in terms of criteria (a word borrowed. from Wittgenstein). 
What moral terms msan, and what our moral concepts are, is 
determined. by the sorts of things we count as fa11~ng under 
those concepts. And the sorts of things we count as falling 
under those concepts depends upon one's instruction and 
training. 
We are now in a position to see why Arrington's view is 
co111>atible both with the possibility that there are and that 
there are not universally held moral beliefs. Because of the 
way in which they are acquired, moral concepts are open-ended 
or fuzzy (1989, p. 284). Because the conditions under which 
individuals acquire their moral concepts may vary, so that 
their criteria for saying, for example, that something is 
obligatory may differ, individuals' moral concepts have the 
potential to be quite divergent. To the extent that persons 
acquire their moral concepts under similar conditions, their 
concepts will be similar. So whether moral standards are 
universal or variable depends upon the lives people live and 
the context in which they live them. Convergent ways of life 
make for co111I10n moral concepts and make basic moral agreement 
possible; divergent ways of life do the opposite. But what 
is important here is that one cannot milk from either vari-
ability or universality any kind of ontological reading of 
moral discourse. 
The open-ended nature of moral concepts gives rise to 
questions concerning to what extent granmatical propositions 
express necessary truths. They do not seem to enjoy the kind 
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of necessity typically attributed to analytical definitions. 
One could deny the truth of a gramnatical proposition without 
uttering a contradiction. Here I think Arrington has over-
stated his point, but not in any way detrimental to the view 
he espouses. To be true to his Wittgensteinian origins, 
Arrington must view nscsss~tyas a status conferred upon 
propositions by virtue of the epistemic and semantic role 
they play relative to other kinds of claim which arise within 
moral discourse. Granunatical propositions serve as the ref-
erence points by which more specific moral claims are judged 
as true or false. The truth of a grammatical proposition is 
never up for consideration. It is hs1d necessarily true. In 
a more cautious vein Arrington says, •The following kind of 
necessity attaches to these gramnatical propositions: we 
must subscribe to them if we are to participate in the moral 
way of life, and within the moral way of life their denial is 
incoherent• (1989, p. 275). One can utter the denial of a 
granmatical proposition, but in doing so one would be utter-
ing what would be deemed nonsensical: the context in which 
it is uttered just is one in which such denials have no use. 
This is not to say that in a different context the very same 
denial might not be meaningful: •God is good• might be a 
granmatical proposition in the context of a monastery, but it 
might not be one in the context of a pharmacology laboratory, 
where one is taught that only successful experiments are 
good. 
The first two classes of moral grammatical propositions 
must be distinguished from what Arrington refers to as sub-
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stantive moral principles. These are principles arrived at 
as a result of argument and decision (1989, p. 292). These 
claims may be defended by appealing to moral grarmnatical 
propositions as general premises. So, for example, the claim 
that #Premarital sex is wrong" might be defended by appealing 
to the grammatical proposition that Mit is wrong to treat 
others disrespectfully." Typically substantive moral princi-
ples include concepts learned after one has acquired. basic 
moral concepts. One does not typically acquire one's concept 
of wrongdo.ingaround the same time as one acquires the con-
cept of premarital sex. For this reason acceptance of sub-
stantive moral principles constitutes an extens.ion of one's 
moral knowledge. 
Some substantive moral principles do not include sophis-
ticated concepts such as those of prBlll,!lr.i til.l sex, piltr~·ot.ism, 
or mercy k.i.1.1.ing; some simply involve a further qualification 
of the existing gramna.tical proposition. In (4a), for exam-
ple, the moral knowledge of, say, a child to whom (upon 
. 
telling her first lie (la) was uttered) is extended. We can 
easily imagine (4a) being uttered to a child upon her second 
(and subsequent) telling of a lie: not only is it wrong to 
tell a lie (now), but it is a.lM11yswrong; one should never 
tell a lie. 
Principles of moral permissibility must be distinguished 
from the classes of propositions described so far. These, in 
general, share the form: MDoing xis neither obligatory nor 
wrong." Typically one is not tril~'nsd in what is morally per-
missible, nor is one brought to believe that something is 
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permissible on the basis of argument. More often than not, 
what is permissible receives neither praise nor blame. Thus 
permissibility moves in the empty contours of our grammatical 
and substantive principles. It is this dimension of our 
moral life which affords us the greatest freedom relative to 
the other members of our linguistic and moral conmunity; the 
other rules, in contrast, set and prescribe the conditions 
under which one is a member of the community. That princi-
ples of moral permissibility stand in this relation to the 
other principles gives Arrington's conceptual relativism a 
distinct advantage over forms of realism which would write 
principles of moral permissibility into the very nature of 
moral reality. To say that something is necessarily permis-
sible carries all the tension contained in the Sartrian view 
of humans as condemned. to be free. The view espoused by 
Arrington casts human freedom in a very different light. By 
effecting social change, by changing social practices, one 
may well alter what counts as permissible or otherwise. 
The last three sets of principles and judgments are jus-
tified by appealing to granmatical and substantive principles 
as well as to the nature of the circumstances in which they 
are uttered. For example, (Sa) might be justified by appeal-
ing to the granmatical proposition (lb) or the substantive 
principle (4b) a2ong r~th the facts concerning •you• and 
•him.• At this end of the spectrum the claims being made are 
highly contingent; (8a) may be true when spoken of one set of 
individuals but false when spoken of another set of individu-
als. 
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What gives Arrington•s conceptual relativism a decided 
advantage over other forms of anti-realism is the way in 
which it distinguishes between different kinds of moral 
claims. Our moral claims form a family whose members play no 
unifo:rm semantic and epistemic role. Grammatical proposi-
tions determine what RlifiY be (not what .is) true or false. 
They define the limits of moral sense for a given linguistic 
coI1111Unity insofar as their denial is a piece of nonsense. It 
is in reference to them that substantive moral principles and 
the more specific moral claims making up the last three cate-
gories may be judged true or false. Grammatical proposi-
tions, furthermore, define--by setting off in relief--what is 
morally permissible. In this way they dete:rmine what may 
sens.ib2ybe spoken of as permissible. 
If I have any objection to raise against Arrington it is 
that his view suffers from a certain inconsistency. The in-
consistency arises in the following manner. Notice that 
nowhere among the categories of moral propositions do meta-
ethical propositions occur. As noted earlier, this sort of 
account treats meta-ethical claims as nonsense. Yet 
Arrington declares himself a conceptual relativist. To de-
clare oneself as an anti-realist of a certain sort just ~s to 
proclaim a meta-ethical truth. How can Arrington consistent-
ly hold such a view when the view itself precludes the possi-
bility of doing so? 
I think Arrington is faced with the following dilenma. 
He must either relinquish his claim to be providing an ac-
count of the ontoiogical status of morality, or he must as-
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sign some legitimizing role to utterances of meta-ethical 
claims distinct from the role assigned to granmatical propo-
sitions (as that role is conceived by him) and from the other 
kinds of claims which make up our moral discourse. Clearly 
the second horn of this dileIIIM is the one more favorably 
seized upon. But it is not clear how that can be done within 
the confines of the present theory. If meta-ethical claims 
are meta-granmatical propositions, providing us as it were 
with a preface or a guide to understanding moral discourse, 
then grammatical propositions could not at all have the kind 
of status the theory confers upon them. They would turn out 
to be contingent upon propositions even more basic than them-
selves--propositions about their ontological interpretation. 
But the cornerstone of Arrington'& theory just is that gram-
matical propositions cannot be grounded in this way. 
I believe that what is essential to the theory can be 
saved, and that some kind of account can be given of meta-
ethical claims. What is required, in order to do this, is a 
modified view concerning the nature of ontological commitment 
and a certain de-cognitivizing of grammatical propositions. 
Blackburn's quasi-realism provides the solution. 
3. BLACKBURN 
This dissertation has wound a dialectical path towards 
Blackburn's position. I maintain that a view like 
Blackburn's is the inevitable outcome of any careful consid-
eration of the issues here described. The key to Blackburn's 
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theory is his conception of ontological coJl'lllitment. Thus far 
we have noted various approaches to this matter. Moore's di-
rect realism makes be.ing the ob,isct of consc.iousness or ,iudg-
mBnt the only criterion for ontological conunitment. Katz and 
the Quinean Naturalists build a criterion of ontological com-
mitment out of that ""1.ich II theory guant.if.iss over. 
Wittgensteinian realists like McDowell tie objectivity to 
thB can,nun.ity of hUR1t!111 rBsponse. What is the source of onto-
logical commitment for Arrington? It is difficult to say, 
but it appears that what he is doing is piecing together the 
most cohsrsnt theory by making discriminations among moral 
propositions; both the theory and the discriminations are 
supposed to do justice to our linguistic intuitions. The 
question Arrington would have us ask ourselves is: is the 
theory true tomy experiences? As members of, rather than 
purveyors of, our iooral linguistic community, we cannot have 
intuitions concerning meta-ethical claims, but we c11n con-
cerning all the rest. I hold, then, that Arrington'& crite-
rion of ontological commitment consists in being true to ths 
f11cts of one's sxpsr.isncr,. What all the views share in com-
mon is that ontological commitments issue in sets of be2.isfs 
concerning what is real. Such is not the case, or at least 
not necessarily the case, for Blackburn. For Blackburn one 
may have beliefs about what is real, but they are secondary, 
almost epiphenomenal, in stature. What is essential to onto-
logical conmitment is the stance one takes towards something, 
regardless of whether or not one is disposed. to say (or con-
sider oneself as believing that) the thing in question is 
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real. Ontological canmitment is to be understood as a set of 
dispositions which may or may not include dispositions to 
utter a particular proposition. Characterizing his view, he 
says: 
[I]t is not what you finish by saying, but how 
you manage to say it that matters. How many people 
think they can just announce themselves to be real-
ists or antirealists, as if all you have to do is 
put your hand on your heart and say, •1 really be-
lieve it!• (or, •r really don't•)? The way I treat 
the issue of realism denies that this kind of avow-
al helps the matter at all. The question is one of 
the best theory of this state of commitment, and 
reiterating it, even with a panoply of dignities--
truth, fact, perception, and the rest--is not to 
the point (1988, p. 363). 
Blackburn, we shall see, rejects the cognitivism inherent in 
Arrington's view. There is much that is cognizable, much 
which can be evaluated as true or false, but grannnatical 
propositions are not among them. Blackburn would reject 
Arrington's claim that these propositions are in some sense 
necessarily true. Instead the role these propositions play 
is secured by the fact that they are rarely uttered. When 
they are uttered they do not function as 8sssrt~ons. Rather 
they show the possibility of a particular stance. 
Blackburn is heavily influenced by Hume's projectivism. 
On this view, the moral and evaluative properties attributed 
to things are in actuality projections of our own sentiments. 
Our •emotions, reactions, attitudes [and] commendations• all 
have a bearing upon what properties we assign to a given 
thing (1984, p. 180). For this reason Hume and Blackburn are 
to be counted among the anti-realists. In certain respects 
Blackburn's Humean bearings make his approach similar to the 
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Wittgensteinians discussed so far; in other respects he dif-
fers from them. The similarity (which he bears even to real-
ists like McDowell) is principally a methodological one. It 
involves a connnitment to descr.ib.lng (to adhering to 
Wittgenstein's maxim to 1ook 8nd BBB) how moral judgments ac-
tually do arise. In this Blackburn, like many of the other 
philosophers examined, is committed to doing justice to the 
phenomenology of our moral life. This methodological simi-
larity, with Arrington at least, is very short-lived, as 
Blackburn develops an explanatory model of how moral judg-
ments are formed. The phenomenological facts are to be ex-
plained, not merely described.. Consequently, the manner in 
which Blackburn arrives at anti-realism is quite unlike the 
way a Wittgensteinian like Arrington arrives at it. The lat-
ter derives anti-realism directly from a dismissal of the 
possibility of providing moral claims with foundational epis-
temic warrant. Blackburn, on the other hand, derives anti-
realism from a consideration of the theoretical model which 
explains how moral judgments are formed. 
For Hume, one is never in a position to comport oneself 
toward the world (other people, objects, events, etc.) in a 
morally neutral way. Objects and events str.ikB us as rele-
vant, irrelevant, valuable or not, commendable or otherwise. 
The objects which comprise our world are, to use Hume's 
phrase, met by approbation or disapprobation on our parts. 
Our atti"tudes, emotions and the like contribute to the forma-
tion of our beliefs. As we investigate, acquire and pursue 
the implications of new beliefs about our world we encounter 
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additional facts about our environment which meets with our 
approval or disapproval. The process is cyclical, and both 
reason and sentiment fonn an essential part of it. Earlier, 
in considering McDowell, we discussed the relative roles of 
reason and sentiment in Hume's philosophy. Because the sen-
timents add a co1or~ng to the world, the moral and evaluative 
properties attributable to objects must be considered as less 
than intrinsic properties of the things themselves. 
Blackburn expands upon the basic tenets of Hume's theo-
ry. Consider the awfulness of a brutal murder. According to 
Blackburn, if one observes a brutal murder, one should count 
among the genuinely observable properties of the event, not 
only such physical features as one may observe, but its aw-
fulness as well. One does not, as it were, observe a set of 
physical events and then infer that they are awful or bad. 
Rather one is struck by the awfulness of the event, one sees 
chat something bad is occurring. To say that all this be-
longs to the observable properties of the event is not to say 
all equally enjoy mind-independent existence. Rather, they 
all belong to a description of ,mac one observes, what one is 
struck by. These are the properties one exper~ences the 
event as having, and thus they must not be discounted from 
the phenomenology of moral experience. 
A consideration of the event-as-experienced allows one 
to discriminate between explanatory properties and spread 
properties (1984, p. 180ff). Spread properties are those 
which subjects are prepar~ to observe in events as a result 
of their various emotions, sentiment, and attitudes. Perhaps 
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the event in question would not even have been observed (per-
haps the subject would have observed the nearby greenness of 
the lawn) had the subject not possessed the particular emo-
tions, sentiments and attitudes which set the particular 
event off as relevant and, indeed, 1110rthyof attention. 
These are referred to as sprsadproperties not only because 
they are spread or projected onto the event by the observer, 
but because their observation gives rise to beliefs as well 
as habits, emotions, sentiments and attitudes which rec?dythe 
subject for further observations; they partially define what 
the subject regards as relevant and worth consideration. To 
say that these properties are spread or projected upon the 
world is just to say that the subject comes to view the world 
as containing the possibility of relevantly similar and dis-
similar events. The subject acquires or modifies or relin-
quishes certain dispositions. The event, with all its awful-
ness, becomes a prototype with which to compare future 
events. 
In contrast to spread properties, there are explanatory 
properties which are not projected upon the situation. The 
physical characteristics of the participants are not project-
ed. Presumably neither is projected the motive which one im-
putes to the murderer to explain his or her behavior. Rather 
these are what elicit one's response, what make one f~nd the 
event awful or bad. One appeals to them in order to exp1a~n 
what occurred, as well as what occurred to one in observing 
the event. 
This theo.zymakes the moral and evaluative properties 
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less than objective. However, as Blackburn acknowledges, an 
adequate theory must accommodate the basic phenomena. In 
this case what must be explained is the fact that the spread 
properties, e.g., the 8Nfu1nessof an event, grip us so. Not 
only do we observe them, we observe them as the most relevant 
properties of the event. They are those features of the 
event which seem most real to us. That they seB/11 so real but 
are not afforded any such status by projectivism stands in 
need of explanation. 
In order for projectivism to be an adequate theory, the 
gulf between what is regarded as real from a theoretical 
standpoint and what is regarded as such from a natural, non-
theoretical standpoint must be bridged. Blackburn's guas~-
rea1~sm is just such an attempt. It strives to show how the 
ontological co:nmitments of the natural and theoretical stand-
points may be compatible. It does this, not by reducing the 
one to the other (i.e., by providing a theoretical link be-
tween the two vocabularies), but by providing an account of 
ontological conmitment itself. 
One is liable to think that the gulf is (or is nearly) 
unbridgeable if one holds to a Quinean view of ontological 
conunitment. That view has it that one is conunitted only to 
the existence of that which the best theories quantify over. 
If projectivism or any other meta-ethical theory is better 
able to explain and predict speakers' moral pronouncements 
better that the explanations offered by the speakers them-
selves (which might, for example, appeal to the property of 
awfulness rather than the 8ppear8nce of the property of aw-
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fulness), then the conmitments of that meta-ethical theory 
are to be preferred over those of the natural standpoint. We 
saw this criterion at work in our earlier consideration of 
Quine's views on ethics, which he labels as methodologically 
infirm. If the natural standpoint is to be regarded as theo-
retically sound, then that can only be if it is somehow re-
duced or translated into the vocabulary of the preferred the-
ory. Whether such a task could be accomplished is an issue 
that lies beyond the scope of this essay. For Blackburn that 
sort of project would be irrelevant, because ontological com-
mitment is not theoretical commitment. 
Realists and anti-realists who think ontological co:rrmit-
ment amounts to nothing more than theoretical conmitment, who 
think that a survey of their most rationally held beliefs can 
reveal what their ontological commitments are, are mistaken. 
For Blackburn our ontological commitments are to be under-
stood as stt!lnasswe take towards objects in our environment. 
Such stances involve sentiment as well as a cognitive ele-
ment. We ready ourselves to be struck by particular objects 
and events, and we are readied to respond to them in some way 
or other. For example, one can speak of a sunset receiving 
one's approbation. Given that one has such an experience, 
and given that she has a belief that the sun will set (again) 
produces a desire in her to see that beauty again. And it is 
the same case with our moral commitments. Our observation of 
a brutal murder gives rise to certain beliefs and emotions. 
The 8wfu1nsss of the situation grips us and we form (and re-
tain) certain beliefs and negative emotions about that event. 
171 
(One is reminded of Heidegger's description of Dasein as a 
pro,iected-pro,isct~onwhich discloses beings.) Our ontologi-
cal commitments take shape as •patterns of reaction" to the 
natural world (1984, p. 182). And, as suggested, it would be 
a mistake to think that the tenn •pattern of rtJ8ct~on" is 
meant to suggest nothing cognitive is at work in responding 
to one's environment. On the contrary, our stances •function 
to mediate the move from features of a situation to a reac-
tion, which in the appropriate circumstances will mean 
cho~ce' (1988, p. 363, emphasis added). Choices require be-
liefs concerning the relevant features of the environment, 
but they require preferences too; actions resulting from 
choice are motivated by emotions, attitudes, and so on. For 
this reason our stances may be described as conat~ve stances 
(1988, pp. 363 and 373). Ontological conmitments are more 
like marriage commitments than theoretical comnitments. They 
are entered into with desires which shape one's expectations 
concerning how one may affect and be affected by another. Of 
course w~th~n the standpoint of a marriage one does not view 
the charm of one's spouse as a projection of one's attitudes 
and emotions; rather, one f~nds one's spouse to be cha:aning. 
One expects to find this trait. One expects to respond to 
it. A marriage commitment is not simply a vow that is ut-
tered; it is, to carry the metaphor a bit further, something 
one eng8ges ~n, something one does or makes. Such is the 
case with ontological commitments, of which ethical conmit-
ments are a specific form. In a marriage commitment one 
readies oneself for a range of possible events (• .•. in sick-
172 
ness and in health ... "); ethical conmitments do likewise. We 
are readied for possible events which are good or bad, fair 
or unfair, pleasant or awful. And such ethical co:rmnitments 
are, in general, commitments to certain (shared) attitudes 
and beliefs. The important point is that all ontological 
cormti.tments are to be understood. from w~th~n a particular 
standpoint, as relative to the attitudes of the participants 
themselves. 
Why should we prefer this construal of the nature of on· 
tological commitment over that which identifies such conmit· 
ments with theoretical commitments? Blackburn's response to 
this question is deflationary. The question is motivated by 
a false conception of science and the theories that there 
ensue. The pract~ce of science includes methodologies (and 
techniques for evaluating methodologies), various research 
goals, and various forms of theories. Science includes cona· 
tive as well as cognitive elements. One's research goa1s, 
one's preferred methodology, what one regards as an adequate 
theory are all conative elements within science. The view 
that science's theoretical cormti.tments are molded by nothing 
but cognitive factors is itself a myth. Basically we are to 
view the scientist as a participant within a context which 
primes for particular attitudes (for example, towards ade· 
quate empirical investigation of hypotheses, sufficient con· 
sistency within the theory, etc.). The scientist's ontologi· 
cal conmitments are formed by a process identical to that 
which produces the conmitments of persons within the natural 
standpoint. 
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The apparent inconsistency between the ontological com-
mitments of a projectivist meta-ethics disappears if one 
bears in mind that such commitments are relative to contexts 
which prime for one or another set of attitudes. One's cona-
tive stance when working out a meta-ethical theory that will 
be found adequate to one's mentors or peers is quite differ-
ent than one's conative stance when observing a brutal murder 
or listening.to one's cha:aning spouse. If ontological com-
mitment is relative to a context, then there is no contradic-
tion in saying (from a theoretical standpoint) that the aw-
fulness of an event is projected, and from a natural or ethi-
cal standpoint) that an event 1s awful. We can understand 
why Blackburn refers to his view as quas1-rsa1~sm. It per-
mits talk of what is real, indeed it 1eg~t~m~zes such talk 
even in those cases in which one disagrees with it; but it 
insists that talk of what is real must be qualified in te:ans 
of the context in which it occurs, contexts which prime for 
one or another set of attitudes. 
Blackburn warns us that this conception of ontological 
commitment should not be taken to be an espousal of ethical 
relativism. Not only do we have preferences, we have beliefs 
about our preferences. We arB free to judge the practices 
which others engage in, which in the end form their sensibil-
ities and promulgate the practices themselves. The practices 
(verbal and nonverbal) which produce the sensibilities of a 
Nazi need not be regarded as immune to our criticism. As 
Blackburn points out (1984, p. 192), •not all sensibilities 
are admirable.• What makes certain sensibilities better than 
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others has to do with what we have come to expect from other 
people and this comes from our desire for the world to be of 
a certain sort. It is interesting how Nazis elicit such fer-
vent negative reactions in us. Audiences watching Nazi sym-
pathizers (on GeraJdo, for example) are moved to the verge of 
violence. This is no mere balking at a set of false beliefs. 
It is, rather, a reaction to a way of J~fs that is so incom-
patible with our own that it meets with thorough disapproba-
tion on our parts. As part.ic.ipants in a particular form of 
life, we have no choice; we just view the world in a certain 
way. We may provide justification for our digust, but justi-
fication would not be sought unless the disgust were felt. 
And as Blackburn points out, seeing the world in one way 
rather than another does not commit one necessarily to rela-
tivism: 
[O]ne last charge of the would-be realist is 
that a projectivist may inhabit a particular ethi-
cal boat, but he must know of the actual or poten-
tial existence of others; where,then, is the abso-
lute truth? The answer is that it is not anywhere 
than can be visible from this sideways, theoretical 
perspective. It is not that this perspective is 
illegitimate, but that it is not one adapted for 
finding ethical truth. It would be if such truth 
were natural truth, or consisted of the existence 
of states of affairs in the real world. That is 
the world seen from the viewpoint that sees differ-
ent and conflicting moral systems--but inevitably 
sees no truth in just one of them. To usee• the 
truth than wanton cruelty is wrong demands moraliz-
ing, stepping back into the boat, or putting back 
the lens of a sensibility.· But once that is done, 
there is nothing relativistic to say (1988, pp. 
371-372). 
Far from being relativistic, then, to the extent of sanction-
ing forms of life-and specific moral principles diametrically 
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opposed to our own, our moral sentiments and ethical commit-
ments are precisely what make our condemnation of the various 
practices in which Nazis engage possible. 
4. AN BXPRESSIVIST ACCOUNT OF MORAL 
GRAMMATICAL PROPOSITIONS 
Blackburn's analysis of ontological conmitment sheds 
considerable light upon the status of what Arrington de-
scribes as mora1 gr8J1111111t~ca1 propos~t~ons. Earlier we cred-
ited Arrington with introducing relevant semantic and epis-
temic distinctions among moral propositions. Doing so en-
ables him to articulate his brand of anti-realism while doing 
justice to important aspects of moral phenomenology (e.g., 
that some claims seem more intransigent than others, that 
what is held finn by some persons may vary from what is held 
fi:an by others, and so on). Arrington finds himself in trou-
ble inasmuch as his theory takes away the very possibility of 
mst!!U1.ingfu11y iflssert~ng that anti-realism is true. A quasi-
realist conception of ontological commitment can resolve this 
problem. And, so, in the end, I advocate a certain combina-
tion of Blackburn's and Arrington's positions. The solution 
requires that we (i) assimilate grammatical propositions to 
express~ons, or, more exactly, we assimilate tokens or par-
ticular utterances of these propositions to tokens which have 
an expressive rather than assertoric function, and (ii) ex-
hibit the relation between meta-ethical propositions and 
granmatical ones. The latter step legitimizes (in certain 
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contexts) utterances of meta-ethical propositions, while mak-
ing their assert~on or den~a1 nonsensical; this will sound 
paradoxical only to someone who thinks that all utterances 
must functions as assertions. 
One of Blackburn's most valuable insights is that very 
basic moral propositions, such as those we call moral gram-
matical propositions, are expressive of one's conative 
stance. I think, in fact, that Blackburn may well be ex-
pressing a view which, if not explicit, is at least implicit 
in the latter Wittgenstein's writings. What Arrington has 
neglected to realize is that tokens of grammatical proposi-
tions do not function as assertions. Rather than *looking 
and seeing• how grammatical propositions function, Arrington 
adheres to the Davidsonian idea that the meaning of a declar-
ative sentence is to be equated with its truth-conditions. 
Like Davidson, he believes that a declarative sentence is 
meaningful only if it is either true or false, which is to 
say that he accepts the principle of bivalence for all such 
sentences. He thinks that gramnatical propositions must have 
a truth-value, and since they are the most fundamental of 
moral propositions, they are to be afforded the status of 
necessary truths. A1though he does qua1ify his use of that 
term (1989, p. 275), he cannot resist its use, especially 
when contrasting the status of grammatical propositions with 
those of more specific moral claims which he regards as con-
t~ngent1ytrue. Arrington quite explicitly refers to gram-
matical propositions as having cognitive (or assertoric) con-
tent. Our acceptance of any moral grarranatical propositions 
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is not, 
... a blind, existential leap of faith. We who 
adopt it have our guideposts; we have our feet 
planted firmly on moral ground. This support is 
provided by the rules of moral granunar. They stand 
firm for us; they provide direction and guidance 
and ensure that we are occupying 100ral space. What 
they do not do is provide us with simple rules or 
principles that tell us what we always ought to do. 
They establish presumptions about what we should do 
in particular circumstances; they tell us what di 
mansions we must take into account if we are to ar 
rive at a moral judgment or take moral ac 
tion .... The rules of 100ral grammar tell us what to 
look for, but they do not tell us what we will find 
( 19 8 9, p • 27 9) • 
A grammatical proposition like uLying is wrong," on this ac-
count, .ident.if.ies a kind of action as morally relevant (name-
ly, lying). That is what Arrington means in saying that they 
define the d~mens.ions of 100rality for us. They do not pro-
vide us with specific guidance (unlike "I ought not lie"), 
but they do provide us with general information from which 
substantive and 100re specific 100ral principles may be de-
rived. Because grammatical propositions function as premises 
in the derivation of substantive and more specific 100ral 
principles, the truth of the latter is said to be contingent 
upon the truth of the former. 
The expressivist account of grammatical propositions 
calls into question the idea that utterances of such have 
cognitive content, at least that they have cognitive content 
in the sense that they have or assert truth conditions. The 
term grammatical propos.it.ion is itself rather misleading. It 
sounds as if specific utterances of sentences which share the 
syntactic form of uLying is wrong" are tokens of a certain 
type of linguistic expression, and that these types of lin-
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guistic expression are in4ividuated in terms of their propo-
sitional or cognitive content. Thus a token of •Lying is 
wrong" appears to express a content, which may be judged true 
or false. 
This is very misleading, as what are called gr8DlllatJca1 
propos.it.ions are really linguistic tokens used in concrete 
situations, not contents expressed by linguistic tokens. 
Arrington does acknowledge that the countenancing of graimnat-
ical propositions by Wittgenstein counts as a shift away from 
cognitivism's thesis that ultimate moral principles cannot be 
given epistemic warrant. But Arrington retains a cognitivist 
view of grammatical propositions to the extent that he be-
lieves they are endowed with cognitive content and provide 
epistemic warrant for more specific claims: they do not rest 
on an epistemic foundation, because they are themselves foun-
dational. This is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's view. 
Wittgenstein's was not a cognitivist even to this extent. 
What Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations pur-
port to show is that there is something which we call "fol-
lowing a rulew which is not cognitive in nature. His exami-
nation of the phenomena of following and obeying rules is in-
tended to show "that there is a way of grasping a rule which 
is not an JntsrprstatJon, but which is exhibited in what we 
call "obeying the rulew and •going against it" in actual 
cases (1958, sec. 201). If rule-following were always a cog-
nitive affair, then before one could follow a rule, that rule 
would have to be interpreted, which would presumably require 
that one say ,.,hat Js meant by the rule. One would be expect -
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ed to provide something of a translation. Such a view of 
rule-following is wrong on two counts. First, if true, it 
would generate an infinite regress. The translation would 
stand in need of an interpretation as well. That is why 
Wittgenstein says, that •any interpretation still hangs in 
the air along with what it supports, and cannot give it any 
support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine 
meaning• (1958, sec. 198). Second, the mere ability to in-
terpret a rule is not any kind of guarantee that someone un-
derstands the rule in question. Our criterion for whether 
someone understands and is capable of following a rule is 
their subsequent behavior. Whether or not someone can give 
an adequate translation of a rule is irrelevant unless their 
words link up somehow with their deeds. If Joe lies to a 
friend, that is a criterion for saying •Joe has done some· 
thing wrong,• as well as for saying •Joe is not following the 
rule (the substantive moral principle) that one ought never 
lie.• Subsequent lying on Joe's part and a failure on our 
parts to get Joe to stop lying would then be a criterion for 
saying •Joe does not understand lying is wrong.• It cannot 
be sufficient for Joe to be said to understand the moral 
grammatical proposition •Lying is wrong• that he be able to 
interpret or paraphrase it for us. He must behave a certain 
way, engage in some practices and not others. Consequently, 
maintaining that understanding grammatical propositions 
amounts to grasping a cognitive content is not compatible 
with Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. 
Arrington points out that moral granmatical propositions 
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do not give us spsc2f2cdirections in how to act but reveal 
the dimensions of moral life. This is, in a way, correct. 
As Levvis (1992, p. 72) points out, the utterance of a gram-
matical remark •is intended to elicit a response of a most 
general nature; their purpose is not to elicit any specific 
move within the language-game, but to get the person to take 
up the language-game in question.• But they do not do this 
by virtue of having some sort of cognitive content to grasp. 
This does not mean that grammatical propositions lack s60/t!ll1· 
t2cproperties entirely (indeed it is not even to deny that 
they may have--or may have attributed to them--some sort of 
cognitive content), but what it does mean is that what seman-
tic properties are essential are not those typically associ-
ated with having a truth-value. What is essential to a gram-
matical proposition is, not what it S8ys, but what it sho111S. 
The expressivist account to be articulated here comports 
with Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and 
Blackburn's quasi-realism, and it enables us to handle a 
range of sentences left unaccounted for (or accounted for in-
correctly) by Arrington. Consider: 
1. •rt is wrong to tell a lie. 
2. •It is true that it is wrong to tell a lie.• 
•rt is a fact that it is wrong to tell a lie.• 
3. •rt is necessarily true that it is wrong to 
tell a lie." 
•rt is necessarily a fact that it is wrong to 
tell a lie." 
4. •There are moral facts.• 
•There are no moral facts.• 
5. •Moral realism is true.• 
•Moral anti-realism is true.• 
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The sentences contained within (1) - (5) are typical of a range 
of sentences along a continuum ranging from (1) grarmnatical 
propositions to (5) meta-ethical propositions. Foremost is 
the account to be given of grammatical propositions. 
The claim that grammatical propositions express or show, 
rather than say something, should not be interpreted to mean 
that they simply reveal what is subjective. It would be 
wrong to interpret (1) along emotivist lines as nothing other 
than the expression of one's own emotion. That view leaves 
utterly mysterious how persons are able to conununicate any· 
thing whatsoever to an unsympathetic listener. The form of 
expressivism found in Wittgenstein makes the uttering of a 
granmatical proposition a kind of show. It shows or d~sp1ays 
the role an expression may (or may not) play within a lan-
guage-game. That is to say, it presents the listener with 
what might be regarded as a ft/Ork~ngprototyps of meaningful 
discourse which employs the expression. A practice (or a 
portion thereof) is displayed. And depending on the disposi· 
tions of the listener, the rule may or may not be understood; 
which is just to say that depending on the dispositions of 
the listener, the language-game or practice will or will not 
be taken up. 
Practices, unlike emotions, are public. 
pressed or shown is how to act, how to go on. 
Nhat is ex-
This point is 
easy enough to see in Wittgenstein, but it is easy to miss in 
Blackburn, since projectivism has it that what are projected 
are emotions, sentiments, attitudes, etc., which are all so 
subjective. It must be remembered, though, that for 
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Blackburn the projection of spread properties arises from and 
results in either the promulgation or modification of pt!it· 
terns of react~on to the natural world. Patterns of reaction 
are public events. They are identical to what we have called 
pract~ces, and Blackburn himself refers to them as "'4ys of 
.l~fB. 
It may be helpful to compare the sort of analysis which 
granmatical propositions will here receive with the disquota· 
tional analyses sometimes .offered of sentences of proposi· 
tional attitude (for example by Quine (1960), Davidson (1968) 
and Stich (1983). According to these theories, when one ut· 
ters a sentence of propositional attitude--•s believes that 
p"··one is showing what S 11/0u.ld St!lyunder certain circum· 
stances. Stich, for example, claims that when one says •s 
believes that p,• one is engaged in a little bit of play-act· 
ing (what Davidson, 1968, p. 104 refers to as st!lmB·say~ng). 
For Stich the •that" functions demonstratively, and every· 
thing prior to it constitutes a bit of stage-setting. The 
actual utterance of •p• in the course of the ascription is a 
kind of demonstration of what we might expect to hear corning 
out of S's mouth given the kind of state Sis in. It is as 
if the ascriber of the attitude were to stand before her au· 
dience and say: •sis in a state of mind which disposes him 
to do th~s: 'p' ." Stich's view is more complex than this, 
and its added complexity bears a relevance to our own meta· 
ethical considerations. The utterance of a propositional at· 
titude ascription does more than show what sort of thing is 
to expected of s. It also reveals what is to be expected of 
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the ascriber if she were situated or poised in the world in 
the same manner as S. The full analysis of the belief as-
cription is: Sis in a state such that, were I in that 
state, I would utter 'p'.• The point is that the play-acting 
at the end of the belief ascription expresses as much about 
the actor as it does about the person to whom the belief is 
ascribed. What it expresses about the actor is not something 
subjective, but how she would go on, what her pattern of re-
action would be, in a similar context. I suggest that gram-
matical propositions perform their function in a similar way. 
What an utterance of (1) does is show what would occur 
in the context of someone lying or in the context of someone 
saying that lying is occurring. someone who utters a gram-
matical proposition like (1) is saying, in effect •rn a con-
text in which lying occurs or someone says that lying is oc-
curring we act th~sway 'It is wrong•.• The sentence demon-
strates what sort of reaction to expect from the speaker in 
that kind of context. Preswnably the speaker intends to con-
vey not only that she engages in that specific kind of behav-
ior but in concordant behavior as well. On the reasonable 
assumption that the listener (a child perhaps) knows that no 
bit of behavior occurs in isolation, this shou1d be under-
stood. The grammatical remark indeed presents only a frag-
ment of what is to be expected, and subsequent instruction 
might require different or more detailed exhibitions (parents 
prone to spanking their children sometimes administer as a 
final warning a very light swat preceded by the sentence: 
•Th~s is what lying will get you•--again this is a demonstra-
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tion). 
This sort of analysis can be extended to many, if not 
all, of the sentences which Arrington includes among his sub-
stantive moral principles. It is hard to believe that these 
are all or always ~nfsrrsd from moral granmatical proposi-
tions. We can well imagine a parent encountering a child's 
sscond lie saying, -one ought never lie,• and this not being 
~nfsrrsd from anything; it would seem, on the contrary, that 
its utterance is necessitated by the child's failure to act 
in accord with the grammatical proposition. We can see this 
point more clearly if we bear in mind that -0ne ought never 
lie• or •Lying is always wrong• may well be rendered by con-
temporary canons of logic as •For any x, if xis an act of 
lying, then xis wrong.• For Wittgenstein, sentences con-
taining variables, like mathematical and logical formulae, do 
not perform an assertoric function; they show the form of 
what can be said. This is a a view which extends at least 
as far back as that philosopher's Tr8c-t8tus (1922). The 
point is that the antecedent can be taken to specify a type 
of context, and the consequent can be regarded as a d~sp28y 
of the sort of thing to be expected in that type of context. 
To paraphrase: •In a context in which xis an act of lying 
(or in which I am willing to say or accept as true 'xis an 
act of lying'), I am disposed to say 'xis wrong•.• It may be 
that Arrington is perfectly amenable to this analysis, since, 
for him, the earmark of a substantive moral principle is its 
semantic and epistemic role, rather than its syntactic form. 
But what I think is questionable concerning his distinction 
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between grammatical propositions and grammatical propositions 
converted into substantive moral principles is the process of 
conversion. He seems to think that if one starts with a 
granmatical proposition (perhaps in the instruction of a 
child) and converts the grammatical proposition into a sub· 
stantive one, then that is a cognitive process in which the 
granmatical proposition functions as a general premise. The 
analysis offered here construes such remarks as further in-
struction (training), since their utterance tends to follow 
upon a failure to grasp the rule. 
What shall we make of the sentences which comprise (2)? 
One objection to the analysis just offered might be that "It 
is true that it is wrong to tell a lie" is synonymous with 
(1). In that case utterances of (1) shou1dbe regarded as 
having a cognitive content with a determinable truth-value. 
From the opposite, emotivist camp, might be heard the objec· 
tion that prefixing "It is true that ... " to "it is wrong to 
tell a lie" merely adds emphasis, makes more emphatic, one's 
dislike of lying. 
Neither analysis need be accepted. The utterances in 
(2) can serve as grammatical remarks which, like (1), show 
one's propensity to act in a certain kind of way. The prin· 
ciple difference between Mit is wrong to tell a lie" and "It 
~s true that it is wrong to tell a lie" is that the latter 
expresses a different stance on one's part. If the former 
shows that one is ready to engage in certain behaviors, the 
latter shows that one is ready to engage in even more specif-
ic behaviors. Specifically, it shows that the speaker is 
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disposed. to trt!Nlt the grammatical remark as the kind of thing 
which is true, the kind of thing from which certain conclu-
sions can be drawn. It announces oneself as one who engages 
in the behavior typically associated with what is c1111ed 
•drawing inferences from propositions of this form." It an-
nounces one's readiness, in the presence of Joe's lying, to 
say •Joe is doing something wrong,• and one's readiness to 
act accordingly. 
It is not clear how the second sentence contained under 
(2), namely, "It is a fact that it is wrong to tell a lie" 
differs from the first. Perhaps in some contexts it is func-
tionally equivalent to the first in the pair. Perhaps an-
nouncing that •it is a fact ..• • shows both one's willingness 
to extend condenmation to the specific case and one's unwill-
ingness to tolerate dissension concerning the moral grmnmati-
cal proposition. From a purely cognitivist position this un-
willingness might look like an unwillingness to debate a 
basic assumption, and indeed parents do say to their children 
•took, I'm not going to debate the issue with you.• In con-
trast to a cognitivist interpretation, I would suggest that a 
child who asks, upon being reprimanded for repeatedly lying, 
•well, why shouldn't I?" has actually run up against the 
bounds of sense. The parent's reply of "It is just a fact 
that it is wrong to tell a lie" or "Look, I'm not going to 
debate the issue with you" sets a linguistic boundary; there 
is no language-game or practice within this context) which 
might be called qusst:ion:ing ,a,hstbsr ts11:ing 11 1:is :is ps.nn:is-
s:ib1s. What the parents shoa, is that the child can always 
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expect them to react in a similar negative way in like con-
texts. Essentially the child's question would go unanswered; 
this would be unsatisfying to the child, but, as Wittgenstein 
would say, the question that cannot be answered cannot (or, 
at least, should not} be asktK/ (1922, sec. 6.5). 
Utterances of sentences like (1) and (2) as well as of 
certain sentences that Arrington might include within his 
list of substantive moral principles play a role within a 
natural moral standpoint. They express a stance on the part 
of the speaker. They thus convey the ontological comnitments 
of those who adopt the stance and engage in certain prac-
tices; in the case of (1) the conmitment is to the wrongful-
ness of lying. 
The sentences contained under (3) are not, however, ut-
tered from within the natural ethical standpoint. They are 
pieces of philosophical parlance which, while expressive, ex-
press a confusion. The description of a grammatical proposi-
tion as a necessary truth results from the cognitivist im-
pulse to provide epistemological foundations for specific 
moral claims. As we have noted, Wittgenstein's rule-follow-
ing considerations run contrary to this impulse. Grammatical 
proposition have their status, not because they reflect a 
necessary truth, but because their acceptance (their remain-
ing unquestioned for the most part} makes our practices pos-
sible. In an CSrta~ntyWittgenstein expresses the point well 
by suggesting that granmatical propositions are Mlike the 
axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in 
the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement 
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around it determines its immobility (1969, sec. 152) . 33 The 
cognitivist will undoubtedly interpret this as a flaw in our 
moral discourse: that it cannot be grounded in the required 
way means our moral beliefs could all turn out to be false; 
the rational person is entitled to be skeptical about all 
moral claims. 
But this is mistaken. What the cognitivist requires in 
terms of justification just cannot exist. This suggests not 
so much a flaw in our moral discourse and practices general-
ly, but an incorrect picture of the nature of moral discourse 
on the part of the cognitivist. Moral grammatical proposi-
tions provide a point of reference with respect to which spe-
cific moral judgments may be determined to be true or false. 
But what shall serve as a reference point for determining 
whether a grammatical proposition is true? Is this not, as 
' 
Wittgenstein says (1958, sec. 217), the point at which we 
reach bedrock and our spade is turned? The question of the 
cognitivist in search of rational justification is like that 
of the child who asks uwell, why shouldn't I lie?" It is a 
piece of nonssnss, in that it is a question that has run up 
against the bounds of sense. To say that the question that 
cannot be answered cannot be asked is just to say that there 
is no context in which utterances of that sort have any role. 
The practice of 11sk.ing for .Just.if.ic11t.ion does not occur hsrs. 
Far from sanctioning skepticism with regard to ethics, 
these considerations establish the autonomy of ethics, or, as 
Arrington would say, the autonomy of our moral language 
(1989, p. 260). Moral grmmaatical propositions cannot be 
11 This passage is cited in Levvis (1992), p. 75. 
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given rational justification, but neither do they require it. 
It is the desire to provide it with a foundation that is non-
sensical; it is the expression of that desire which is non-
sensical. What this means is that we may s11fs.lyengage in 
such tasks as forming moral judgments, criticizing one anoth-
er, expressing our approval or dissaproval 11s M!!J do, that is 
without rational foundation. Morality answers to us, a point 
even Kant, the rationalist, acknowledges. But whereas Kant 
thought that moral rules must answer to our rationality, the 
viewpoint defended here insists that it must answer to our 
entire nature--to our emotions, attitudes, sentiments and 
sensibilities. As I said above, this does not mean that 
morality is subjective or that the disagreeable actions of 
others are i11111une from criticism. Those would be conclusions 
one might draw only if one regarded the lack of a foundation 
as a flaw. Rather, disagreements are cast in a different 
light. Their resolution cannot be viewed as merely the 
achieving of rational agreement. Instead, their resolution 
is an attunement of sensibilities, a sharing of a certain 
sort of stance. 
Let me conclude with an account of the kinds of sen-
tences contained in (4) and (5). These qualify as full-blown 
meta-ethical claims. It is here that Blackburn's quasi-real-
ism is of the greatest help. From within the natural ethical 
standpoint (4) and (5) are patent nonsense. From the stand-
point of one who engages in such 'linguistic' practices as 
ascribing value, registering dissapproval and offering con-
demnation, (4) and (5) have no use. Their utterance could 
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play no role w~th~n those language-games. Nevertheless the 
natural standpoint, the various stances we take up when not 
engaged in a theoretical examination of ordinary moral judg-
ments, has no monopoly on ontological coillllitment. In this 
respect Blackburn's view seems to diverge from 
Wittgenstein's. There OHybe some context in which utter-
ances of (4) and (5) do play a role; that context will not be 
the one in which someone must arrive at an ordinary normative 
judgment. (4) and (5) belong to the pronouncements of meta· 
ethics n8tura1~st~ca11yconstrued. As I point out below, 
they belong to the psychology, sociology, sociolinguistics of 
moral discourse. And if that is the case, then the autonomy 
of our moral discouse-·of m:,r42~ty--entails a continuity be· 
tween meta-ethics and the social sciences. That is of no 
small consequence, since it suggests there is no purely 
philosophical approach to meta-ethics. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
What this dissertation emphasizes is that moral language 
must be understood in its variety, in terms of its function 
within its general context. That means that certain ap-
proaches to the study of meta-ethics are more appropriate 
than others. Within meta-ethics, there has been a tradition-
al split between normative and descriptive approaches. The 
normative approach is concerned with telling us how we ought 
to think about moral issues. Kant's moral theory (1785) is 
one such example of that kind of approach. His Categorical 
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Imperative tells us how we should form moral judgments, that 
we should will our actions to be universalizable. The de· 
scriptive approach, though, lays out how we actually think 
about moral issues. Wittgensteinians in general follow this 
approach, It is not that I want to discount the normative 
approach, but the descriptive approach, in general does 
offer more insight into what we actually do as moral agents. 
In this. dissertation we moved from the least naturalis-
tic approaches, Moore's and Katz's theories, for example, to 
the more descriptive views, those of Platts, McDowell, 
Arrington and Blackburn. One of the chief criticisms of 
Moore's intuitionist view was that it could not adequately 
explain how we actually form false moral beliefs. Katz's 
theory was able to accomodate false moral beliefs yet his 
theory is nevertheless deficient in that he holds that pla-
tonic senses are the determinants of reference. As my dis-
sertation has shown, concrete linguistic tokens are better 
candidates for determinants of reference and the 
Wittgensteinian view defended in this dissertation does give 
prominence to the semantic role which linguistic tokens play. 
Platts and McDowell were both referred to as descriptive 
realists in that their accounts of morality demonstrated 
Wittgenstein's Mlook and see• approach. McDowell, in partic-
ular, emphasized that in order to understand the moral judg-
ments of a group one had to be able to understand their form 
of life or shared practices. Arrington, also a 
Wittgensteinian, though he appreciates the fact that such re-
alists do not view moral sentences in isolation and, as such, 
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have bridged the gap between moral discourse and practice, 
criticizes such realists on the grounds that their accounts 
of morality suffer from not making the necessary distinctions 
between different types of moral claims. Arrington points 
out that we must understand the logical and semantical 
relations found with our moral language if we are to have an 
adequate account of morality. His view is a description of 
these different relations, and as such, his view offers us 
deeper insight into what we are actually doing as moral 
agents. His theory, which he refers to as conceptual rela-
tivism, is an anti-realist view. But it is his reference to 
his theory t!IS t!I.Dt.i-rst!l1.ist which causes a problem. And the 
problem is this: to proclaim oneself to be an anti-realist 
just is to proclaim a meta-ethical truth. But Arrington's 
theory tells us that meta-ethical claims are nonsense in that 
they have no meaningful role to play within our moral lan-
guage games. 
As I suggested earlier, though, an account can be given 
of meta-ethical claims which can be added to the fundamental 
features of Arrington's theory. Such an account is found in 
Blackburn's expressivist view of morality. Blackburn's theo-
ry is to a great extent a Humean view of morality in that he 
emphasizes that our moral judgments involve a blend of cogni-
tion and sentiment. I believe that his view is the most de-
fensible in that his description of our moral behavior dis-
closes (alternate) ways of valuing by pointing out the exis-
tence of spread properties, that it is we who project our 
values onto the world. All in all, his quasi-realist view of 
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the nature of morality best legitimizes the descriptive ap-
proach. 
This is not the end of the story, though. The descrip-
tive approach has offered us greater insight into how it is 
that we make the moral judgments we do and, as a result, has 
shown that meta-ethics should now be viewed as an aspect of 
social science, but there is certainly more work to be done. 
This approach, then, points to further research that is not 
within the scope of this dissertation. The type of research 
I have in mind includes investigations of roles within legal 
contexts, analyses of interactions between children (as found 
in Gilligan's A D~fferent Vo~ce), as well as other socio-lin-
guistic projects. The purpose behind such research, then, is 
to give us more knowledge about ourselves so that we will be 
able to ask ourselves whether the moral values we hold 
presently are ones that we should continue to hold. The de-
scriptive approach, then, allows us to better formulate our 
moral viewpoints. It makes us consider whether the values we 
presently have are ones we should want to inculcate among our 
people. 
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